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A tradition of the criticism of modernity 
 
Nowadays, moviegoers are very familiar with prison dramas. These stories are 
exciting because the hero has to be strong in the interest of justice and truth in a world 
where there is no law to implement justice. The ever-innocent hero in these stories 
finds himself in a world where there is no law, where force alone organizes human 
relations. Among prisoners there is no consensus, common sense, or intersubjective 
norms which could control the acts of individuals and decide their conflicts apart from 
eternal struggle. While the prisoners’ world is so chaotic, it is also very strictly 
organized and conditioned by means of walls and cages, a detailed time-table and by 
the fact that their spatial movements are strictly regulated. However, this is not carried 
out in a normative way. The walls and iron cages define conditions without 
necessitating any obedience - the personal ethical problem of obedience does not 
emerge here. The walls and cages represent a kind of force for people they sorround, 
and from their point of view these are arbitrary. These walls and cages are not 
legitimate among prisoners, in as much as they control people without reference to 
their normative-ethical imagination, because, as I have mentioned, the world of 
prisoners lacks any norms. This world is chaotic without a sense of justice and self-
control, so the only effective controlling agencies for sinners cannot be legitimate and 
non-normative at the same time. In these stories there are two kinds of arbitrariness or 
forces: one among the prisoners, the other from outside, and the two create conditions 
of eternal chaotic struggle. Probably a good example for this paradox is the image of 
the market. On the one hand people refer to it as a field of struggle among unlimited 
self-interests, where force is the only relevant factor (this picture is rather far from the 
premodern view on ‘fair’ which means - up to now - mutuality, the ethics of Gospel 
(Mathew 17. ); but on the other hand market is seen as something that operates under 
strict, ‘objective’ rules and laws which are independent of the will or self-interest of 
agents. 
Too much or too little control, and control in general, that is, the problem of 
order and freedom is one the oldest problems in social and political thinking.  My 
supposition in this paper is that there is not only one kind of control - an idea opposed 
to the originally Whiggish view of modern history as progress in the direction of more 
freedom and less control. The paradoxical idea of too much control and too much 
freedom at the same time is rather modern, at least it is a paradox which became 
dominant in the critique of modernity after the French and industrial revolutions. Both 
historical events questioned the existing controls in social life and focused attention 
on the possibility of the re-creation of new kinds of control. It has been widely 
referred to as the phenomenon of decline of religion, old and established customs and 
morality. (A clear example is the notion of the market: on the one hand, the market is 
seen as a field of eternal conflicts between money-minded people, while on the other 
hand, the market is thought to be governed by strict iron laws of economics.) But even 
if the emergence of modernity created new problems, the answers were to be found in 
the traditional ideas and concepts. I am going to illustrate this paradoxical critique of 
modernity by means of a few significant authors. 
The social paradox (sociodox) of Chaotic Prison seems to be the result of the 
demolition and evaporation of norms and laws as well as the adherence to them. This 
sociodox, the coexistence of chaos and despotism, is rather typical in modernity, the 
age after the industrial and political revolutions. The notion suggests that neither 
people nor governors are bound by any limits. Somehow, there is too much libero 
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arbitrio, and, at the same time, it does not exist any more. Those thinkers who were 
sensitive only to one side of this sociodox, wanted either liberation or order. 
According to these images there is chaos or anarchy and defencelessness, serfdom; the 
same world, however, is perceived as uniform, homogeneous, systematic and 
despotic. Both despotism and chaos lack any norms, in both states of human world 
there is only will (the will of one or the wills of many) and it is the strength of will 
which determines everything. Neither despots nor anomic people acknowledge any 
limitations above their arbitrary will. In this sociodox, the peculiarity of modernity is 
that despotism (omnipotent over-control) coexists with chaos and ungovernability 
(impotence, and chronic disobedience and conflicts among individuals). Of course, 
the problems of too much and too little control, order and freedom have a long history 
in our culture. But this sociodox, an image which connects the notions of too much 
and too little control and interprets them not as alternative but as inherently related 
phenomena, is rather modern. The French and the industrial revolutions questioned 
the traditional controls and thematized the problem of their recreation or the 
implementation of new kinds of control. However, even if there are new problems, 
these are experienced mainly in terms of old notions. In this paper I try to illustrate 
this critique of modernity via some of its influential representatives. 
   The origin of the image of Chaotic Prison can be found partly in Plato’s texts 
and partly in the Exodus, two texts which are the sources of most of our common 
ideas. Plato did not really favour democracy, but he hated despotism even more. His 
main criticism of democracy was that it resulted necessarily in despotism. I will not 
try to provide a thorough-going analysis of Plato’s text, rather turn to his description 
of democracy, where he points out such vices as money-minded thinking, uninhibited 
wishes, and the loss of the sense of moderation. „And he lives on, yielding day by day 
to the desire at hand. At one time he drinks heavily to the accompaniment of the flute, 
at another he drinks only water and is wasting away; at one time he goes in for 
physical exercise, then again he does nothing and cares for nothing; at times he 
pretends to spend his time on philosophy; often he takes part in public affairs; he then 
leaps up from his seat and says and does whatever comes into his mind; and if he 
happens to admire military men, he is carried in that direction, if moneyed men, he 
turns to making money; there is no plan or discipline in his life but he calls it pleasant, 
free and blessed, and he follows it throughout his time.”1 „And you know that in the 
end they take no notice of the laws, written or unwritten, in order that there should in 
no sense be a master over them.”2 The „spirit of anarchy” and „exaggerated liberty” 
lead democracy  necessarily into the serfdom of despotism, because people start to 
look for certainty. Thus, limitlessness is connected to despotism and serfdom; for 
Plato the two poles are opposite to each other only in logic, but not in social practice, 
which is not logical. Whilst in Plato’s description there is a chronological succession 
between chaos and despotism, in the Exodus serfdom and immorality exist together. 
Before the Exodus, the Jews lived in serfdom, they lived under the despotism of 
pharaohs. However, the Jews were morally corrupt, they had idols and foreign gods. 
The promise of Canaan was not only a promise of collective freedom, a life without 
serfdom, but also of a moral upgrading. Obedience to divine law liberates the people 
from worldly power because by adhering to this law they find peace and harmony 
without any necessity for a system of coercion to ensure peaceful cooperation.  
The two phenomena are connected - freedom and true morality, despotism and 
immorality. Augustine spread the idea in Christian thinking that, as a result of original 
sin, the lack of true faith and morality are necessarily connected to arbitrary power or 
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coercion. From the point of view of the present paper, this image of civitas terrena is 
highly important. In the civitas terrena the original sin results in vain, wilful, self-
interested people who are necessarily in conflict with each other and only arbitrary 
force may implement some, relative peace among people. Since there is no morality 
among people in the civitas terrena, this power is necessarily arbitrary and cannot be 
morally legitimated. It is meaningless to think of morally conditioned power when 
people are an immoral mob. In this social setting the controlling agency cannot 
depend on the approval of individuals. The citizens of the City of man, civitas terrena, 
can approve only sinful things, thus their control cannot and should not result from 
their will. In order that those corrupted individuals can coexist only a despotic power 
can control and oppress their licentiousness for the sake of relative peace. The 
solution is true faith and the love of God, which create real peace among people, and 
in this case - if man is obedient to God - people do not need any human power. The 
more people can live peacefully without outer controlling agency, the less they need a 
despotic power. It is an important point for us that in Augustine’s thinking there is 
only one kind of faith, one proper love. Sin and sinful self-love are not other kinds of 
human attitude, but the lack of the real and true one. Everything that exists is a 
creation of God, and God cannot be the creator of sins. So the civitas terrena is not 
another kind of society, another order, but the lack of society and order. There is only 
one type of society, the civitas Dei. So the world of chaotic wills and despotic power 
is not another order or society, but the absence of social order. Perhaps I do not have 
to emphasise how critical this Augustinian view of society is. Its critical potency 
describes the normative image of the City of God as the only real society. In any other 
case, power is arbitrary and despotic, independent of any norms the subjects might 
have. The idea of civitas terrena is too close to the Chaotic Prison to suppose this 
similarity is merely accidental. 
The paradox of Chaotic Prison was used rather often to criticize modernity, so 
this idea is not only normative, and therefore critical, but it is anti-modernist. Edmund 
Burke was one of first who used this illuminating paradox to criticise modernity, that 
is, the social results of the French revolution. He characterized the French state and 
society (that is, the collapse of society in revolution) as a state in which there were too 
strong controls (the new ones) and too weak controls (the old ones). This paradoxical 
view was connected to his deep conviction that society and control cannot be created 
rationally, and that both social relations and control are non-rational. Burke wrote that 
individual actions, behaviour became arbitrary, confused on the interpersonal level, 
therefore life was experienced as chaotic on this level; on the other hand, the 
government concentrated an enormous amount of power, but because of the lack of 
obedience, the government was able to control people by means of the continuous 
presence of force.  Such people are apt to break laws and rules as soon as the guards 
look the other way. On the interpersonal level people are amoral and wilful, and they 
do what they want. And the same „mob” attitude characterizes the revolutionary 
government - it is not limited by divine law, governors do what they want. On both 
levels, force, coercion alone may organize human relations. There are too many rules 
and limits, but, at the same time, there are no rules and limits. From this point of view 
the question is not whether there is natural law or not; for Burke, the important point 
is that in former times people assumed that natural law existed and adjusted their 
actions to this supposed law which was embedded in tradition. So the natural law was 
taken for granted in tradition. 
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Burke refused the atheism of radicals as dangerous to society, because for him 
atheism was connected to individualism. „In the mean time a system of French 
conspiracy is gaining ground in every country. This system happening to be founded 
on principles the most delusive indeed, but the most flattering to the natural 
propensities of the unthinking multitude… A predominant inclination towards it 
appears in all those who have no religion, when otherwise their disposition leads them 
to be advocated even for despotism.”3 The radicals have a twofold character: they are 
immoral and they harm natural law because of their blind faith in their own reason, 
therefore they endanger the very existence of society. Revolutionary politics were 
over- and under-moralised: independent of and even in opposition to traditional 
morality and religion, in eliminating traditional morality and life they eliminated the 
sources of obedience and the limits of power; at the same time, in its efforts to spread 
the perfect morality and religion, this politics represented a new kind of despotism. 
Burke depicted the revolutionary politics and its results as anarchic and despotic. The 
consequence of a politics which aims to reconstruct society is not the creation of a 
new order, or a new society, but rather the end of any society or order, and the end of 
freedom which supposed the existence of society and order. „They have found their 
punishment in their success.”4 If power goes beyond the barrier, it overturns and 
destroys itself.5 Many „even in France, have been made sick of their theories by their 
very success in realizing them.” 6  
In the description of the new world there are two opposing categories: chaos 
and too little freedom. This world is chaotic and despotic at the same time: „people at 
once in bondage and confusion”.7 And this new world stems from the original sin:  
„It’s spirit lies deep in the corruptions of our common nature.”8 The rationalized state 
is both more and less efficient than the earlier state. Only those people can be ruled 
who are apt to be obedient, and the means of revolution are not sufficient to form the 
habit of obedience. In Jacobinism, bonds cannot remain stable and certain, and amidst 
social and political uncertainty and limitlessness there is only one measure for 
everything: self-interest. „That what was done in France was a wild attempt to 
methodize anarchy; to perpetuate and fix disorder. That it was a foul, impious, 
monstrous thing, wholly out of the course of moral nature.”9 Violent politics is the 
only possible form of politics in chaos which is the very result of rational plan for 
social reconstruction. 
The new world is not only chaotic but also despotic and violent, and these 
characteristics are much worse than in the case of any previous political power. 
According to Burke, after the revolution, power remains but in a new and 
irresponsible form, more violent, without limits and often concealed. „It is to delude 
ourselves to consider the state of France, since their Revolution, as a state of Anarchy, 
it is something far worse. Anarchy it is, undoubtedly, if compared with Government 
pursuing the peace, order, morals and prosperity of the People. But regarding only the 
power, that has really guided from the day of the Revolution to this time, it has been 
of all Governments the most absolute, despotic and despotic, and effective, that has 
hitherto appeared on earth.. Their state is not an Anarchy, but a series of short-lived 
Tyrannies.. France has no public; it is the only nation I ever heard of, where the people 
are absolutely slaves, in the fullest sense, in all affairs public and private, great and 
small, even down to the minutest and most recondite parts of their household 
concerns.”10 „Individuality is left out of their scheme of Government. The state is all 
in all. Every thing is referred to the production of force; afterwards every thing is 
trusted to the use of it. It is military in it’s principle, in it’s maxims, in it’s spirit, and 
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in all it’s movements. The state has dominion over minds by proselytism, over bodies 
by arms... France has, since the accomplishment of the Revolution, a complete unity 
in it’s direction. It has destroyed every resource of the State, which depends upon 
opinion and the good-will of individuals. The riches of convention disappear… the 
command over what remains is complete and absolute.”11 Revolutionary politics 
militarized political life demanding greater sacrifices from citizens citing the dangers, 
besieged situation and permanent state of emergency. This new power is „the display 
of inconsiderate and presumptuous, because unresisted and irresistible, authority”.12 
This power does not win obedience from the affections of people but it forces them 
and is based on their fear.13 „Troops prevailed over the Citizens… Twenty thousand 
regular Troops garrison Paris. Thus a complete Military Government is formed. It has 
strength, and it may count on the stability of that kind of power. Every other ground of 
stability, but from military force and terror, is clean out of the question… The whole 
of their Government, in its origination, in its continuance, in all its actions, and in all 
its resources, is force; and nothing but force. A forced constitution, a forced election, a 
forced subsistence, a forced requisition of soldiers, a forced loan of money.”14 The 
common character of chaos and despotism is that both are opposite to the recognition 
of divine, or natural, or whatever kinds of transcendental limits independent of the 
will of individuals. The evaporation of these limits creates chaos in everyday life and 
despotism in public life.  The only alternative to society based on customs, traditions, 
habits is the anarchistic, rebellious one which is under the coercion of military or 
economic power. „Kings will be tyrants from the policy when subjects are rebels from 
the principle.”15  The new despotism emerges necessarily because, trying to 
reconstruct a new and perfect society, revolutionaries ruined the old one and melted 
people into a chaotic and turbulent mass. The result was not a new order, but the lack 
of any order and society, where power is necessarily despotic, that is, outside the 
control of citizens. The „will to power” is the only motive of the mob as well as 
politicians, both groups are the same: they are without any sense of limits beyond their 
will. The radicals „will find themselves engaged in a civil war with those whose cause 
they maintain.”16 The paradoxical description of revolutionary France was connected 
in Burke’s case to a critique of rationalism. Rationalism is per definitionem in conflict 
with society, because the Cartesian ratio, whatever it is, opposes existing traditions, 
prejudices, lifeworld, and political rationalism tries to transform the social setting in 
accordance with abstractions alien to existing society. The Humean critique of 
rationalism was widened by Burke, who emphasized that political rationalism not only 
eliminated existing society and obedience, but, in this way unintendedly, undermined 
its own normative power. The point was for him that there was only one kind of 
normative power and obedience, and they were rooted in tradition. Rationalism on the 
other hand hopes that control has other possible methods which differ from the 
normative one and require neither coercion nor obedience. However, Burke 
emphasized the vanity of this hope. The result of political rationalism is that when the 
institutions, traditions, religion, habits - that is, society - limit and support the power 
at the same time, the only possible way of control is the limitless and uncontrollable 
force: „you have industriously destroyed all the opinions and prejudices and, as far as 
in you lay, all the instincts which support government. Therefore, the moment any 
difference arises between your National Assembly and any part of the nation, you 
must have recourse to force. Nothing else is left to you, or rather you have left nothing 
else to yourselves.”17; „On the scheme of this barbarous philosophy, which is the 
offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings, and which is as void of solid 
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wisdom as it is destitute of all taste and elegance, laws are to be supported only by 
their own terrors and by the concern which each individual may find in them from his 
own private interests.. These public affections, combined with manners, are required 
sometimes as supplements, sometimes as correctives, always as aids to law.”18 The 
necessary result, originating from the nature of society, is not government but force. 
Tradition is the sedimentation of the wisdom rooted in our ancestors’ experience, so 
the wisdom embedded in tradition may inform the long-term effects and side-effects 
of actions; tradition limits the human mind and activity in terms of these effects not 
evident for atomized minds. This intersubjective wisdom, measures are only partly 
conscious and not systematized, but they are „natural”, that is, taken for granted by 
their owners. Montaigne and Hume spread the notion of the importance of custom in 
social life, and Burke re-emphasized that the main characteristic of customwas its 
origin in the continuous past of social life.19 The significance of the concept of 
tradition - lifeworld was that it replaced the concept of sociability as an explanatory 
idea of social integration. The idea of tradition - lifeworld is inherently normative, 
critical: if sociability is a natural characteristic of human beings, the implication is that 
they will live in society forever. But if social existence is a result of intersubjective, 
common knowledge rooted in the past, society will receive a normative meaning: the 
non-historical society, any kinds of plan to reconstruct society is meaningless and 
harmful. After the collapse of this tradition - lifeworld, the coexistence of human 
beings is possible, but it is not society with its self-organizing and self-sustaining 
intersubjective meanings. The several descriptions of modernity, whether they are 
critical or not, agree that tradition is fading away, but on the other hand, a stronger and 
non-personal dependency and control is emerging. For Burke, tradition was not a 
formal notion, an eternal phenomenon, but rather a way of thinking and form of 
human relations that was not modern. 
For Burke, order was an important condition of true freedom, but he thought 
that order that was consciously created rather than having emerged historically was 
impossible, and the experiment to create such order to be a monster, „an opinion at 
once new and persecuting is a monster.”20 The order without historical precedent 
instituted by revolutionaries or rulers is ab ovo alien to people and coercive. A new 
power is never limited, because it is new. Limitation is not a value in itself, only the 
historically emerging and taken-for-granted limits. The intentionally introduced new 
controls and limits refer to ratio in opposition to existing tradition. And this new 
power is a dictatorship because it does not acknowledge any limiting law or morality 
above itself; the new power tries to create and introduce laws, rather than to 
accommodate itself to the existing ones. 
The best follower of Burke was a continental author, Alexis de Tocqueville. 
Tocqueville depicted the same picture of Chaotic Prison in a somewhat different 
context. The chaotic prison for Tocqueville was not a consequence of the activity of 
sinful radicals, but the result of the necessary democratizing tendency in Western 
societies. Practically, Tocqueville was more pessimistic than his tutor, but both of 
them described modernity in a critical way through this paradoxical picture. „It cannot 
be absolutely or generally affirmed that the greatest danger of the present age is 
license or tyranny, anarchy or despotism. Both are equally to be feared; and the one 
may proceed as easily as the other from one and the same cause: namely, that general 
apathy which is the consequence of individualism.”21 „The principle of equality, 
which makes men independent of each other, gives them a habit and a taste for 
following in their private actions no other guide than their own will.. disorder must 
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instantly reach its utmost pitch and that, every man drawing aside in a different 
direction, tha fabric of society must at once crumble away.. For the principle of 
equality begets two tendencies: the one leads men straight to independence and may 
suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other conducts them by a longer, more secret, 
but more certain road to servitude.”22 The explanation of this sociodox is that people 
in a democracy behave and think in the same way, same style, they become 
homogeneous, but nonetheless remain unpredictable in everyday life. 
In Tocqueville's description, the American way of thinking is rationalist and 
individualist - individuals do not trust anybody. This „heterogeneous and agitated 
mass”23 ruined tradition and authority, so these people - characterized by „envy, 
hatred, uncharitableness, pride and exaggerated self-confidence" - mistrust the 
judgement of one another. „Everyone then attempts to be his own sufficient guide... 
Thus that independence of mind which equality supposes to exist is never so great, 
never appears so excessive...”24 This voluntarist individuality is connected to the 
elimination of traditions and authority as well as to the tyranny of public opinion. For 
Tocqueville, as for Burke, tradition was somehow the embodiment of eternal law of 
God. So a rebel against tradition is also a rebel against God. „What force can there be 
in the customs of a country which has changed, and is still perpetually changing, its 
aspect, in which every act of tyranny already has a precedent and every crime and 
example, on which there is nothing so old that its antiquity can save it from 
destruction, and nothing so unparalleled that its novelty can prevent it from being 
done?... What strength can even public opinion have retained when no twenty persons 
are connected by a common tie, when not a man, nor a family, nor chartered 
corporation, nor class, nor free institution, has the power of representing or exerting 
that opinion, and when every citizen, being equally weak, equally poor, and equally 
isolated, has only his personal importance to oppose to the organized force of the 
government?”25; „In the age of equality all men are independent of each other, 
isolated, and weak.” 26 The loss of tradition is the loss of rules, limitations, and such 
loss results in unpredictable, that is, meaningless actions. „every man, at his own will 
and pleasure, forsakes one portion of his forefathers’ creed and retains another; so 
that, amid so many arbitrary measures, no common rule can ever be established, and it 
is almost impossible to predict which actions will be held in honor and which will be 
thought disgraceful.”27 Democracy progresses amongst ruins that are its own 
creations, and it „constantly advanced in the midst of the disorders and the agitations 
of a conflict.. hence arises the strange confusion.”28  
The chaotic effects of democracy strangely oppose Tocqueville’s other, oft-
quoted view of democracy in which the emphasis is on the tyranny of public opinion 
over individuals and on the homogeneity of individuals’ mind. „It seems at first sight 
as if all the minds of the Americans were formed upon  one model, so accurately do 
they follow the same route.”29 Whilst every individual insists desperately on the 
freedom of thought, democracy makes it impossible by means of the equality of life 
conditions. Democracy controls individuals by these conditions and much less by 
normativity. „In democrarcy... all men are alike and do things pretty nearly alike... 
men and things are always changing, but it is monotonous because all these changes 
are alike.”30; „It is the vehemence  of their desires... perturbs their minds, but 
disciplines their lives.”31For Tocqueville, the expressive, romantic individual is not 
the alternative of the tyranny of democracy, but these are correlated phenomena, two 
sides of the sociodox of modern democracy. The problem with democracy is the lack 
of limits and the lack of the sense of limits. „it may be asked what we have adopted in 
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the place of those institutions, those ideas, and those customs of our forefathers which 
we have abandoned. The spell of royalty is broken, but it has not been succeeded by 
the majesty of the laws. The people have learned to despise all authority, but they still 
fear it, and fear now extorts more than was formerly paid from reverence and love... 
we have destroyed those individual powers which were able, single-handed, to cope 
with tyranny.”32 In the state of equality and weakness, force is seen by everyone as 
„the only argument for the present and the only guarantee for the future.”33 
Democracy is worse than what went before. Of course, a lot of authors wrote about 
the elimination of good old rules, morality, etc., and the lack of any new ones in the 
present. The modernists typically hope that they can create or detect new rules, 
morality, or a new kind of social control in the place of any morality. But, on the other 
hand, since Burke, we have become familiar with the notion that mind, tradition, 
lifeworld cannot be created rationally and intentionally. These important phenomena 
of social life are unintended results of the activity of many people and generations, 
and if there is an intention behind their emergence, it is the „invisible hand” of 
Providence. 
In spite of the above, democracy can exist in America, because - besides the 
self-governing townships - there is a common religion which limits individuals. 
Religion supports democracy by means of the limitation of thinking. These limits are 
not arbitrary, according to Tocqueville, but true, whilst the forced limits of public 
opinion over the individual mind are arbitrary. „Thus, while the law permits the 
Americans to do what they please, religion prevents them from conceiving, and 
forbids them to commit, what is rash or unjust.”34 Liberty especially needs religion, 
because in despotism there is a political control, but in liberty it is replaced by 
religious morality. „Religion is much more necessary in the republic which they set 
forth in glowing colors than in the monarchy which they attack; it is more needed in 
democratic republic than in any others. How it is possible that society should escape 
destruction if the moral tie is not strengthened in proportion as the political tie is 
relaxed?”35 As in Biblical thinking, man has to be obedient to God (as in Paradise) or 
to another man. Liberty and order can exist side by side, if (the true) religious morality 
governs individuals. But if this morality evaporates, public opinion and bureaucracy 
replace it, and there will be too much control and too little order, too much liberty and 
the absence of liberty. „But what now remains of those barriers which formerly 
arrested tyranny? Since religion has lost its empire over the souls of men, the most 
prominent boundary that divided good from evil is overthrown everything seems 
doubtful and indeterminate in the moral worlds; kings and nations are guided by 
chance, and none can say where are the natural limits of despotism and bounds of 
licence.”36 ; „I doubt whether man can ever support at the same time complete 
religious independence and entire political freedom. And I am inclined to think that if 
faith be wanting in him, he must be subject; and if he be free, he must believe.”37 It is 
worth recalling Augustine: only true faith and love can liberate man from serfdom and 
rule of other men; whilst the erroneous love and its product, self-love necessarily 
bring about the domination of man over man. In democracy, neither the government, 
nor people are obedient to eternal moral laws, that is why they are voluntarists without 
any sense of limits, thus, government is despotic, while people’s lives are chaotic. The 
evaporation of Christian religion, and with it, the evaporation of traditions and 
customs, means the elimination of any intersubjectivity: the individual stays alone. 
„Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his 
descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever 
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upon himself alone and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude 
of his own heart.”38 Somehow, despotism goes together with atomisation of society, 
the absence of a common lifeworld. „Despotism, which by its nature is suspicious, 
sees in the separation among men the surest guarantee of its continuance, and it 
usually makes every effort to keep them separate. No vice of human heart is so 
acceptable to it as selfishness... Thus the vices which despotism produces are precisely 
those which equality fosters. These two things perniciously complete and assist each 
other. Equality places men side by side, unconnected by any common tie; despotism 
raises barriers to keep them asunder; the former predisposer them not to consider their 
fellow creatures, the latter makes general indifference a sort of public virtue.”39 
(emphasis is added) Despotism is particularly dangerous in the age of democracy, 
because democracy by nature tends to eliminate common morality, lifeworld and, by 
doing so, to bring about the condition of despotism; while despots try to do the same 
intentionally. The closer the members of a democracy are to the citizen of civitas 
terrena, the more despotic democracy becomes. The lack of common morality brings 
about chaos, unpredictablity in everyday life which makes the people of democracy 
give more and more power to government and administration in order to somehow 
cope with and regulate the unbearable chaos: „the dread of disturbance and the love of 
well-being insensibly lead democratic nations to increase the functions of central 
government as the only power which appears to be intrinsically sufficiently strong, 
enlightened, and secure to protect them from anarchy.”40 One form of democratic 
despotism is the above mentioned public opinion; the other one is bureaucracy. „It is 
easy to foresee that time is drawing near when man will be less and less able to 
produce, by himself alone, the commonest necessities of life. The task of the 
governing power will therefore perpetually increase, and its very efforts will extend it 
every day. The more it stands in the place of associations, the more will individuals, 
losing the notion of combining together, require its assistance: these are causes and 
effects that unceasingly create each other.”41 The individual in a democracy „exists 
only in himself and for himself alone... Above this race of men stands an immense and 
tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifications and to 
watch over their fate. This power is absolute, minute, regular, provident and mild... 
For their happiness such a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole 
agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their security, foresees  and 
supplies their necessities, facilities their pleasures, manages their principal concerns, 
directs their industry... what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking and all 
the trouble of living.”42 Like Burke and unlike the modernists, the new kind of 
control, limitation did not fire Tocqueville with enthusiasm, rather it terrified him. For 
Tocqueville, the alternative of the despotism of public opinion and benevolent 
bureaucracy was not the romantic, unbounded, expressive individual, but the one who 
is regulated by the common Christian religion-customs. The important point in 
Tocqueville’s description is the danger bureaucracy poses. (Since Max Weber, the 
danger of a new kind of despotism originating from bureaucracy has been a 
commonplace in social thinking. But this problem was not realised by 19th century 
liberals who hoped that societal progress of could be achieved by the benevolent 
social engineering of bureaucrats. J. S. Mill typically did not worry about new kinds of 
dependency and bureaucracy, but trusted its enlightened power.) It is worth pointing 
out that Tocqueville, Carlyle, and later Weber saw the essence of the new kinds of 
power of bureaucracy in the creation and limitation of conditions, a kind of restriction 
of alternatives, which is opposite to the old-fashioned normative rules and authority. 
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But much as the mass, containing atomized and self-loving individuals, needs 
the benevolent power of bureaucracy, these individuals are not obedient even to them, 
because the common religion-custom which used to create the habit of obedience has 
disappeared. „They are naturally impatient of regulation, and they are wearied by the 
permanence even of the condition they themselves prefer.”43; „This same temper, 
carried with them into political life, renders them hostile to forms, which perpetually 
retard or arrest them in some of their projects.”44 This kind of man „perpetually 
oscillates between servitude and licence”.45 This kind of people who lack the habit of 
obedience and the sense of normativity need a new kind of control, which is 
situational, factual, and not normative. 
If individuals are not embedded in society any more - that is, if they have 
fallen out of the governing and limiting tradition which was a stock of the experience 
of previous generations - society either collapses as such, or else it receives a new 
meaning. And indeed, the meaning of society in modernist thinking differs from that 
in the thought of critics of modernity. The elimination of customs, tradition-lifeworld 
goes hand in hand with licentiousness, ungovernability, because the elimination of 
tradition-lifeworld means the elimination of limits, measures above individuals. Thus, 
this social change has resulted in a citizen of civitas terrena who is self-loving, 
conflictual and does not acknowledge any limits above himself. Burke, Tocqueville 
and others emphasized that authority did cease in modernity, while a new kind of 
power emerged which seems to be greater. In this new situation, similarly to 
individuals, power seems to be arbitrary, even if it refers to a universal rationality. The 
„bureaucratic individualism results in their characteristic overt political debates being 
between an individualism which makes its claim in terms of rights and forms of 
bureaucratic organization which made their claims in terms of utility... The mock 
rationality of the debate conceals the arbitrariness of the will and power at work in its 
resolution.”46 Arbitrariness means arbitrariness in the relation with intersubjective, 
common rules, habitual morality; rationality is meaningless in terms of tradition-
lifeworld. The power, just like every individual decision, is necessarily arbitrary 
because of the lack of a common, habitual morality, lifeworld. 
Beside Tocqueville, Carlyle was another important follower of Burke’s image 
of the Chaotic Prison. Although Carlyle was romantic, whilst Tocqueville was 
classicist, both of them continued Burke’s critical view of modernity. Let us 
remember that in Tocqueville’s case modern despotism was not connected to the 
government, but to impersonal life-conditions and the bureaucracy which shaped 
them. When these authors use the image of Chaotic Prison, they speak about too much 
and too little control, they refer to the new and to the old controls, respectively. In 
connection with the notion of too much control, Tocqueville mentiones the new kind 
of control, which, due to its newness, is an alien form. And when he depicts the weak 
control over individuals, he refers to old, customary, taken-for-granted rules. 
Traditionally, the problems of control and rule are parts of natural law thinking. As 
early as Hooker, we can find two interpretations of the law of nature: it could mean 
normative rules (like the ability to realise right and wrong), and it could also mean 
„factual” necessities originating from the nature of society. While normative rules can 
be broken by rulers - and, in this case, they become despots - social laws cannot be 
broken by anyone because of the harmful consequences. Burke identified tradition 
with normative laws of nature, and for him it was important that the normative laws of 
nature made social life and liberty possible. But, on the other hand, during modernity, 
the idea of factual social law became increasingly popular. The emerging social 
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science at the beginning of the last century undermined the notion of normative laws 
of nature - because of their arbitrary, non-rational character - whilst it emphasized the 
importance of factual social laws. The latter ones could explain unintended social 
phenomena, and the emerging social science increasingly hoped to acquire a 
knowledge of these laws in order to create a developed society. This way of thinking 
was connected to the progressivist movement which hoped to eliminate old normative 
controls and to create new society by means of new norms (New Christianity, 
Religion of Humanity, etc.) or hidden social laws. This kind of "hidden hand" 
explanation originated from the search for causes. The notion of order of tradition-
lifeworld was succeeded by the notion of the system of mutual and causal dependence, 
and the notion of historical formation of the first one was succeeded by the notion of 
causal, necessary processes and trends: „Order is nothing but necessity... connected 
chain of causes and effects.”47 Society is a network of impersonal, unchangeable and 
covert necessities. None of the motions man underwent was spontaneous, these were 
dependent on causes, wholly out of the reach of his own powers. Man „is continually 
impelled by causes, which, in spite of himself, influence his frame, modify his 
existence, despite of his conduct... every movement of his duration, he was nothing 
more than a passive instrument in the hands of necessity.”48 (emphasis is added) 
This argument of causal-functional necessities, based on the notion of laws inherent in 
social life, was related to utilitarian and instrumental meanings in d’Holbach’s case. 
The original program of 18-19th century rationalism was to discover these factual, 
objective social laws in order to create a new, real eternal moral order on their basis. 
The emerging social science, as opposed to today's, did not enjoy the sense of chaos, 
but was terrified by it and tried to cope with chaos rationally. The modernists can be 
differentiated from their critics by means of their optimistic view: both of these groups 
sensed some chaos, the erosion of taken-for-granted traditional morality, but the 
modernists had strong hopes for a new and better society, man and control. 
„Nevertheless, confusion... is nothing but the passage of a being into a new order.”49 
The modernists have tried to create a new normative order which would be based on 
the necessities operating in society. „Morality... ought to possess stability; to be at all 
times the same, for all the individuals of the human race; it ought neither to vary in 
one country, nor in one age from another... we must take for the basis of morality the 
necessity of things.”50 This project was represented in social sciences by positivists, 
like J.S.Mill and Durkheim. They tried to replace existing personal traditional 
morality - which they thought was arbitrary, contradictory, unintelligible - by a 
rational and real one. Funnily enough, the modernist thinking labelled the taken-for-
granted lifeworld as arbitrary and as humanly created - and since the Reformation, 
radical thinking has been suspicious of everything humanly created, above all, of the 
Catholic Church -, whilst they labelled the new morality and new kind of control and 
institutions as natural, although these were overtly created, invented and implemented 
by people in front of the very eyes of their contemporaries. The modernist, liberal as 
well as leftist thinkers preferred the factual social laws to traditional, personal 
morality; they thought it was possible to organise a society where control was 
excercised mainly by factual social law, where the necessities of factual social laws 
would replace obedience and traditional arbitrary normativity. That is why the 
modernist way of thinking was very sensitive to social laws, and an elective affinity 
joined social science to these political wings. Social laws allow conditional (factual) 
control instead of normative rules. While normative control works in terms of right-
wrong, meaningful-meaningless, conditional control works in terms of effective-
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ineffective adaptation (useful-useless). The latter one is commonly called functional 
or technical rationality. 
In the 19th century, sociology was a moral science, as in the case of J.S.Mill 
and Durkheim, and one of its basic problems was the experience of anomie, that is, 
the collapse of traditional morality. I call the notion of anomie a sense of chaos. This 
sense was connected to the search for „objective” social laws which could explain 
unintended social phenomena and which were thought to offer the most effective 
methods of control apart from the intentions (traditional morality or anomie) of the 
members of society. „Objectivity” became one of the most important characteristics of 
these social laws, because „objectivity” means that these laws are out of the scope of 
human will. These laws can be used by social engineers, but nobody is able to resist 
their force. These laws are more convenient means for governors than normative rules 
and orders, because the latter ones allow alterations, disobedience, whilst objective 
social laws do not carry the problems of obedience and legitimation. Modernists 
suggested these laws because of their marvellous efficiency in social control. 
Somehow, the more emphasis was added to factual social laws in social thinking, the 
more sceptical social scientists became about the normative interpretation of the law 
of nature and traditional morality. „There are two kinds of independence: dependence 
on things, which is the work of nature; and dependence on men, which is the work of 
society. Dependence on things, being non-moral, does no injury to liberty and begets 
no vices; dependence on men, being out of order, gives rise to every kinds of vice, and 
thorouh this master and slave become mutually depraved. If there is any cure for this 
social evil, it is to be found in the substitution of law for the individual; in arming the 
general will with a real strength beyond the power of any individual will. If the laws 
of nations, like the laws of nature could never be broken by any human power, 
dependence on men would become dependence on things; all the advantages of a state 
of nature would be combined with all the advantages of social life in the 
commonwealth. The liberty which preserves a man from vice would be united with 
the morality which raises him to vitrue. Keep the child dependent on things only... Let 
his unreasonable wishes meet with physical obstacles only, or the punishment 
which results from his own actions, lessons which will be recalled when the same 
circumstances occur again. It is enough to prevent him from wrong doing without 
forbidding him to do wrong.” 51 (emphasis is added) It is easy to see the advantage of 
this kind of control: in the case of control by means of factual social laws there is no 
more personal domination and dependence, and together with this, the problem of 
obedience also ceases. In the emerging situation, there is no need for normative 
legitimation any more, because this control is not normative, but factual. If it is 
impossible to rebel against or deviate from orders, obedience is not a question any 
more. The use of factual social laws for control - when „things”, that is „objective 
situation” control - covers the necessary arbitrariness of power. The advantage of this 
kind of control is its more effective, impersonal and non-normative nature. These 
characteristics (1) can put aside the problem of normative legitimation, and (2) may 
allow any kind of individual morality. This kind of control liberates government as 
well as individuals from moral bounds: the individual may think and live as he wants, 
and the government may also act as it wants. In this case governmental activity does 
not claim any moral support from citizens, as it can work effectively without a 
legitimating consensus. „The very words obey and command will be excluded from 
his vocabulary, still more those of duty and obligation; but the words strength, 
necessity, weakness, and constraint must have a large place in it.”52 Therefore, the 
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control based on factual social laws is recommended for the government in modernity 
partly because of its efficiency, and partly because this kind of control is not bound 
normatively by any existing traditional morality and is able to work without taking 
them into consideration. Thus, the emergence of this form of control may be 
interpreted as a liberation, because it does not need any kind of virtue or common 
moral behaviour of citizens, and furthermore, this kind of control is supposed to be 
able to reform and change society, because it can work effectively without the 
intentional support of people. 
Rousseau‘s view became rather widespread in 19th century social theories. 
These theories characterised modernity by the impersonal, factual, „objective” laws 
and necessities coming from them: „superordination and subordination are quite 
indispensable means of organization and their disappearance would destroy one of the 
most fruitful forms of social production. It is thus our task to preserve superordination 
and subordination as long as they have these positive consequences, while at the same 
time eliminating those psychological consequences that make such relationships 
abhorrent. This goal is clearly approached to the extent to which all superordination 
and subordination become merely technical forms of organization, the purely 
objective character of which no longer evokes any subjective reactions.”53 During the 
19th and 20th centuries, social relations have been increasingly interpreted as factual 
laws and necessities, determinations. Whether the significance of this kind of 
relationship or its recognition has grown is an important question, however, it lies 
outside the scope of the present paper. Their attitude towards these factual, impersonal 
and immoral social necessities differentiates modernist thinkers from those who are 
critical of modernity. Modernists have interpreted these relations as liberating 
processes which might create a new society that combines freedom and accountability, 
predictability. In this context, order was followed by system, and freedom was pushed 
back into private life. In modernist thinking, these factual necessities advance the 
increase of individual freedom. „If the notion of the personality as counterpart and 
correlate must grow in equal measure to that of objectivity, then it becomes clear from 
this connection that a stricter evolution of concepts of objectivity and of individual 
freedom go hand in hand... on the one hand the laws of nature, the material order of 
things, the objective necessity of events emerge more clearly and distinctly, while on 
the other we see the emphasis upon the independent individuality, upon personal 
freedom, upon independence in relation to all external and natural forces becoming 
more and more acute and increasingly stronger.”54 
However, there was another interpretation of the same experience of emerging 
modernity. In Carlyle's description, the image of chaos in everyday life and that of 
impersonal necessities received a rather different colouring. Together with 
romanticism, he picked up the line of Burke’s critique of rationalism. Chaos and the 
necessary tendencies of despotism were interpreted by Burke, as well as Carlyle, as 
the results of spreading rationalism and the experiment to create a new society 
rationally. In this interpretation, means-end rationality is both a sign and a means of a 
new kind of impersonal and despotic control: „we should be tempted to call it (present 
age), not an Heroic, Devotional, Philosophical, or Moral Age, but above all others, the 
Mechanical Age. It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and inward sense of 
that word; the age which, with its whole undivided might, forwards, teaches and 
practices the great art of adapting means to ends.”55 And this way of thinking was 
thought to be the most dangerous in politics, where it was becoming increasingly 
dominant. In a society which works like and is thought of as a mechanism, a machine, 
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men „are to be guided only by their self-interests” and „the faith, hope and practice of 
every one founded on Mechanism of one kind of other”.56 This society is and is seen 
by its members to be a great wheel with necessary rotations. Carlyle was frightened by 
the factual social laws social thinking had just revealed, because these could take 
freedom away. „For it is the ‘force of circumstances’ that does everything; the force of 
one man can do nothing... We figure Society as a ‘Machine’”.57 In Carlyle’s thinking, 
the instrumental and calculating rationality was connected to the notion of impersonal, 
factual necessities. It is not too hard to notice the impact of Carlyle’s criticism of the 
„steamengine Utilitarianism”58 on Weber’s famous metaphor of the iron cage of 
bureaucratic rationality. „If Mechanism, like some glass bell, encircles and 
imprisons us”.59 (emphasis is added) For Carlyle, on the one hand, mechanism meant 
the organizations and relations based on instrumental, calculating rationality, which 
relations and type of institutions flooded even religious life, but mainly politics; on the 
other hand, it meant a notion of society characterized by impersonal factual, objective 
necessities against the individual. He saw the man of his age as a cripple who needed 
the help of mechanisms, and, exactly because of this, this man could be controlled by 
the developing life-conditions determined by mechanisms. As opposed to him, 
modernists were enthusiastic about the possibility of reconstructing society by means 
of these factual social neccessities, because they thought these factual, objective 
necessities to be much more effective than moral control. Furthermore, they regarded 
factual laws to be liberating, because these laws were amoral, that is, they could work 
without any moral support. They operated as „invisible hands” without any intentional 
or moral support from the members of society. This state of social life filled 
romanticism with anxiety. But Carlyle advocated social order against social system. 
Whilst Carlyle typically connected the notion of too much control, which originated 
from the use of factual, amoral social laws and necessities, to instrumental, utilitarian 
rationality, he described the chaotic state of his age as a result of the elimination of a 
commonly shared and taken-for-granted, and in this sense „natural”, morality in 
interpersonal relations. The sense of a chaotic, unarranged and disorganized condition 
of society appeared on the interpersonal level. „Things... are growing disobedient  to 
man... no man feels himself safe or satisfied.”60 „That waste chaos of Authorship by 
trade, that waste chaos of Scepticism in religion and politics , in life-theory and life-
practice.”61 He links chaos to a certain type of man, to a „sort of heart, from which, 
and to which, all other confusion circulates in the world” 62 It is hard not to notice the 
reference to Augustine’s civitas terrena which is a result of a type of man 
characterized by a particular type of feeling (self-love, disobedience, libido 
dominandi).  The sense of chaos or anomie has been, and still is, rather general. 
However, in this tradition of the critique of modernity, chaos is not the necessary 
concomitant of the transition of modern society, but is seen as a collapse of society, 
because this tradition holds only one form of society to be possible: the society that is 
based on common tradition - lifeworld. Just as in Augustine's case, for whom there 
was only one possible order: the one that came from God; in his thinking, nothing 
could exist without God’s intention. Sin is simply the lack of right action, so there is 
no such thing as an anomic social order: it is the absence of society. Modernity is not a 
new and different kind of society, but the lack of society, because it is without the 
traditional lifeworld which contained God’s moral laws. There is no other kind of 
morality, thus there is no other possible way of social relations that merit the label 
'society': „we have departed far away from the laws of this Universe, and behold now 
lawless Chaos and inane Chimera is ready to devour us!”63 The „chaotic, ungoverned, 
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of Devil, not of God.”64 „Unnature, what we call Chaos, holds nothing in it but 
vacuities, devouring gulfs.”65 In Carlyle’s case, as in Burke’s or Tocqueville’s case, 
the sense of chaos went hand in hand with the sense of too much control. His age was 
„nothing but Mechanism and Chaotic Brute-Gods.”66 
However, this critique of modernity, the view of chaotic prison, is not typical 
only among our ancestors alone, it is rather general in contemporary social thinking as 
well. I would like to illustrate this view by citing just two examples from two different 
kinds of thinking. In MacIntyre’s case this sociodox is rather clear. On the one hand, 
he often refers to the moral disorder, „the disorders of moral thought and practice”67, 
as something that goes together with „private arbitrariness”.68 The type of man that 
characterises this disorder is called „emotivist”, which means that there are no 
impersonal criteria, standards of justice, generosity and duty. „The specifically 
modern self, the self that I have called emotivist, finds no limits set to that on which it 
may pass judgement... the emotivist self lack any such criteria.”.69 „Whatever criteria 
or principles or evaluative allegiances the emotivist self may profess, they are to be 
constructed as expression of attitudes, preferences and choices which are themselves 
not governed by criterion, principles and choices which are themselves not governed 
by criterion, principle or value... the emotivist self can have no rational history in its 
transition from one state of moral commitment to another... It is a self with no given 
continuities.”70 The emotivist self does not acknowledge any intersubjective criteria, 
common measure, or limits above the individual, and regards society to be simply a 
field of struggle of random wills. MacIntyre’s anti-hero is Max Weber, in whose 
thinking the endless struggle and incomparativity charaterise the world of values 
which determines the goals of human actions, and there is only one kind of 
intersubjective criteria: the efficiency of rational bureaucracy, that is, the utilitarian 
effectivity in terms of means and ends. That is why MacIntyre describes modernity as 
bureaucratic individualism which means unpredictability on the interpersonal level, in 
lifeworld, and strict predictability on the level of bureaucratic planning and control of 
society at large. The typical man in modernity is expressivist. He places his critique of 
modernity - where the processes of moral-epistemological democratization (everyone 
has the right to find out the categories of right and wrong and the convenient actions) 
and elitism (some experts with qualifications and methods have the right and duty to 
organize other members of the society in terms of their knowledge) coexist - in the 
framework of the sociodox of emotivist self and bureaucrats: „The contrast between 
this democratization of moral agency and the elitist monopolies of managerial and 
therapeutic expertise could not be sharper.”71 „But  in fact what is crucial is that on 
which the contending parties agree, namely that there are only two alternative modes 
of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary choices of individuals are 
sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so that it may limit 
the free and arbitrary choices of individuals... the politics of modern societies oscillate 
between a freedom which is nothing but  a lack of regulation of individual behavior 
and forms of collectivist control designed only to limit the anarchy of self-interest... 
bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well antagonists. And it is in the 
climate of this bureaucratic individualism that the emotivist self is naturally at 
home.”72  
However, this view of sociodox is typical mainly among conservatives. The 
modernists are modernist because they think it possible to create a different society 
which works by means of a different and new kind of amoral, liberating and effective 
control based on factual social laws. However, the sociodox of the Chaotic Prison has 
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not been the sole property of conservatives. The modernist Marx described capitalism 
as the struggle of egoistic individuals and at the same time as a system dominated by 
iron laws of necessities; this view is also a mixture of chaos and domination. The 
same sociodox can be found, as I have already mentioned, in Weber’s writings. 
Nevertheless, Weber is closer to the romantic or premodern critique of rationality, as 
he connected the notion of too much control to rationality in the metaphor of the „iron 
cage”. Habermas, together with other members of the Frankfurt School, borrowed this 
line of argument from Weber in the analysis of the relation between rationality and 
domination in modernity. Habermas is particularly interesting in this tradition of 
critique of modernity, because, as a leftist, he has an ambiguous view about 
modernity. Modernity as such is basically full of conflicts and lasting immorality, that 
is, civitas terrena, even if the root of these conflicts is not the immorality of men, but 
the instrumental and functional rationality. „We can speak of the ‘fundamental 
contradiction’ of a social formation when, and only when, its organizational principle 
necessitates that individuals and groups repeatedly confront one another with claims 
and intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible.”73 This world of necessary 
conflicts is opposed to the world of communicative action (communicative 
rationality), which is a sort of millenarian community where neither power and 
authority, nor conflicts exist, which is a terrain of mutual understanding. In the 
communicative community, the old problem of European tradition, that of the 
subordination of man to man would not exist any more. 
Meaning is something opposed to chaos. The basic function of world-
maintaining interpretations is to cope with chaos, that is, to master contingency. 
Chaos is the lack of nomos (custom, law) as well as the loss of meaning. Meaning is 
closely connected to order. Habermas does not speak about „too much freedom”, he 
talks about the „loss of meaning” much more often, that is, as I have already 
mentioned, another side of chaos. Chaos means the lack of a meaningful and ordered 
social world in which man is able to orient, that is, the actions of others are not clearly 
contingent but more or less foreseeable and the motivation of others’ actions is 
meaningful, that is, intersubjective. Meaningful social order is also the existence of 
common, intersubjective explanations for invisible-hand-like, unintended 
consequences. The loss of meaning, or Berger’s notion of the „homeless mind”, refers 
to the sense of everyday chaos or anomie. The loss of meaning, homeless mind or the 
complaints about licentiousness refer to the unstable and inscrutable nature of 
everyday life and the concomitant conflicts. And if meaningful social order is lost, 
normativity is also lost. It does not seem too hard to connect the notion of the loss of 
meaning to the idea of Chaotic Prison, because, for example, Augustine mentioned the 
Tower of Babel as an instance for civitas terrena. In the metaphor of the Tower of 
Babel, disobedient people lost their common language, they lost any intersubjectivity 
and any possible integration. They were dropped into a meaningless, contingent world 
in which any cooperation or any social relation became impossible. People who are 
incapable of orienting and mapping their social world are disordered. In this story, 
chaotic world is not connected to much liberty, but to the loss of meaning. Habermas’ 
critique of modern lifeworld is not a complaint about licentiousness, but the loss of 
meaning and incapacity for communicating. He explains this loss of meaning „as 
effects of the uncoupling of system and lifeworld”74 The loss of emanating as a 
special phenomenon of modernity is a result of the rationality of system-integration 
which is fused with the political system (the state). It is called the colonization of the 
lifeworld by means of media of system-integration. 
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Habermas explains the sociodox of Chaotic Prison in a theoretical framework 
borrowed from Lockwood. The system-integration divorced from the social one, a 
process which is followed by the colonizing attempts of system-integration, that is, 
system-integration tries to shape social integration in accordance with its own 
functional needs, independent of the historically emerging elements of tradition-
lifeworld. Because of the invasion of system-integration (instrumental and functional 
rationality) lifeworld becomes fragmented and chaotic. Hume’s or Burke’s critique of 
rationalism was based on the argument that society, that is, tradition-lifeworld cannot 
be created rationally, and even the attempt to do so demolishes society and freedom. 
We can find the same argument targeted against instrumental and functional 
rationality in Habermas, who developed his critique of the big and arbitrary welfare 
state in connection with the nature of system-integration. He perceived the loss of 
freedom as a result of the "iron cage" - a notion taken from romanticism via Weber. 
The iron cage is „an administered, totally reified world in which means-end rationality 
and domination are merged.”75 Following Weber, Habermas exploits the traditional 
argument of anti-rationalists which describes rationality as a means of arbitrary power, 
despotism and something that homogenises life-styles and results in the loss of 
meaning. (Despite its reactionary origin, this argument is rather common among the 
members of the Frankfurt School.) As a means of a new kind of power, rationality is 
responsible for modern anomie because it demolishes both normative tradition-
lifeworld and normativity in politics: „a colonization of lifeworld by system 
imperatives that drive moral-practical elements out of private and political public 
spheres of life.”76(This invasion of system-integration into tradition-lifeworld was 
brought about by the attempt to create obedience (engineering mass loyalty). This 
attempt was not successful, its unintended result, however, is that „the communicative 
practice of everyday life is one-sidedly rationalised into a totalitarian into a utilitarian 
life-style." The loss of meaning is a consequence of the fragmentation of tradition-
lifeworld caused by this attempt of system-integration to create a new and functionally 
convenient lifeworld. „This communicative infrastructure is threatened by two 
interlocking, mutually reinforcing tendencies: systemically induced reification and 
cultural impoverishment.”77 The system-integration (political system) is increasingly 
independent of lifeworld, that is, increasingly norm-free, which is nothing but 
arbitrariness from the point of view of individuals. And this norm-free system-
integration invades lifeworld and deprives it of its intersubjective, common normative 
structures. This colonization of lifeworld results in „a loss of meaning and freedom”, 
that is, chaos coexists with the loss of freedom. What is necessary for freedom is an 
intersubjective, meaningful order and not a system. This colonization is the 
supercession of normativity by instrumental and functional rationality: „when 
interactions are no longer coordinated via norms and values, or via process of 
reaching understanding, but via the medium of exchange value... they transform social 
and intrapsychic relations into instrumental relations.”78 
But with the loss of meaning the possibility of normative consensus, that is, 
legitimation is also lost. Habermas, in a rather similar way to Burke, writes about the 
necessary failure of the attempts to engineer mass loyalty, obedience. The „political 
system... cannot produce mass loyalty in any desired amount.”79; „A legitimation 
deficit means that it is not possible by administrative means to maintain or establish 
effective normative  structures to the extent required. During the course of capitalist 
development, the political system shifts its boundaries not only into the economic 
system but also into the socio-cultural system. While organizational rationality 
 20 
spreads, cultural traditions are undermined and weakened. The residue of tradition 
must, however, escape the administrative grasp, for traditions important for 
legitimation cannot be regenerated administratively. Furthermore, administrative 
manipulation of cultural matters has the unintended side effect of causing meanings 
and norms previously fixed by tradition and belonging to the boundary conditions of 
the political system to be publicly thematized.”80; „The cultural system is peculiarly 
resistant to administrative control. There is no administrative production of meaning... 
The procurement of legitimation is self-defeating as soon as the mode of procurement 
is seen through. Cultural traditions have their own, vulnerable, conditions of 
reproduction. They remain „living” as long as they take shape in an unplanned, nature-
like manner, or are shaped with hermeneutic consciousness... A cultural tradition loses 
precisely this force as soon as it is objectivistically prepared and strategically 
employed. In both cases conditions for the reproductio of cultural traditions are 
damaged, and the tradition is undermined.”81 Tradition sets limits to action, but 
tradition as such bounds administrative or any rational action, because it cannot be 
manipulated. By means of its media (power and money) the norm-free political system 
is growing too big and invades lifeworld in order to shape it in accordance with its 
own needs. Without the support of tradition-lifeworld, the political system cannot gain 
legitimation, that is, obedience and loyalty. It is true that the norms of tradition-
lifeworld do not limit the will of individuals and political system any more. But the 
lack of obedience to this norm-free, arbitrary political system (which is rational from 
its own point of view, but arbitrary from the point of view of citizens) increases the 
extent of the rational invasion of lifeworld by system-integration. Habermas’s view is 
based on the traditional dual conception of power/authority in social thinking. On the 
one hand, Habermas refers to normative control which allows the possibility of 
disobedience, and therefore needs obedience, that is, legitimation; on the other hand, 
he also refers to control via media which shape conditions and allow no alternatives, 
and therefore does not need obedience, that is, legitimation. The latter form of control 
is norm-free: based on rational social and economical laws, it operates via „factual” 
conditions.82 Its media make the modern welfare state too strong (second kind of 
control), but at the same time, the chronic absence of mass loyalty, obedience 
highlights its serious deficiency in regard to the first kind of control. That is why the 
welfare state tries to engineer the first kind of control (that is, legitimation, obedience) 
via the second one (that is, rationally exploiting its media for condition-formation). 
 Putting aside Habermas’s modernist optimism, which supposes that lifeworld 
can be recreated by communicative rationality, his diagnosis of modernity fits in the 
tradition of social thinking described above. The loss of meaning is a loss of 
normativity in everyday life: instead of normative control, the political system deploys 
a norm-free control which does not require obedience. „In this process, free 
communication can be replaced only by massive manipulation, that is, by strong, 
indirect control.”83 Through its media, the political system attains an omnipotence 
(both power and money is based on utilitarian means-end calculation), but it suffers 
from a deficit in legitimation and obedience. Habermas’s utopia is a lifeworld which 
gives place to communicative activity, meaningful and mutual, without coercion and 
assymetrical relations - a vision similar to the civitas Dei. But in this imagery, society 
is a civitas terrena which, because of its utilitarian rationality, lacks normativity, 
where only an arbitrarily forced control can sustain a relative peace and cooperation. 
And this control (power) cannot be norm-bounded, since norms have evaporated from 
lifeworld, and they cannot be recreated by a rational use of money or power. The 
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members of system-integration (political system), the technocrats, see themselves to 
be rational, but from an outside perspective they appear to be not reasonable but 
arbitrary, because their activity is determined by an instrumental and functional 
rationality which, by its origin, has nothing to do with any reason embedded in 
existing tradition-lifeworld. But there is no return to Paradise; in modernity, tradition-
lifeworld and normativity have ceased to exist, so even if the political system would 
like to anchor its activity in norms of tradition-lifeworld, it would not be able to do so. 
The colonization of lifeworld is the implementation of the explicit 
predictability-needs of several organizations against the opaqueness of everyday life. 
Any predictability that existed in lifeworld, was always limited, and even though there 
were boundaries, they were fading away. Individual freedoms, just like predictability, 
were limited in tradition-lifeworld. The project of the Enlightenment tried to enhance 
both together by means of creating new norms. Despite its failure, ever since this 
project, there has been a common experience of a new and enforcing opinion, a 
monster.  An important difference between modernists and their critics is that the 
former think of the elimination of tradition-lifeworld as emancipation, while the latter 
interpret this experience as anomie. 
The non-normative limitations (despotic as well as „factual”) are outside of 
society, so they do not need legitimation, because they do not need obedience, which 
is an old dream of utopian thinking. The critics of „factual” control often point out 
one of its important characteristics. Namely, that this kind of control is not manifest, it 
tries to exploit the „objective social and economical laws and necessities”, but it is 
always ambiguous whether these objective laws or the political system using them are 
„responsible” for the situation. (From the point of view of the present paper it is not 
important whether these objective laws really exist or not; and whether social 
engineers are able to use them for their purposes or not.) One of the essential 
statements of this tradition of the critique of modernity is that power, norm-free 
control has become more hidden and much less responsible.  
In this paper I tried to illustrate a paradox image of society (a sociodox) which 
spread after the collapse of the notion of the laws of nature. This image is based on the 
critique of two basic presuppositions fundamental in sociology. The first one is that 
there are no normative laws of nature („natural” normativity); an idea which led to the 
notion that every moral claim is arbitrary. The other presupposition important for the 
self-image of sociology is about the existence of factual social laws, necessities, 
which can be discovered by rational methods and can be used rationally as a means of 
controlling people. The presupposition of social and economical laws is inherently 
connected to the new kind of control, which tries to shape conditions via universals 
like power and money. Since Adam Smith, one of the main activities of social 
science, and also the basis of its claim for being a legitimate science, has been the 
search for meaning of unintended social phenomena. Since the Wealth of Nations, 
social and economic thinking had to reflect upon the problem of an „invisible hand”, 
that is, how people achieve an end which was not part of their original intent. Smith's 
explanation to account for unintended consequences lay with Providence, but the 
social sciences secularized the invisible hand and offered plenty of explanations for 
this phenomenon. When critics of modernity refer to rationality as an irresistible 
means of control, they mean the supposedly discovered rational explanations of the 
„invisible hand” and the instrumental-rational use of these functionally rational 
explanations. The use of such explanations, whether they are correct or not, helps 
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controlling agencies to create situations in which people can act only in a certain way, 
or to reach some goals which were not intended by any subject. 
The social evaluation of everyday morality, non-reflective habits and 
prejudices was a reaction to Cartesian rationalism and puritanism. Descartes, who was 
uneasy about the idea that thinking could be a product of customs, directed his 
scientific method to depart from customs and tradition-lifeworld. Tradition was also 
an enemy for puritans, because tradition was equated with Catholicism and the 
existing social world which they saw as something sinful and rotten. The re-evaluation 
of tradition-lifeworld took place mainly among the English sceptics and in Scotland in 
the 18th century84, but its earlier examples in social thinking were also targeted against 
innovating reformation.85 For them, the morality of everyday life, custom, meant 
regularity and meaningful relations regardless of their origin or the existence of 
arguments. This world meant the society for them, and it contained natural, taken-for-
granted and efficient normative controls and limits, even though these were not 
always clear and were rarely reflected upon. This emphasis was a reaction to the 
failure of the efforts for rational justification and systematization of morality in the17-
18th century. This failure resulted in the demolition of the normative meaning of the 
law of nature, and in the increasing fashionableness of its „factual” interpretation. 
This early rationalization project was indirectly an avantgarde in the demolition of 
existing tradition-lifeworld and its limiting, controlling norms. The common elements 
of the above mentioned examples of the sociodox of the Chaotic Prison are: (1) that 
egoistic (sinful) man means the elimination of tradition-lifeworld, its norms, 
limitations and meanings which results in a chaotic, meaningless world where 
individuals are mutually defenceless against the arbitrary will of others; (2) that 
society, interpreted as tradition-lifeworld, cannot be created rationally; (3) the parallel 
phenomena of increasing power and decreasing authority which results in anomie, 
legitimation problems and the emergence of a new and irresistible form of control. 
The new is never natural, never taken for granted but something alien, thus arbitrary in 
terms of existing norms of historically established common tradition-lifeworld, so, 
new control is always felt to be more coercive than the customary one. The sense of 
„unnaturalness” of the new kind of control is brought about by the fact that it does not 
acknowledge the habitual, customary limits which could bound the controlling activity 
of the political system. But the new kind of control typically tries to redraw these 
limits, it always attempts to define its own conditions and borders, that is, it tends to 
be self-defining, which is to say it knows no limits. The closer the description of 
modernity is to Augustine’s civitas terrena and the meaningless world of the Tower of 
Babel, where vain, self-loving individuals are in eternal conflict and struggle, the 
more the political and social control looks (and/or is) arbitrary and despotic.            
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The wisdom of institutions: in between the reality of mass individualism and an 
utopia reloaded 
                                 
The praxeological starting point of present paper is simply that human beings 
act, that is, they have goals and purposes and they try to achieve them. But goals, 
means and situations can be understood only by - using Ryle’s phrase86 - thick 
description. That is, all the people on the Kossuth square, in Budapest, standing side 
by side and shouting seem unreasonable and irrational. Maybe, someone will say so. 
But they protest, they want the Prime Minister of Hungary to go. So, without this thick 
description we cannot understand them. Apart from modern social science, people’s 
ideas, their knowledge and its origin is at stake. Ideas are important because of their – 
although not logical – consequences. The convictions and ideas people hold say a lot 
about their actions, their choices, about the situations they can perceive and answer. 
Ideas can incite passions and revolutions or may moderate them, as well. Apart from 
the basic presumptions of modern social sciences and economics, people’s actions can 
be less explained by impersonal “forces”, “causes” or some other favourite toys of 
these moderns sciences. Focusing on people’s vested interests some usually 
presupposes that these are given, however, not only historians of ideas but political 
actors are also well aware of the significance of interest formation. This paper is 
interested in some epistemic aspects of globalization.. 
Modern soothsayers prefer talking about necessities, implicitly negating moral 
and intellectual agency of man. Referring to technological, economical or political 
necessities they imply that man does not act, but he is acted upon. My generation in 
Hungary was grown up in an intellectual life of satellite state, where any criticism 
concerning socialism was put aside by referring to economical or geopolitical 
necessities. This kind of scientism neglects to pay due attention to the role of ideas 
and debates.  
I’m going to focus on the problem of the origin of our knowledge: 
globalization has mad problematic the reasonableness by demolishing our institutions, 
a space where wisdom may emerge from trial and error, and from the interaction of 
several generations and contemporaries. Our past does have relevancies for our action, 
namely, most of our knowledge came from the past. We may act reasonably according 
to our past experiences and knowledge. 
 
1,  
Globalization is the steady decline in importance of national boundaries and 
geographical distance as constraints on mobility and connections. Technological 
innovation made connection easier, but mainly economical and religious, and later 
political motivation moved this process.  
According to globalists the key political issue of our time is to ensure the 
potential gains of boundlessness. In globalist thinking boundaries are not perceived as 
wall defending something (let’s say, “our world” or “our home made order”), but as 
divining lines which may make conflicts, enmities and arrest world peace, harmony 
and its economic blessings.87 Global co-operation and global institutions and 
arrangements are seemed to be fruitful to eliminate, or at least to control the problems 
inherited from our dark past, full of limits and limitations. But, what is more, 
according to globalists, the blessings of globalization or openness cannot be reached 
without conscious efforts. Paradoxically, they claim governments to lower or even 
abolish all man-made barriers, first of all, nation state created one, to mobility of 
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goods, money, people and ideas. Beside clearing the way in front of globally free 
movement of anything, nation state has meaning in globalist agenda only as a 
corporation with the Prime Minister as chief executive. 
Progressives have been supposing that the origin of our present problems, 
conflicts is the lack of adaptation to the changed environment/necessities. If we 
change, we adapt ourselves to a situation described by them, and this adaptation – 
commonly called “progress” – may result a world free from problems and conflicts. 
The only source of our present problems, resentment against globalisation is mal-
adaptation to the environment. Adaptation, that is, change per definitionem is always 
good. The question is not whether such a progress makes people happy, but it makes 
them happier than they would otherwise have been. Once upon a time, progress and 
its necessities were interpreted as nation building, today as globalization.  
Globalization usually classified into economical, technological, political and 
cultural branches (the last means, first of all, the Anglosaxon mass culture). But the 
dominant theme, I guess, the mismatched national states and global markets. Anxiety 
concerning globalization is often labelled as xenophobic or worst, while globalists can 
see mainly the rosy possibilities of the phenomenon. However, our tradition contains 
the Pythagorean and Aristotelian aversion from boundlessness (apeiron), and the 
positive evaluation of limits (peras). The first is somehow chaotic, indefinite, 
indeterminate and infinite, that is, formless, always changing and in flux. In the 
context of globalization nation states usually connected to self-determination and 
safety, that is, therefore limits and boundaries regained their traditionally positive 
meaning. 
Political and cultural globalization meant that there is one and rational, 
therefore context-free and universalizable solution for all social, moral and political 
problems. Universalism has an elective affinity to rationalism in politics and moral 
thinking.88 Diversity of cultures and contingency of situations are seen as obstacles, 
potential source of danger for modern harmony, that is, for peaceful political 
hedonism. Diversity and contingency are seen dangerous as potential sources of 
conflict. 
This universalizing and rationalist way of thinking, called commonly 
modernity, means the eradication of traditional, historically emerged identities and 
knowledge, and the emerging homogeneous and easily manipulated mass society 
without moral or physical limits and boundaries. This homogenizing universalism 
created the political nation as well, an universal mode of association, via the 
elimination of local institutions as competing authorities and loyalty claims by 
centralized nation state. 
The question is whether globalization is simply the recent step in the 
modernization process, which was preceded by the nation state? In this case, the 
conflict between globalists and nation states would be a home affair of the 
progressives. Or, are the conflicts around globalization something different? 
 
2, 
Some liberal and Marxist thinkers presuppose that economy (or technology) is 
the infrastructure of society, the basis which defines the politics, ethics, culture, 
identity, the so called super structure. Marx wrote in The Poverty of Philosophy that 
the hand mill gives us feudal society, the steam mill industrial capitalism, so 
productive forces, technology determine the human relations, social, political and 
other aspects of human life. 
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Labor is organized, is divided differently according to the instruments it 
disposes over. The hand-mill presupposes a different division of labor from the steam-
mill. Thus, it is slapping history in the face to want to begin by the division of labor in 
general, in order to get subsequently to a specific instrument of production, 
machinery… Under the patriarchal system, under the caste system, under the feudal 
and corporative system, there was division of labor in the whole of society according 
to fixed rules. Were these rules established by a legislator? No. Originally born of the 
conditions of material production, they were raised to the status of laws only much 
later. In this way, these different forms of the division of labor became so many bases 
of social organization. As for the division in the workshop, it was very little developed 
in all these forms of society.89 
 
The socialist experiment was based upon this, so-called, materialist 
metaphysics. Ironically, this experiment sought to introduce new economic laws by 
means of political power. It was really a system of the sense of centralized panoptical 
surveillance in economics as well as in other spheres of life. But contrary to socialist 
experiment, capitalism is not a system – it does not built up from blocks, 
interconnected by necessities. Even if there are global economy and technology, these 
do not define politics or culture, that is, the mode of our political association and our 
idea of good life. Many critics as well as supporters of globalization presuppose a kind 
of economical-technical over-determination. Of course, technology is not neutral. It 
spread the importance of efficiency against wisdom and phronesis, plurality, 
judgment. Still, even in case of socialism it may be false to talk about necessities: 
there were several kinds of socialism; and there are endless versions of political 
society connected to market economy. My point is that even if there are economical 
and technological constrains, it depends on our moral and political imagination and 
knowledge, what kind of political society and way of life may emerge.  
Both critics and supporters of globalization agree that this economical and 
technical phehomenon produces the decline of nation state or any kind of state. And if 
they are right, what is emerging instead?  
The dominant criticism of globalization is characteristically anti-capitalist, it is 
a criticism of free market which cannot be controlled by the existing nation state 
institutions and legislation. And nation state is seen by these critics as a quasi-
Socialist state: a means to reduce the unwanted effects of market economy. Criticism 
of market may refer to the consequences of free market and competition, like poverty, 
unfairness, exploitation. Or, this criticism may point out that pure and perfect 
competition is an ideal, and there are always power relations; non meritocratic values 
but networks and force decides the competition. Whilst the first criticism says that fair 
competition results unfair results, so it is bad; the last criticism teaches us that there is 
no fair competition, what is called this way is only the veil of pure power relations, 
oppression or exploitation. 
Globalization is often described as economical and technological dominance 
or, at least, dependence, but in both cases it would be a control from without of nation 
state. The modern conception of Sovereignty of nation state eroded, decision allegedly 
made by the majority of voters has been becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
But, it can be said that  the conflicts of globalization are home affairs: these are 
conflicts between industrial and agricultural producers and buyers or consumers. 
Practically, everyone is consumer, but less and less people are producer, less and less 
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people are involved in the labour market. So, the globalization vs. nation state conflict 
may appear as the conflicts of  producers and consumers. 
Mainly the producers are sensitive for global competition and they claim 
reinforced state sovereignty to defend them – that is, their market position - by means 
of market control and redistribution. As I can see, nation state and state sovereignty 
for them mean the productivist or welfare state which is an opaque and anonym 
redistributive structure – irresponsible but successfully manipulative. Still, they hope 
more access to its control than to the deeply irresponsible and anonym global market 
and institutions.  However, anti-globalists do not necessarily prefer nation state. 
Instead, they prefer state or any other regulating agency.  Society has ceased in the 
sense of self-regulation, and nation state as a different kind of self-regulation method 
followed it. Globalizatison means that social ordering does not seem to be national, it 
seems not to be correlated with nation state, but with several agencies which govern 
from distance by trans-national regulatory apparatus. Criticism of market and 
globalization are not only against competition, but also for some version of statism, 
because state as such seems to them eligible for self-control. 
Our question is rather simple: what kind of political society we live in? 
Does the proposed mode of life differ in the case of either globalist or anti-
globalist? What is called nation state is a real alternative to globalized way of life? As 
I can see, both are based on political hedonism and mass individualism. 
The promise of mass individualism is the satisfaction of material wishes by a 
rational and universal organization – let it be world market or some trans-national 
(bureaucratically regulated) association. There is seemingly only one task, the opinion 
management, that is, keeping at bay those opinions which are potentially dangerous 
for the peaceful mass consumption. Those who disturb the peaceful consumptions are 
not heretics, but they are trouble-makers, speaking hate speech. The today dissidents 
are those who are loyal to some particulars: they are not revolutionaries, but 
traditionalists, nationalists and religious people (today, called fundamentalists).   They 
are, first of all, anti-hedonist and anti-secularist., that is, they refuse founding the 
moral and political order only upon human empirical wishes. These contemporary 
dissenters claims moral or religious limits against boundlessness.  
Political hedonism would found order on the satisfaction of human wishes, and 
allegedly accept any kind of whimsical wishes, therefore it describes itself as tolerant, 
apart from those so-called oppressing norms which would limit human wishes. So, 
every community and institution, fist of all the churches, are bigot and against human 
freedom. Of course, political debate with these intolerant institutions is impossible, 
therefore, they must be excluded from the neutral public by the honest moderns. 
 
3. 
In the following section I describe the epistemic situation in mass democracy, 
with special reference to post-socialism. 
The modern mass democracy created a strange form of individualism on mass 
scale: mass individualism combined the radical human rights thinking with market 
liberalism. Whilst the first emphasizes rights without duties, the last spread the view 
that anything can be solved by human choices. Basically both thinking flatter to mass 
individuals: there is no bad choice, one has the rights to do whatever he wants.  
Egalitarian democracy is often criticized because of its relativism, and mass 
individuals are frustrated because they value foremost his difference from the others, 
but nothing is worth differing, nothing is better than anything else. They may choose, 
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but they may not choose well. Even making a value judgement is seen as moral 
failure, and neutrality or tolerance are the most preferred virtues. There is no wrong 
choice or life-style, and anything make them upset what makes them remember for 
their conscience or the morally good. Today, anti-clericalism cannot be explained by 
the authoritative activity of churches, from this point of view it is most important that 
even the existence of churches makes mass individuals remembering for right and 
wrong.  
The frustrated and angry mass individuals self-confident, still they claim 
security by the state, in practice, they claim a guaranteed life-style. It means that the 
main task of the state today is the elimination of the unpleasant results of the wrong 
choices of mass individuals. The political hedonism would build political order on the 
satisfaction of human desires, and it can call itself tolerant, because formally it accepts 
any claim and labels any moral as oppressive, which would limit these desires and 
wishes. Neutrality is able to get relativism and hedonism dominance by expelling all 
morals from public life, which would limit desires. 
Present democracy, people believe, can satisfy diverse needs, and, really, it 
renders easily all contending beliefs inoffensive or ridiculous. In modern democracy, 
on general, and in post-communism, in particular, the only legitimate public belief is 
egoism and the private pursuit of economic well-being. The dominant political 
hedonism claims productivist or welfare state, and makes all ideas unattractive and 
unpopular, unless they appeal to economic interests. Its strength is not in its forced 
liberal ideal, but rather in its renunciation of all ideals, apart from empirical individual 
well being. By means of an apolitical economical and social policy, democracy 
created a consumer culture as Tocqueville foreseen some generations ago.  
Modernity is rationalization, universalization and massification. Mass 
individual, rooted out from communities and institutions, is solitary, alienated 
therefore more vulnerable and destitute. Modern state as well as economy inimical 
towards collective identities, as potential source of conflicts and technically not easily 
manipulated. The pre-modern institutional-communal (local) control was replaced by 
state bureaucratic controls, agencies which govern from distance, and wisdom by 
alleged technical rationality.  
Today everything is justified or legitimated by its functional contribution to the 
empirical satisfaction of mass individuals, just like in Plato’s pigs’ polis based on the 
merely appetite.90Anything limiting human wishes is labelled as despotic or inhuman. 
Because, only the claims for the satisfaction of empirical wishes are legitimate issues 
in public life and the means to satisfy them, public debates limited only to them. 
The presently dominant utopia in public’s mind connected to the self-image of 
productivist state. One of its elements is the still dominant hope of progress, that is, 
the promise of an ever improving world in terms of satisfaction of empirical desires. 
Progress, hopefully, will result harmony of the economic interest of all members of 
society or world is a modern idea, opposing Montaigne’s teaching that the gain of one 
is invariably the damage of others, no man profits but by the loss of others. The 
other element of this utopia is universalism, the final end of conflicts emerging from 
nations or from other particulars. This hope and promise of the end of conflicts, that 
is, finally politics, is an anti-political. The moderns’ political hope is anti-political. 
Economical-technical globalization contains the utopian promise of anti-
politics: the administration of things, managerial policy characterized by protection, 
peace, harmony and security. The difference between liberals and socialists – two 
branches of moderns – is that liberals think that order is able to consolidate itself by 
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means of economics (economic cooperation and/or competition). But today nation, 
particulars are anathema for both liberals and socialists.  
 
4,  
As David Hume wrote in his essay, Of the First Principles of Government91, 
government is always government of the many by the few. But – as one may read in 
Hume’s essay or in la Boetie’s The Politics of Obedience. The Discourse of Voluntary 
Servitude92 – power is always ultimately on the side of the governed, and the 
governors have nothing to support them but opinion.  If public opinion is ultimately – 
continues this tacitly contractual argument – responsible for the structure of 
government, it is also the agency that determines whether there is freedom or 
bondage. Therefore, the struggle for freedom or for meaning is not resistance to 
tyrants or oligarchs but resistance to the public opinion. A little bit later, Tocqueville 
and J.S. Mill taught us that the fight for freedom and against tyranny is not the 
struggle of the many against the few, but of minorities against the majority. At least, 
since la Boetie and Hume knowledge of common people has gained political 
significance.  
Instead of physical force, are able to manipulate by centralizing and 
homogenizing social life – therefore, modern domination based on hegemony over the 
allegedly open minded mass, emerged after the destruction of independent institutions 
and moral. Because the present governments based on popular consent, one of their 
main activities is opinion management. That is why mass communication has became 
so widely discussed. Mass communication is not simply politically relevant but a 
constituent part of power network. In our systematized and bureaucratically managed 
world revolution seems to be impossible, but the revolts here are typically directed 
against mass media headquarters, as the symbols and agents of power. 
Instead wisdom, public is dominated by the arbitrariness of post-modern multi-
culti (bloody, pathological identities, tribalism) and fundamentalist rationalism and 
the rhetoric of economic over-determinism. But, despite of utopical hopes, modernity 
much better characterized by mutual mistrust and the lack of loyalty to any authority 
in case of conflict. „It seems we trust our leaders, our neighbours, our visitors, and 
even our own future behaviour, less and less.” 93 
Global politics and economics, just like modern nation state, are managed by 
abstract manipulation of social engineering. Responsibility is fading away: no space 
for it in the thinking dominated by economical, political, technological or whatever 
necessities. 
By emerging huge organizations the democratic promise of representative self-
control is also fading away. These organizations manage consent by mass scale 
manipulation via the mass media and the medium of money and power. 
 
5, 
Men are quarrelsome as well as cooperative/consensual by nature. But, even in 
the case of rational benevolent and enlightened masters, and even in case of a world 
without nations, conflicts may emerge among individuals. The tragic sense is that evil 
or sin cannot be eliminated from this world, therefore decision has to be made. In our 
present world, however, we can see that no one trust decision makers; their reason, the 
ground of their judgment is usually not evident and not consensual. Even if there is 
universal rationality and our managers would be able to implement their rational 
knowledge, they couldn’t bring about loyalty. 
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The weakest point of our present political existence is that it promises the end 
of conflicts, but in case of the emerging conflicts decisions do not seem to be 
reasonably from the point of view of people involved in conflicts, therefore decisions 
are hardly accepted. The idealized neutral politics would be separated from the moral 
consciousness of people. Therefore, there is a continuous disloyalty towards state or 
global organizations, because the knowledge used in them are so far from common 
people’s intersubjective knowledge. And without emerging consent, only force or the 
presence of sanctions and mass scale manipulation may compel people to be obedient.  
Both the bureaucratic rationalism and whimsical mass individualism are 
meaningless in the everyday life, both are far away from intersubjectivity. Even the 
rationality of bureaucracy is seen whimsical from the shared wisdom of common 
people, because it, like a god, giveth and taketh away. On the other hand, 
globalization in everyday life practices means a sense of irrelevance and dis-
functionality of our knowledge created by our shared trial and error efforts in 
interpersonal relations and by free discussion of ideas. 
Whilst the common argument against globalization refers to locality, as a place 
of identity, I don’t follow this line of argument. The contemporary fashion of identity 
would smuggle pre-modern values into our present post-modern context, resulting 
relativism and anomie. Talking about locality means particulars (little platoons), first 
of all institutions like parishes, schools, families, etc., but instead of identities 
connected to them, I focus on the intersubjective life contained in them. 
Men are not good or bead, they can be improved or debased. Men are able to 
keep the permanent threat of evil at bay by constructing shared moral rules, 
institutions and traditions. Reasonableness, that is, wisdom of institutions came from 
the free trial and error learning process. This kind of knowledge is cooperatively and 
interpersonally constructed moral and practical rules, and not impersonal, 
administratively created and/or applied, manipulating techniques. More these 
constrains - via the medium of money and power – are impersonal (“administration of 
things” by Engels, Lenin and their modernist followers), and further away from 
everyday life, the more these are harsher. Living in communities and institutions 
people not only creates indirectly practical and moral rules, but, also indirectly, the 
sense of obedience and loyalty emerge in them. Loyalty formation, participation, 
responsible decision-making, reasonableness, collective self-regulation and education 
of the next generations – the very problem why people in mass democracy complains - 
happened in our institutions in the past. Institutions are the objects of our loyalty and 
affection, and the repositories of much human wisdom – formed by the collective 
experience of previous generations. 
Shared wisdom capital leads to trust, respect, and commitment to work 
together. Wisdom, emerging and learnt intersubjetively in institutions, contains skills 
like conflict negotiation, listening, cooperation. Wisdom is proper or, at least, 
probable understanding of ordinary experiences and skill in judging in borderline 
cases in face of this uncertainty. It tends to increase with experience. This kind of 
knowledge refers to the long term consequences of present actions, considers probable 
side-effects, makes people be able to make reasonable plans and strategies for the 
future, to monitor them and to detect early warning sign of difficulties, and to assess 
their significance.    
Anti-globalist, by criticising neo-liberalism, may refer to dominance and over-
control of market as well as its chaotic and whimsical influences to (local) life. But 
the age before globalization was dominated by Keynesian redistributive and 
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productivist  state, its disciplinary apparatus and surveillance in the name of progress 
or guarantied life –  even if this surveillance was allegedly democratic, that is, self-
imposed. And the redistributive and productivist state may be slightly better from my 
epistemical point of view, it corrodes bureaucratically institutional wisdom just like 
the phenomena called globalisation. 
Modern society has no time for wisdom: it emerges during long period of time, 
and to acquire it is also along process. However, any form of mass individualism 
claims instant gratification and sees institutional wisdom only as barriers. Moderns, 
whether supported the idea of nation state or supra national organizations and the idea 
of one nation, were apt to remove institutions and communities containing wisdom as 
the barriers to progress – whatever progress means.  
Uninformed by the wisdom tradition, data, information, knowledge, intellect, 
expertise, strategies, open society can be organized by manipulating techniques to be 
exploited, degraded. Open society, apart from Popper’s utopia, doesn’t contain 
individuals searching fro truth or falsehood, but mass individuals easily manipulated. 
We live in age in need of wisdom. Technical and organizational achievements of 
science and technology have made the Moderns ignore wisdom or practical 
knowledge, traditions contained in institutions. Moderns tend to ignore that A wise 
group – containing diverse and decentralised members – makes better judgements or 
solve problem better than experts with kind of certifications or credentials.
 31 
The problem of political knowledge and action in the criticism of Modernity 
 
Since the first reaction to the political and moral Modernism in the 18th century 
there have been continuous efforts to criticize the Moderns’ concepts and hopes 
referring to political knowledge and action. This concern with political epistemology 
and action became much stronger during the 20th century.  
Many years before Churchill said his bon mot on democracy, democratic 
constitution had achieved a position similar to those of monarchy during the Middel 
Ages. As monarchy was seen as the best regime by people during the Middle Age, 
democracy could reach this status in the political thinking at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Democracy and the sovereignty of the people became inevitable, the regimes, 
later labeled totalitarian, referred to people, too. Since then the issue of good regime 
became a taboo and political thinkers left it. Political thinking shifted into the area of 
political epistemology and action theory. The issues of the nature of political 
knowledge and political action allow people to think about good life and human 
condition apart from the actual constitutional or power structure of state. 
The criticism of Modern politics referred to changes like democratization, 
massification, revolutions, totalitarianism and the welfare state. These institutional 
and visible changes in the character a politics seems to be connected to a characteristic 
notion of the nature of political knowledge and action. As it is well known, Oakeshott 
connected rationalism to the new prince and the new class in politics, who wouldn’t 
spend too much time with the slow and uncertain learning of tradition and practice. 
Or, let me mention Popper’s paper published on utopia and violence, where he 
connected the wrong version of rationalism to enforcement and utopia-building 
efforts, and his Open Society – written by one of its enemies – is huge Nuremberg 
Trial to convict Plato and Hegel because of the Modern totalitarianism. Ironically, the 
idea, that the interpretations of the nature of political knowledge and action are 
connected to specific regimes can be read back in Plato’s Republic. Oakeshott’s, 
Strauss’ and Voegelin’s work in general combined the criticism of contemporary 
regime with criticism of Modern political epistemology and action theory.  
Those authors who didn’t enjoyed the political Modernism perceived two 
different kinds of dangers coming from the epistemological presuppositions of 
Moderns. One of them is commonly called rationalism, whilst the other is called 
relativism. Ironically, the second one commonly explained as a result of the first one. 
According to critics, in both case, the epistemological and moral (action theoretical) 
mistake result the loss of good order. Modernity is depicted typically as a kind of 
Chaotic Prison. 
On the one hand, according to rationalist, political knowledge is logical 
sequences following logical rules, therefore there is no need for personal judgment. 
These 20th century critics of political Modernism emphasized the need for personal 
decisions in morality and politics, which cannot be eliminated from a free and 
responsible man.  
Modernist thinking started partly as an epistemological debate in the literature 
at the end of the 17th century, and leading figures modern politics founded their claims 
on epistemological arguments called Enlightenment. Moderns emphasized the break 
between past and present, and the irrelevance of experiences, knowledge coming from 
the past in the understanding of the present situations, alternatives and dilemmas. 
Modern originally meant „what is at hand” (from the Latin modo). 
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For the critics of Modernity, not only the nature of the political knowledge and 
action differed from Moderns’ epistemological hopes and promises, but the elements 
of this knowledge, too. For them, the history of political thought has become a part of 
the answer to the problem of practical wisdom in Modernity. The emerging role of the 
history of political thoughts in the political education and thinking seems to have 
affinity with a non-Modern notion of political knowledge and action. It is not clear 
how political knowledge may emerge. What we may know is that usually those 
people’s moral imagination is better who had classical education, who studied the 
Ancients.  
It seems to me that the history of ideas is in a kind of discursive coalition with 
those thinking which criticizes Modern politics. Not simply because of Lovejoy, but 
history of ideas excavates old and maybe forgotten issues, dilemmas and debates. This 
coalition may be well interpreted really as the rebel of the Ancients’ view of man and 
the humanan condition. This criticism of politically Modern was connected implicitly 
to the Ancient standpoint. It seems that there is a discursive coalition between certain 
epistemological and political positions. As the social sciences were in coalition with 
reformism, progressivism and welfare state, there is an elective affinity between the 
criticism of politically Modern and the history of political ideas. 
 
Scientism  and Social Engineering 
But not only the break with past, authority and tradition what is important for 
us, but the very nature and the object of knowledge relevant in political action were at 
stake. The late 19th and the first half of the 20th century were dominated by the social 
scientific thinking, imitating the natural science. Social science has been implied 
society which can be known and mapped with certainty, and can be formed and 
reformed by using scientific knowledge; and political action was interpreted 
increasingly as a naturally reformist activity. This view of knowledge combined with 
social and political reformism during the 18th century, and later with the democratic 
hope that humans can be self-governing and obedient only laws, institutions and 
relations created by them. 
An important part of scientism was the "hidden hand" explanation originated 
from the search for causal laws. The notion of order of tradition was succeeded by the 
notion of the dynamic but stable system of mutual and causal dependences, and the 
notion of historical-providential formation of the first one was succeeded by the 
notion of causal, necessary processes and trends: „Order is nothing but necessity... 
connected chain of causes and effects.”94 In this social deism society is a network of 
impersonal, unchangeable and covert, law-like necessities. None of the motions man 
underwent was spontaneous, these were dependent on causes, wholly out of the reach 
of his own powers. D’Holbach: Man „is continually impelled by causes, which, in 
spite of himself, influence his frame, modify his existence, despite of his conduct... 
every movement of his duration, he was nothing more than a passive instrument in the 
hands of necessity.” 95  
The original program of 18-19th century scientism was to discover these 
factual, objective social laws in order to create a new and eternal human order by 
utilizing them. The emerging social science, as opposed to today's, did not enjoy the 
sense of chaos, but was terrified by it and tried to cope with chaos rationally. The 
Modernists can be differentiated from their critics by means of their optimistic view: 
both of these groups sensed some chaos, the erosion of taken-for-granted traditional 
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morality, but the modernists had strong hopes for a new and better social world. 
„Nevertheless, confusion... is nothing but the passage of a being into a new order.”96 
This scientist version of rationalism emerged from whiggism (see Locke) 
which combined the progress of science and Enlightenment to that of liberty, the tory 
Sceptics like Droyden, Swift and Johnson turned attention toward the compulsory and 
monopolistic nature of rationalism. Since then, the basis of the criticism rationalist 
political epistemology is individual freedom.  
Carlyle was important follower of Burke’s image of the Chaotic Prison. In 
Carlyle's description, the image of chaos in everyday life and that of impersonal 
necessities, coercing from without, received a rather different colouring. Chaos and 
the necessary tendencies of despotism were interpreted, as the results of spreading 
rationalism and the experiment to create a new society rationally. Carlyle was 
frightened by the factual social laws social thinking had just revealed, because these 
could take freedom away. „For it is the ‘force of circumstances’ that does everything; 
the force of one man can do nothing... We figure Society as a ‘Machine’”.97 In 
Carlyle’s thinking, the instrumental and calculating rationality was connected to the 
notion of impersonal, factual necessities, the previous used the latter. „Mechanism, 
like some glass bell, encircles and imprisons us”.98 But the lack of freedom connected 
to chaos in Modernity which is „chaotic, ungoverned, of Devil, not of God.”99 The 
sense of chaos went hand in hand with the sense of too much control. His age was 
„nothing but Mechanism and Chaotic Brute-Gods.”100 
This project was represented in social sciences mainly by positivists, like 
Comte, J.S.Mill and Durkheim, etc. They tried to replace existing personal traditional 
morality - which they thought was arbitrary, contradictory, unintelligible - by a 
rational and real onebased on social laws. Funnily enough, the modernist thinking 
labelled the taken-for-granted life-world as humanly created, whilst they called the 
new morality and new kind of control and institutions as natural, although these latter 
were overtly created, invented and implemented by people in front of the very eyes of 
their contemporaries. The modernist thinkers preferred the factual social laws to 
traditional, personal morality; they thought it was possible to organise a society where 
control was exercised mainly by factual, therefore impersonal social laws, where the 
necessities of factual social laws would replace obedience and traditional normativity. 
That is why an elective affinity joined social science to reformist political wings.  
Social sciences searched for „objective” social laws which could explain 
unintended social phenomena and which were thought to offer the most effective 
methods of control apart from the intentions of the members of society. „Objectivity” 
became one of the most important characteristics of these social laws, because 
„objectivity” meant that these laws are out of the scope of human will. These laws, if 
they were found, can be used by social engineers, and nobody is able to resist their 
force. These laws are convenient means for reformators, because do not allow 
alterations, disobedience. Modernists suggested these laws because of their supposed 
marvellous efficiency in social control.   
As Rousseau wrote: „There are two kinds of independence: dependence on 
things, which is the work of nature; and dependence on men, which is the work of 
society. Dependence on things, being non-moral, does no injury to liberty and begets 
no vices… Keep the child dependent on things only... Let his unreasonable wishes 
meet with physical obstacles only, or the punishment which results from his own 
actions, lessons which will be recalled when the same circumstances occur again. It is 
enough to prevent him from wrong doing without forbidding him to do wrong.”101  
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This kind of control would liberate government as well as individuals from 
moral bounds: the individual may think and live as he wants, and the government may 
also act as it wants. In this case governmental activity does not claim any moral 
support from citizens, as it can work effectively without a legitimating consensus. 
„The very words obey and command will be excluded from his vocabulary, still more 
those of duty and obligation; but the words strength, necessity, weakness, and 
constraint must have a large place in it”.102  
Therefore, the control based on factual social laws – when „things”, that is 
„objective condition” control the actor’s will formation or available means – is 
recommended for the government in Modernity partly because of its efficiency, and 
partly because this kind of control is not bound normatively by any existing and non-
rational traditional morality and is able to work without taking them into 
consideration. During the 19th and 20th centuries, social relations have been 
increasingly interpreted as factual laws and necessities, determinations. Their attitude 
towards these factual, impersonal and immoral social necessities differentiates 
modernist thinkers from those who are critical of modernity. Modernists have 
interpreted these relations as liberating processes which might create a new society 
that combines freedom and accountability, predictability.  
Moderns partly hoped to solve the problem of loyalty and obedience by 
supposing that rule can be replaced by the administration of things. Saint-Simonian 
and Comtean, or Marxist-Leninist social engineers have had a vested interest in this 
version of political activity. According the scientist promise, action wouldn’t be a 
result of prudential judgment, but the recognition of scientific necessities, whether 
Marxian or other. If political knowledge is a kind of techné and politicians are social 
engineers, each problem could have a solution, and political education would be only 
to create, collect and transmits this technical knowledge. Someone could understand a 
situation according to models, and he would be released from decision making and 
responsibility connected to it.  
 “Society”, as the phrase spread in social sciences, is something impersonal, 
where blind causes, forces and laws works. Successful politician could be those who 
knows them and can apply them.   
Contrarily, anti-scientists implied that humans are moral beings in the sense 
that they are not mindless billiard balls who are under impersonal forces, but moral 
beings with moral imagination, capacity to realize good and bad, and deciding 
somehow. They have ideas, gained from numberless resources by numberless ways, 
by which they interpret themselves, their situations and perceive alternative actions 
and make decisions. Making a difference and the capacity to realize distinctions in the 
world are this idealized actor’s characteristics.  
The 50s and early 60s, characterised by the End of Ideology debate, was the 
period when the political philosophy re-emerged. Scientism waned much earlier than 
the economic problems of welfare state started. Rationalism was not able to deal with 
the problem of Cleopatra’s nose. (Pascal: Thoughts 162.) The perception of modern 
mass democracy as barbars inside the gates, political hedonism and statism was 
combined a reaction in political and moral epistemology. It is also suggested that 
rationalism and political Modernism were able to win earlier mainly because of their 
promises, but in vain. The promises only partly could be fulfilled, the basic 
characteristics of politics and human condition haven’t changed at all. Therefore, the 
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failure of the Modern political hopes, like certainty and guaranteed way of life (vivere 
sicuro), has made the anti-Modernist political epistemology and view of action 
plausible. 
This return of the political philosophy was connected to the decline of the 
optimism of Moderns and social sciences. The anti-rationalism spread as criticism of 
scientism, and its popularity rose with that of political philosophy and with the 
growing disappointment from social sciences. The main stream of anti-rationalism 
and criticism of Modernity came from Central and East Europe where rationalism was 
perceived as alien: something French or British. Dostoevsky’s criticism which 
opposed emotion against the scientist version of rationalism; Schopenhauer who 
emphasized the dark motivations in human actions; Nietzsche who explained the 
difficulties of modernity by the loss pre-Socratic, Dionysian thinking; Tönnies model 
of Gemeinschaft and Wesenwille, Burckhardt’s on individuality;  Kuhn’s notion of 
paradigm; Wittgenstein’s language theory; Berlin’s pluralism; Popper’s notion of 
incommensurability; Schmitt’s decisionism; M. Polányi on implicit and personal 
knowledge; Husserl and Alfred Schütz on life-world; etc. One may add Voegelin’s 
works on Gnosticism and new political science, and Strauss’ criticism of value-fact 
distinction and the idea of neutrality in social sciences. I must say, in this context 
Oakeshott was a honorary Easterner, an ossi.  
Looking for family resemblances, their common themes may be that 1, 
rational, systematic cognition of human world is limited and fallible; 2, human actions 
are typically do not rational, and the human world can exist because of non-rational 
elements like habit, prejudice, custom, piety, etc.; 3, rational action is not necessarily 
good, it may ruin human world; 4, rational action may work but only in this non-
rational human environment.  
These reactions did not bother too much how to legitimate political action, 
decision-making and coercion, instead, they emphasized that decisions and coercion 
are inherent in political action, and any hope to eliminate them from public life is anti-
political utopianism or hypocrisy. Let me turn now to the relation between the Modern 
democratic self-image of contemporary regimes and this anti-rationalist political 
epistemology. 
 
Moral Absurdity vs Democracy 
Not necessarily all critics of scientism were anti-rationalist or against the 
Modern project, Rawls and the liberal casuistry in general obviously continued its 
Kantian version. Beside the scientist version, liberal casuistry is the other dominant 
wing in the 20th century rationalism: the industrious casuists, terrible busy 
mathematician manqés of the Anglo-Saxon universities’ political and moral 
philosophy departments, hope they are able to found particular political actions and 
institutions by using logical arguments without presupposing particular political or 
cultural values. The liberal casuist version of rationalism implied that:  
- that human world is rational and can be known rationally, therefore 
consequences of human actions can be foreseen, responsibilities are clear; 
- using rational arguments universal consensus can be created, therefore 
in the emerging rational community there is less and less need for arbitration and 
coercion. 
The Modernist hope – men’s self-government may replace God’s or 
institution’s rule – has an utopian-antinomian stance, and it continued the Lockean 
tradition which hoped that coercion can be domesticated or finally eliminated from 
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politics. Tory sceptics just like 19th century Germans romantics rebelled against this 
whiggish optimism and started to emphasize the arbitration as inherent parts of 
political activity: Dilemmas are dilemmas because they cannot be rationally resolved. 
(Palto, Eutyphron 110 b-d). 
 
SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose 
for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of 
this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at 
once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? 
EUTHYPHRO: True. 
SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly 
end the differences by measuring? 
EUTHYPHRO: Very true. 
SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a 
weighing machine? 
EUTHYPHRO: To be sure. 
SOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and 
which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the 
answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these 
enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, 
honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and 
about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I 
and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?  
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we 
quarrel is such as you describe. 
SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, 
are of a like nature? 
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are. 
SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and 
evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no 
quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences—would there now? 
EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right. 
SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and 
good, and hate the opposite of them? 
EUTHYPHRO: Very true. 
SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and 
others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings 
among them. 
EUTHYPHRO: Very true. 
 
Coercion seems to be necessary because practically impossible to find good 
reasons to persuade all member of the political community. Political Modernism was 
a radical interpretation of contract theory: they hoped and aimed to form social 
relations. Politically Modern means the hope that people is able to take into their 
hands their own life, they will be our own masters, human condition can be 
completely understood and controlled. Consequently, anything resists human 
understanding and control – because it is opaque and unintelligible – is arbitrary and 
oppressive. What is worst, enemy of human progress and happiness. Moderns are 
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rationalist because they are not able to accept piety: the sense that humans must trust 
something what is out of their control.   
The anti-rationalist critics – apart from the Leftist critics of the age – didn’t 
dispute the goodwill of rationalists, instead, they challenged the potentiality of 
political knowledge. As Aristotle (Politics 1262a), Pascal (Thoughts 358) or the 
already mentioned Burke, they separated intention of action from results. Because of 
the unforessen and often unpleasant consequences, understanding the human 
condition contains a piety toward the human world: an acceptance of its fuzziness and 
that our knowledge of human world is rather limited.  
The emphasis of the narrowness and necessary imperfection of our knowledge 
is a pessimistic or tragic view, because man must make decisions on morally and 
cognitively uncertain epistemological basis. He must act in a fuzzy human world 
where he is still responsible as Oedipus was. Politicians are responsible for unforeseen 
consequences. And what is more, often morally wrong action may result some public 
good, what is the real absurdity for rationalist.  
 
Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’s Augustinian view of human condition re-emerged 
with the anti-rationalist backlash. The non-rational and non-knowable nature of 
human world involves the necessary imperfection of politics. Even a thorough 
rationalist like Aquinas who represented an optimistic view on human world and 
epistemological potentiality to know it, taught that emergency situations didn’t have 
laws. As he wrote: necessitas non subditur legi (Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, q. 96, 
a.6), and necessitas non habet legem. (Summa Theologica, IIIa, q. 80, a.8) If not 
always, but in certain situations, called necessitas, human condition is morally 
obscure and absurd. Why it is the nature of politics? Why does our epistemological 
imperfection involve moral absurdity and need tragic heroism from political actors, as 
Weber taught in his Politics as Vocation? 
The Aristotelian–neo-Thomist prudential thinking about political action is 
optimistic, supposing that virtues and propriety can be achieved at least potentially, 
even if not actually. But pointing to the imperfect nature of political epistemology 
involves the tragic view of political action and the morally absurd nature of human 
condition. 
If the human world is not rationally ordered and it seems to resist to its 
systematization as well as rational understanding, humans must part the certainty and 
clearness of maths in political and moral life. This anti-rationalist view of political 
knowledge and action undercuts implicitly democracy based on the notion of self-
government and responsibility, and welfare state and bureaucratic ethos based on 
certainty and responsibility. How could anyone be responsible for his action without 
certain knowledge about its consequences?  How could anyone be responsible for his 
action in an ethically absurd world full of dilemmas, contingency, dominated by 
Fortuna and unforeseen situations interpreted as “consequences”. The refusal of 
optimistic epistemology of rationalism may involve a pessimistic view of human 
agency and political settings. 
The anti-rationalist stream of political philosophy came together with a piety 
concerning human condition in general, and politics in particular. However, this 
disillusioned view of politics hasn’t turned away from it. Instead of evacuating politics 
as a dirty activity, these thinkers suggest that political action is incomplete and tragic, 
sometimes heroic because in spite of the best intention and prudential circumspection 
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of actors, the consequences may be something wholly different. Still, it is necessary 
activity, if someone does not want to let the ship fall over. 
As Thomas More wrote in his Utopia: “It is even so in a commonwealth and 
in the councils of princes; if ill opinions cannot be quite rooted out, and you cannot 
cure some received vice according to your wishes, you must not therefore abandon the 
commonwealth; for the same reasons you should not forsake the ship in a storm 
because you cannot command the winds.”  
 
Anti-rationalist thinkers, as it is often said, are rather anti-theoretical. Someone 
may say, as JS Mill did, that they are simply stupid people, and he could be right. But 
inherent in anti-rationalism that at least the human world is to complex to describe 
and systematize into a logically consistent theory. One couldn’t talk about an anti-
rationalist school, because there are so many versions. Yet, at least in the field of 
political thinking, anti-rationalist shows some family resemblances. Although, the 
anti-rationalist thinkers do not bother too much with existing institutional 
establishment, but the above mentioned Platonic-Aristotelian connection of political 
epistemology and institutional settings implies that the criticism of political 
modernism and anti-rationalism is a covert refusal of mass democracy and 
bureaucratic welfare state. The issues of dilemma, decision, coercion, unforeseen 
consequences for which the actors yet responsible, so the tragic elements in politics 
instead of rational consensus fabrication or scientific administration of things (social 
engineering) turned away the attention from the Modernist hope concerning humans 
capacity to reform their world. 
Oakeshott’s writings are concerned with modern hubris. It presupposes the 
belief in absolute knowledge and the possibility of distinguishing Appearance from 
Reality. The other presupposition of this hubris is the belief that the political and 
social order can be reshaped by rational planning in accordance with whatever vision 
of well-being we may choose. 
The central belief of modern western progressive thought since the French 
Revolution is belief in the power of human will to shape history in accordance with 
whatever visions of the good life we may entertain, in practice, to escape from the 
human condition and politics. Rationalism is not only an epistemological mistake 
about the possibility of guiding  practice by abstract rational principles: it is inspired 
by the false belief that by doing so, human beings can detach themselves from their 
embeddedness in tradition and thereby prepare the way for them to become self-
creators. 
Oakeshott was not the only one who critized this hope and illusion in the 20th 
century.    
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Political reality and the failure of democracy 
 
The realism of contemporary political thinking is that it accept liberal 
democrarcy – the Anglo-Ssaxon winner of the competition among regimes during the 
20th century – as the best imaginable regimes. In this respect, the mainstream political 
thinking defends the political status qui, just like as it happened in the often looked 
down Middle Ages. On the other hand, beside this realism – the winner is always right 
and just – of political theorist, one may see a certain kind of moralism  among them.  
The liberal political thinking has tried to find moral justification for the institution and 
praxis of liberal democracy. This moralizing effort took the form of liberal casuistry, a 
virulent praxis in the present academic life. 
The political science in the 20th century focused on the idea and practice of 
procedural democracy as the evolutionary winner of the competition of regimes. 
Supposedly, this liberal democracy is the viable and coherent regime of our main 
values like justice, liberty, etc. Many years before Churchill said his bon mot about 
democracy, democratic constitution had achieved a position similar to those of 
monarchy during the Middle Ages. As monarchy was seen as the best regime by 
people during the Middle Age, democracy could reach this status in the political 
thinking at the beginning of the 20th century. Since then the issue of good regime 
became a taboo and political thinkers left it.  
Political thinking shifted into the area of political epistemology and action 
theory. The issues of the nature of political knowledge and political action allow 
people to think about good life and human condition apart from the actual 
constitutional or power structure of state.  
 
1, Dirty hand dilemma – action theory and moral epistemology 
The problem today called as the dilemma of dirty hands is not a contemporary 
one at all, it is inherited from the Greeks. Socrates said in his Apology that „he who 
will really fight for the right, if he would live even for a little while, must have a 
private station and not a public one.” (Apology 31d-32a) Politics seems to be morally 
problematic since it was invented by Greeks. 
Plato referred to politics as opposing justice, for him politics and morality 
seemed to be irreconcible. (Even his ideal state would be based on a white lie about 
the gold, silver or bronze nature of several people.) The problem is that morally right 
motives are not always results right consequences and sometimes wrong motives or 
only wrong means results morally acceptable outcome. Dilemmas are dilemmas 
because they cannot be rationally resolved. The question whether this perplexities 
limited to politics (see Plato’s Eutyphron 110 b-d) or the moral dilemmas are 
necessary part of human life and  are “neither systematically avoidable, nor all soluble 
without remainder”.103  
People referring to moral perplexity of political actors usually mention two 
types of action: Violence, enforcement and fraud, manipulation. Both seem to be 
necessary because practically impossible to find good reasons to persuade all member 
of the political community to co-operate.  
Since Thucydides through the democrats of French Revolution up to president 
Obama’s tutor, there are disturbing connection between arguments for Dirty actions 
and democracy. S. Alinsky104, president Obama’s tutor wrote in his Rules for 
Radicals, A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals, in chapter titled: Means and 
Ends: 
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“The practical revolutionary will understand Goethe’s “conscience is the 
virtue of observers and not of agents of action”; in action, one does not always enjoy 
the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one’s individual conscience and 
the good of mankind.  The choice must always be for the latter.  Action is for mass 
salvation and not for the individual’s personal salvation.  He who sacrifices mass 
good for his personal conscience has a peculiar conception of “personal salvation”; 
he doesn’t care enough for people to be “corrupted” for them... 
 
2, Political reality – human condition 
What are the characteristics of politics or human condition which make acting 
there morally problematic? Why is it that moral dilemmas are more typical here and in 
economics than in other fields of human life? How can the human condition be so 
absurd that right results often can be achieved only by wrong actions?105 In general, 
may one suppose that human condition allows morally right life? Or, if there are only 
extraordinary situations – called emergency – when people is forced to commit 
morally wrong actions, why there such situations are? Is the human condition, or at 
least politics, not simply unordered, but morally absurd as well? 
One of the main issues for Thucydides beside the defence of Athenians’ power 
politics was the effective action in politics. He defended their politics by means of a 
so-called “realist” description of politics. Political actions were characterized as 
strategic, snake-like rational carrying one’s interest. The honest and successful 
Athenians think of people as assertive and ruthless without real moral 
considerations.106 In this description human beings are without moral concern, they 
motivated by angry, envy, fear self-interest and the will-to-power. Therefore they can 
be made to co-operate only by enforcement, violence and fraud.107 (See Hobbes’ 
Leviathan ch. XIII.) He didn’t wrote that some men some times are motivated by the 
will-to-power, but he taught that all men always motivated by that. Naked force is 
simple the necessary means to find our way in the world or to create order. 
One may read similar ideas concerning political action in St. Augustine’s, 
Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’ works, who interpreted human condition as containing 
sinful or amoral, masterless people. Defenders of the morally problematic actions 
interpret usually human nature and political reality as inherently amoral, which can be 
ordered only from without by force. Beside the amorality (i.e. the sinful nature) of 
political reality, it is game-like. Those involved in politics are not only motivated by 
self-interest, but they want to get power above each other, therefore it is like other 
activities as trade or battle. Because politics about the human relations and 
arrangements, in absence of consensus concerning good order or proper relationships, 
people have to be forced to accept the arrangements created by winners. But, on the 
other hand, power needs support and loyalty as well, it cannot be based only on fear. 
Therefore politics is continuously unstable: enforcement and violence to get power 
seems to be a part of the game, but power cannot exist without some voluntary 
support and loyalty, i.e. legitimacy, as well. The Dirt hands dilemma refers to an 
important characteristic of politics: its actors interested mainly in results, so utility is 
more significant here than motivation. And finally, people who argue for dirty actions 
imply or emphasize usually the separation of public and private life. They say, that 
private moral obligation cannot bind action for sake of public interests.  
Plato’s dialogues answered partly to Thucydides who argued for democracy in 
Athens. He – just like his antagonist, Thucydides – separated just life and morality 
from politics.108 Accepting this separation some people have been hoping to eliminate 
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politics altogether by faith, by institutional reforms (as the elimination of private 
property), by bureaucratic-scientific expertise or by communicative action and 
deliberative democracy. 
  
- agnostic argument 
 Human condition contains the anxiety because of its unknowable character. 
Although, cave dwellers closed into their perception of shadows without hope to 
convert, they have to act. The uncertainty and moral absurdity of human condition in 
general, and politics in particular is that even rightly motivated action may result 
wrong consequences, and, on the other hand, wrongly motivated actions or wrong 
means may result right consequences. As St. Augustine put, the human condition is 
opaque where we may have only probable knowledge about the others intention and 
our situations. Man may know only partially the consequences of his actions. 
Therefore, human condition is not chess-like as Goerg Simmel109 described, it more 
opaque: it is without clear rules and knowledge concerning the others’ approximate 
intentions.  
The problem of Dirty hands shows that mainly in politics, man are faced 
conditions and tasks which exceed his faculties.110 But this view on politics or human 
condition in general doesn’t have to conclude that dilemmas or conflicts can be solved 
only by means of violence and fraud.  
The notion of non-intended consequences, side effects or hidden hand, called 
by modern as latent function, refers to this tragic or ironic situation: man have to act 
and be responsible in unknowable conditions. The unpleasant hazard of failure is 
always present, but is also makes room for liberum arbitrium. 
 
- sin, self-interest, amoral human nature  
Plato’s description on demos is similar to those how St. Agustine depicted the 
civitas terrena, or Machiavelli the Renaissance citizens and Hobbes the Puritan faith-
warriors. Human nature is sinful according St. Augustine, not the love of God, but the 
love of ourselves (i.e. amor sui) motivates most people. In Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’ 
works man is depicted as masterless, rebellious and dishonest amoral being with 
whom is meaningless or useless to argue or make an agreement. As Machiavelli 
wrote: 
 “In addition to this, human appetites being insatiable (because by nature they 
have to be able to and want to desire everything, and to be able to effect little for 
themselves because of fortune), there arises a continuous discontent in the human 
mind, and a weariness of the things they possess; which makes them find fault with the 
present times, praise the past, and desire the future, although in doing this they are 
not moved by any reasonable cause”.111 
 
- truth claims 
Conflict, antagonism seems to be perennial, ineradicable, but not only because 
of the biases, interests, limited resources and pathologies. A serious source of these 
antagonisms is the very idea of justice and liberty and other transcendental knowledge 
which aims to abolish politics, struggles and enforcement and violence altogether. 
(See Plato’s philosopher turning back into the cave) The rebirth of Platonic issues has 
problematized the taken for granted relationship between the political order of cave 
dwellers and truth claims, and turned the attention to the agonistic and authoritative 
nature of politics emerging from the ambiguity of claims referring to justice or liberty. 
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Divine madness must be overcome but it can never been completely kept out. The 
European political – intellectual as well as institutional – tradition cannot cope with 
this problem, there seems to be a continuous flux of violence, enforcement to secure 
peace. Historical achievements are fragmentary and broken. Both the institutional and 
the intellectualist approaches set aside the violence and enforcement used by political 
authority. However, neither of them can fulfill this hope. Both the truth claims coming 
from mania, and the several imperfections and contingency necessarily result conflicts 
and dilemmas. Therefore de-liberation and the concomitant enforcement seem to be 
smuggled unreflectively into the practice during the process of creating political unity 
from plurality. 
 
According top this view, human condition is not self-regulating or self-
ordering, order can be only political to overcome of radical plurality coming from 
numberless sources. There is no substitute for politics, if by politics we mean the 
several ways in which authoritative decisions are arrived in a world in which there are 
different opinions, interest and views about the purposes of government, proper 
arrangements of human relations.  
 
3, Argument for strong state power 
The so-called ‘realist’ view of human condition and the acceptance of dirty 
politics are combined with the claim of strong executive power in St. Augustine’s, 
Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’ thinking. While they had the above described tragic view 
on human condition, they accepted wrong actions only in public life and only from 
politicians, but not in the private life. Why is it so? The moral separation of private 
and public, that is, in the private life moral integrity can be better valued than public 
good, presupposes not only that public is more important than personal moral 
integrity, but also the conflicts between certain public goods (like order, power, 
welfare, etc.) and morality. 
As Machiavelli wrote, again: „for where the entire safety of the country is to 
be decided, there ought not to exist any consideration of what is just or unjust, nor 
what is merciful or cruel, nor what is praiseworthy or ignominious; rather, ahead of 
every other consideration, that proceeding ought to be followed which will save the 
life of the country and maintain its liberty”.112 
And “a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which 
men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to 
faith, friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a 
mind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, 
yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if 
compelled, then to know how to set about it”. 113 
According the defenders of dirty actions, political situation is not normal 
situation, but a rather specific one, because the restoration of order, decent life 
requires to use means that are forbidden in other fields. The worldly magistrates create 
order in the above described ambiguous human condition, therefore those who create 
and keep order can claim the privilege of immoral acts or they are burdened by the 
duty of committing immoral acts and the concomitant distracted conscience.  
If there is no any order, rules in human condition, it should be created by 
violence and fraud. Politics is not a part of human nature, but it completes it. Because 
men are immoral and apt to use force and fraud, politics and state should create order, 
a chance for good life. Politics is not the elimination of violence and force, but their 
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use against themselves. State, based on enforcement, is the visible Dirty Hand 
itself.114 
Even good, moral people commit sinful actions because of the tragic nature of 
human condition, but politician is obliged to commit them. Policy is necessary in an 
immoral world: „how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live, that he 
who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his 
preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon 
meets with what destroys him among so much that is evil.”115 (See also Machiavelli’s 
A description of the methods adopted by the Duke Valentino when murdering 
Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina 
Orsini)  
 Apart from the ciceronian tradition, St. Augustine, Machiavelli didn’t simply 
wrote that utilitas more important in politics than honestas, so wrong action is 
necessary in politics,  but they taught that wrong action may result right political 
results. Later this absurd view of human world was spread into human affairs in 
general by Mandeville and A. Smith. „a wise planner will never reprimand anyone for 
any extraordinary activity that he should employ either in the establishment of a 
Kingdom or in constituting a Republic. It is well then, when the deed accuses him, the 
result should excuse him; and when it is good”.116  
An important argument for the use of violence and enforcement is the Goddess 
Fortuna or as Aquinas called it contingency. If there is a continuous and unforeseen 
flux and change in human affairs, how an order can be created in it from without? 
Goddess Fortuna, referred to the unforeseen consequences of actions, took the role of 
Providence of God.117 The arguments for dirty, that is morally problematic actions, 
presupposes that these unpleasant unforeseen consequences can be eliminated by force 
or fraud,118 but we cannot find clear analysis of these effects of enforcement and 
fraud. What is more, the more radical is Fortuna’s role in the description of political 
reality, the dirtier actions are claimed to check it. The continuous flux and change of 
human condition dominated by Fortuna vindicated a regular and powerful state to 
create order anyhow. 119 Because God left the saeculum, it is dominated by sin, 
chance, contingency and Fortuna, state is necessary. And state means the 
institutionalized use of enforcement to create order, i.e. a right consequence of dirty 
actions. 
In spite of his latent agnosticism, Machiavelli formed rules of actions for 
politicians. An important part of this dilemma is the fickleness character of human 
condition.  But if it is true, how one can suppose that force or violence will cause fear, 
and fear will motivate the claimed action from underdogs. But fear may result angry, 
as well, therefore violence should be prudentially used. 120 
Namely, if one supposes that political situations are opaque, how can he 
maintain that force, violence, fraud or any dirty action would result the hoped results? 
This argument for dirty actions supposes what was refused at the beginnings of the 
argument: the fully knowable character of human situations. 
This morally absurd view of human condition used for justifying morally 
problematic actions, but this agnosticism may be overturned against the argument for 
dirty actions, as it was did by Montaigne. He taught that prudence and even prince’s 
force is too weak to dominate Fortuna: (See his essay: BY DIVERS MEANES MEN 
COME UNTO A LIKE END) “What have our lawmakers gained with chusing a 
hundred thousand kinds of particular cases, and adde as many lawes unto them? That 
number hath no proportion with the infinite diversity of humane accidents. The 
 44 
multiplying of our inventions shall never come to the variation of examples. Adde a 
hundred times as many unto them, yet shall it not follow that of events to come there 
be any one found that in all this infinite number of selected and enregistred events 
shall meete with one to which be may so exactly joyne and match it, but some 
circumstance and diversity will remaine that may require a diverse consideration of 
judgement. There is but little relation betweene our actions that are in perpetuall 
mutation and the fixed and unmoveable lawes.” (ch. XIII Of experience) 
 Montaigne’s criticism radicalized the agnostic view: human condition is so 
much changeable that one cannot put general rule concerning the necessity of dirty 
actions like violence and fraud. (see ch. XXXIII That fortune is oftentimes met withall 
in pursuit of reason; XLVII. Of the uncertaintie of our judgement) Accepting that 
human world is radically chaotic and without self-imposed rules, one may ask how 
politicians can know rules for effective but dirty actions?  If it is true that people’s 
actions cannot be predicted, why politicians may hope to act consistently by immoral 
prudence? (ch. Of the inconstancie of our Actions) 
„The like I thinke of these politike discourses. What part soever you are put 
unto, you have as good a game as your fellow: provided you affront not the apparant 
and plain principles.” (Of Pretence)  In human affairs, mainly in politics, no one may 
get certainty about the consequences of an action, nobody can foresee, therefore 
political actors are without good argument for violent or fraudulent actions. One 
doesn’t have good reason think that dirty action will be more successful than any 
other.   
Not only violence but even laws are unable to solve the problem of political 
order because the ambiguities of actions and situations can be decided only by 
enforcement. The more laws are created to make order, the more enforcement is 
needed. The rational control of human condition or even foresee of the consequences 
of actions are practically impossible. Neither dirty action, nor amoral rationality is 
able to liberate people from this absurd and tragic character of human condition and 
human epistemological.  
 
4,  Undermining the epistemological presuppositions of democracy and 
rational bureaucracy 
- The Dirty hands dilemma means that someone knows the situation and the 
means to reach the wished outcomes. If the means perceived as wrong, it is maybe a 
mistake, because the action is from right motive and it results good consequences, just 
like medicine contains sometimes poison. But, if man perceive right action as morally 
problematic, it means that his faculty to orientate himself in moral and political world 
is limited. 121 Moral claim may cause only irresolvable dilemmas and turbulences in 
political or individual life. Because of the characteristics of human condition and 
humans’ handicapped faculty to get proper knowledge for actions, moral 
consideration is tragic ab ovo. It creates only irresolvable individual and political 
perplexities. Moral dilemmas are not resolved but eliminated by tyrants and the 
Moderns by arguing for the separation of politics from moral claims.  
If human condition is full of traps and perplexities, cannot be solved, less by 
philosophers, the best if one takes them easy without any anxiety as Lucian wrote in 
his Menippus: 'The life of the ordinary man is the best and most prudent choice; cease 
from the folly of metaphysical speculation and inquiry into origins and ends, utterly 
reject their clever logic, count all these things idle talk, and pursue one end alone--
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how you may do what your hand finds to do, and go your way with ever a smile and 
never a passion.'.122 
The Dirty hands dilemma points to a pious acceptance of Augustinian theology 
in which the world is morally absurd and opaque, contingent, and to the refusal of the 
Pelagian or Gnostic hope of redeeming Modernity. According to St. Augustine our 
knowledge is limited, action always has side-effects and contains some failures, 
therefore the democratic ideal of self-control, self-domination is impossible. The 
acceptance of this human condition requires humility, a basic attitude of Christian 
religion. Otherwise, man will always feel oppressed and servile. And tranquility is 
fleeting at best, human beings are not rocks. Conflict and instability are perennial 
possibility. The yearning for a world without politics (dirty actions) is self-destructive. 
Because of the unforeseen and often unpleasant consequences, understanding 
the human condition contains a piety toward the human world: an acceptance of its 
fuzziness and that our knowledge of human world is rather limited. The emphasis of 
the narrowness and necessary imperfection of our knowledge is a pessimistic or tragic 
view, because man must make decisions on morally and cognitively uncertain 
epistemological basis. He must act in a fuzzy human world where he is still 
responsible as Oedipus was, still he is responsible for unforeseen consequences. And 
what is more, often morally wrong action may result some public good, what is the 
real absurdity for a rationalist.  
 
- Social reformism and the pragmatic hope for the end of political philosophy123 
were combined not only with critical description of human world, but with an 
arrogant pretence of knowledge, too. Politically Modern means the hope that 
people are able to take into their hands their own life, they will be their own 
masters, human condition can be completely understood and controlled. 
Consequently, anything resists human understanding and control – because it 
is opaque and unintelligible character – is interpreted as arbitrary and 
oppressive, what is worst, enemy of human progress and happiness. Moderns 
are rationalist because they are not able to accept piety: the sense that man 
must trust something what is out of his control. Political relation, just like 
human condition, contain humility, an arch-enemy for progressives.  Top u it 
blunty, progressive politics has emerged fom the utopicl hope for aworld witot 
the need for humility. 
- The Augustinian view of human condition and political action re-emerged 
with the anti-rationalist backlash. The non-rational and non-knowable nature 
of human world involves the necessary imperfection of politics. Even Aquinas 
who represented an optimistic view on human world and epistemological 
potentiality to know it, taught that emergency situations didn’t have laws. As 
he wrote: necessitas non subditur legi (ST, Ia IIae, q. 96, a.6), and necessitas 
non habet legem. (ST IIIa, q. 80, a.8) If not always, but in certain situations, 
called necessitas, human condition is morally obscure and absurd.  
 
If the human world is not rationally ordered and it seems to resist to its rational 
understanding as well as systematization, humans must part the certainty and clearness 
of maths in political and moral life. This anti-rationalist view of political knowledge 
and action undercuts implicitly democracy based on the notion of self-government and 
responsibility, and welfare state and bureaucratic ethos based on certainty and 
responsibility. How could anyone be responsible for his action without certain 
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knowledge about its consequences?  How could anyone be responsible for his action 
in an ethically absurd world full of dilemmas, contingency, dominated by Fortuna and 
unforeseen situations interpreted as “consequences”. The refusal of optimistic 
epistemology of rationalism may involve a pessimistic view of human agency and 
political settings. According to Dirty hands dilemma , the conflictuous  human nature 
and the absurd human condition cannot be avoided, therefore self-government is 
hopeless and simply  a present fraud. 
If one would accept Thucydides view on human nature or the Dirty hands 
dilemma, how could he found consensual or liberal democracy? The modern hope of 
intellectuals has been being the moral psychology of Kant, Rawls and Habermas, 
which is based on the idea that everyone is required morally to take the perspective of 
everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self and world of all 
others. (Habermas’ presupposition of communicative action - situation would be 
inclusive, coercion free, open and symmetrical - would eliminate decision and 
violence and fraud altogether.) And doing so, rational agreement will emerge 
somehow. But agreement and rational consensus is illusory. Politics is not an 
exchange of opinions but a contest for power. Political decision does not announce 
that the other party was morally wrong, simply, they have lost. There is no rational, no 
non-authoritative solution for plurality and contingency. Instead of rational agreement 
there can be coercion, authority, bargaining, manipulation. 
The “Dirty hands dilemma” would also mean that moral community 
impossible apart from its constitutional form, and immoral action didn’t cause too 
much hard in it. This dilemma refers to an unpleasant question: Does political 
morality exist at all? Or, politics is a tragical activity as one may learn, for example, 
from Weber’s Politics as Vocation, and not only its radical moraliziation á lá Kant or 
Rawls , but its modest vesion of Cicero or Aristotle is impossible altogether. 
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In Defence of Practice: Oakeshott reads Michael Polányi 
 
In the case of every author the question of thematic unity always arises. If there 
is any thematic unity in Oakeshott’s work, one aspect of it is the defence of practice: 
the defence of practice from the distorting effects of philosophy, science, history, 
rationalism, teleological state and the several political and intellectual effects of the 
rise of the masses. In his thinking, practice was connected to a matrix of ideas like 
tradition, Lebenswelt, all of which refer to reasonable action. Rationalism, teleological 
state and the ignoratio elenchi were seen by him as demolishing practice, i.e. 
reasonable interpretations of contingent situations and reasoned deliberations. In other 
words, his aim was the conservation of conversation.124 
In Oakeshott’s epistemology the most important mode was the practice. It is 
clear that the notion of practice took on different meanings in his different works, but 
he insisted on it. While in his Experience and its Modes125 he separated practice from 
history, science and philosophy, and tried to defend one from the others, in his later 
works he wrote on science, history and even philosophy (and theorizing) as activities 
containing their own practice. The result of this shift in Oakeshott’s interpretation of 
practice in his post-war works is a much wider use of the notion of practice, built on 
tradition and authority.  
Without a doubt the influences of several authors can be detected in 
Oakeshott’s thinking. However, in this paper I would like to emphasize the German 
influence: Dilthey’s, Heidegger’s, but most of all Michael Polányi’s influence. The 
last name is significant because Oakeshott referred only to a few authors, but his 
programmatic paper, Rationalism in politics (1947) starts with references to two 
Hungarian emigré scientists’ works, George Pólya’s How to Solve and Michael 
Polányi’s Science, Faith and Society.126 Both of them pointed out that science is far 
from representing a definite and different mental operation. Both Oakeshott and 
Michael Polányi aimed to undermine the epistemological claims of the opposed 
political thinking and activity. Polányi’s description of scientific activity supported the 
broadening and transformation of Oakeshott’s own notion of practice. (Since another 
important resource, according to his references in Rationalism in Politics127, for his 
main theme, the defence of practice, was Confucianism, he may be called a kind of 
„political taoist”: tao is proper functioning, acting, which follows a pattern inherent in 
a given activity.) 
Oakeshott’s life-long effort was to tell something to the hopelessly dry 
utilitarian Anglo-Saxon audience. His debt to Hegel via the British idealist is well 
known, but in case of his core theme, the defence of practice, we should keep in our 
mind Heidegger’s famous workshop metaphor in Being and Time. This metaphor 
points to fore-structure, fore-conception presupposed in any activity or theory. 
Everyday life is basically pre-theoretical, and Heidegger emphasized that practical 
activity is more fundamental than theory making. According to Heidegger, practical 
understanding cannot be regarded merely as an inferior grade of theoretical knowing. 
The practical understanding of a person engaged in an activity is not simply different 
from theoretical or philosophical understandings, as Aristotle teaches us, but it is prior 
to the theoretical understanding of a person looking on in a detached manner.  
Let us consider the cobbler in his shop as he uses tools to make shoes. How is 
it possible? Ordinarily, the equipment is so ready-to-hand, so handy that we are not 
explicitly aware of it as such. For example, in hammering away at the sole of a shoe, 
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the cobbler does not notice the hammer. Rather the tool is, in effect, transparent. For 
the tools to work right, they must be „invisible” in the sense that they disappear in 
favour of the work being done. Tools and meanings are useful because they are 
reliable. In their reliability they disappear in favour of the work to be done with them. 
Tools and meanings become visible, paradoxically, when their reliability vanishes: 
when they are missing, when they don’t work, or when they get in the way. When the 
cobbler reaches for a tool and cannot find it, when a breakdown of some sort occurs in 
the activity of work, the work world suddenly becomes illuminated in a way that it is 
not when he is engaged in working. The set of reference relationships that constitutes 
his world becomes revealed precisely because the smooth functioning of the work that 
is a constitutive element in those realtionships are now upset by the missing tool. The 
cobbler realizes that he cannot finish the shoe on which he is working without the 
tool. The questions arise: how, why and who removed the tool or meaning? 
As with most conservatives, Oakeshott was not simply interested in conserving 
the existing society. He did not look upon the whole as wholly rotten, for he saw some 
pockets of practice worth defending the ruins of tradition: „we have no resources 
outside the fragments, the vestiges, the relics of its own tradition of behaviour which 
the crisis has left untouched.” (RiP 59) 
 
Oakeshott on science and practice in Experience and its modes 
Oakeshott was only slightly interested in the philosophy of science, the part of 
the Experience and its modes concerning science is the shortest. Science interested 
him because of its supposed dangerous effects caused by its expansion into practice, 
because of its ignoratio elenchi: „we have now to consider the consequences of an 
incursion of scientific thought into the world of practical experience. And my view is, 
of course, that such an incursion causes no less error and confusion in the world of 
practice than that which follows, in the world of science, from a similar incursion of 
practical thought.” (E 312) Criticizing the expansionist science – originating from 
Newton’s Optica where he generalised the methods of natural science to other fields 
of understanding - Oakeshott tacitly accepted the positivist self-interpretation of 
science, mainly J.S. Mill’s and Russel’s positivist version of science. „there is little in 
the history of folly to which one may compare the infatuation which the modern mind 
has conceived for ’science’.” (E 312) (On the other hand, as early as in Experience 
and its modes he tacitly used the criticism of facticity and objectivity of scientific 
outlook emerged in German idealism such as Dilthey’s and Husserl’s works, and 
Heidegger’s lecture on Criticism of Facticity in 1923.) Oakeshott’s tacitly accepted 
positivist notion of science supposes that science is non-personal and ythe whole of its 
knowledge – apart from its presuppositions – is communicable. Michael Polányi 
criticism of this interperation of science attacked these points, underlining the 
authoritative and traditionalist, that is, the practical nature of scientific understanding. 
In Experience and its modes practice as a mode exists for the sake of actions, 
that is will – sub specie voluntatis. It means that science and history, just like 
philosophy are not activities because these differ from practice. „Practical knowledge 
is nor a conclusion of reason, but of intuition, not of reflection but of instinct.” (E 
252) Practical experiences are instinctive, random, irrational and beyond control. 
Referring to religion as practice par excellence, as „merely practical experience at its 
fullest” (E 292), Oakeshott seems to use the typical 18-19th century opposition of 
science and religion as two different and mutually exclusive modes of understanding.  
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Practice or volition (that is, religion and morality) „everywhere implies and 
depends upon an unrealized idea, a ’to be’ which is ’not yet’… practice is activity… 
practices takes the form of explicit change.” (E 257) Here I would not like to go into a 
detailed analysis of Oakeshott’s well-known notion of practice. For my present 
purposes it suffices to assert that practice is activity, and as such differs from the other 
modes and philosophy. Science, history and philosophy are explicitly beyond the 
scope of practice; talking about the practice of science or history is a categorical error, 
that is, something demolishing the coherence and meanings of each mode of 
understanding. In Experience and its modes scientists and historians have to put aside 
their practical interests, as engaging in practice (i.e. activities) they must not use 
scientific or historic ideas, if they would not like to demolish the coherence (i.e. 
meaningfulness) of  practice. Here Oakeshott seems still to follow Aristotle’s 
differentiation of praxis from contemplation, phronesis from eidos.   
 
Michael Polányi on science 
Michael Polányi started his career in biology and chemistry in Budapest, later 
he conducted physico-chemical researches in Germany from where he moved to 
Britain in 1933. He was a scientist far removed from the academic life of philosophy, 
and his interest in the philosophy of science sprang mainly from political motivation. 
In particular he was perturbed by the extent to which Western intellectuals succumbed 
to the influences of Nazism, Socialism, and the ideas of planning. His keenly felt and 
direct political experience was the collapse of the relatively liberal Habsburg Empire 
and the failure of liberal democracy in the Weimar Republic. Like many others of his 
generation he looked for the causes of the collapse of these parliamentary systems as 
well as of the fashion of planning which phenomenon was the target of Oakeshott’s 
criticism in his post-war works. His answer was that responsibility did not lie with the 
residues of premodern society and thinking, like tradition, authority and ugly 
prejudices. But rather that the Enlightenment was somehow responsible for these 
present problems. His criticism of the epistemological presuppositions of the 
Enlightenment was not at all unique – this criticism was not only well spread in 
Romanticism, in German idealism, but it was at hand in the British tradition as well, 
for example the Moot-circle (T.S. Eliot and Ch. Dawson) gave similar answers. 
Polányi wanted to defend free society just like free science endangered by false 
epistemological claims in science, politics and economy.  
Both Polányi and Oakeshott found the core of false epistemology in the idea of 
context-free, self-creating knowing and acting. According to Polányi the idea of 
context-free knowing and acting tries to explicate and criticize any knowledge in order 
to be able for absolute self-definition. Because of this perfectionist hope, the follower 
of this epistemology, consciously or not, demolishes the tacit knowledge needed in the 
practice in every meaningful activity, even in science itself. Polányi as a practicing 
scientist – he educated several Nobel Prize winners like Leo Szilárd, Jenı Wiegner 
and his son, John C. Polányi – proved that the way of getting scientific knowledge did 
not differ from the way any other knowledge is acquired. In Aquinas’s term: science is 
not scientia but opinio which is not certain, true understanding but probable based on 
authority and earlier experiences known from tradition. He emphasized that modern 
science was based on tradition, authority, presuppositions and faith forming a context. 
And the scientific activity contains a lot of and decisive non-conscious steps and 
elements. The empiricism of Bacon, Locke and Newton as well as the Cartesian 
rationalism supposed certain and perfect knowledge, and opposed tradition and 
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authority. This epistemological error dominant in science was called „objectivism” by 
Polányi. Polányi continuously spoke about the tradition and practice of science 
opposing its „objectivist” interpretation. He shared the criticism of Oakeshott and 
many other German post-Romanticist idealists regarding science as a not 
epistemologically but only in its premises differing mode of experience from 
knowledges used in everyday life. This criticism focused on the idea of fact or 
facticity. Polányi aimed – as Kuhn did later – to reinterpret scientific activity and its 
tradition. 
Knowledge in science is undefined just as in the case of biking or tea drinking. 
The pattern of invention, knowing and acting is the same – a non-conscious striving 
for coherence, an activity pursued without clear rules. People have two different kinds 
of knowledge: explicit knowledge – word, signs – and tacit knowledge existing in 
activity. This latter knowledge is not reflective, it is acritical, logically it cannot be 
controlled or argued against. Tacit knowledge is tacit decision making according to 
tacit measures. Scientific invention – i.e. finding the hidden coherence of nature – 
happens the same way as the learning of any activity. Learning an activity is a non- 
reflective finding of pre-existing coherence. 
Polányi based his idea of science on the problem of Plato’s Mnenon: how we 
know that we don’t know something. Or in Oakeshott’s language: why we look for the 
intimation of tradition. Polányi’s answer is that we look for knowledge because of 
non-conscious perception of coherence problems. Invention just like learning a 
practice follows the pattern described in the Gestalt psychology – we integrate clues 
not consciously and uncontrollably into a new whole. This integration, getting new 
knowledge presupposes indwelling into theories, presuppositions, knowledge. Getting 
knowledge and learning practices presuppose a taken-for-granted acceptance of a 
context. Scientific invention is making or finding coherence, and it originates in the 
perception of a problem, i.e. from the sense of incoherence. So, scientific activity is 
the same as any other meaningful activity – if meaningful or reasonable means 
nothing else than the coherence of elements in a context: it starts from a sense of 
incoherence and it results in the unconscious finding of coherence. The capacity of 
scientists to perceive the presence of lasting shapes as tokens of reality in nature 
differs from the capacity of our ordinary perception only by the fact that it can 
integrate shapes presented to it in terms which the perception of ordinary people 
cannot readily handle. Explicit rules of methodology of science can operate only by 
virtue of a tacit coefficient, the ideal exactitude has to be abandoned. The process of 
perception is akin to scientific discovery and learning an activity. And science is an 
activity, a practice akin to everyday practices. „The solution of riddles, the invention 
of practical devices, the recognition of indistinct shapes, the diagnosis of illness, the 
identification of rare species, and many other forms of guessing right include seem to 
conform to the same pattern. Among these I would include also the prayerful search 
for God.” (SFS 34) Scientific perception, invention as well as verification – the 
problem of propriety, i.e. phronesis – is based on personal and not wholly rule-bound 
judgements as in case of other practices in everyday life, and here Polányi emphasized 
personal judgement as opposed to automatic rule-following or syllogism. „The 
scientist’s task is not to observe any allegedly correct procedure but to get the right 
results.” (SFS 40) Finding natural laws „is not done and cannot be done, by aplying 
some explicitly known operation to the given evidence of measurements.” (SFS 22); 
„our decision… cannot be wholly derived from any explicit rules” (SFS 30) „The 
rules of research cannot usefully codified at all. Like the rules of all other higher arts, 
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they are embodied in practice alone.” (SFS 33) And learning how to do scientific 
researches based on imitation and intuition, is as well – intuitive finding of something 
hidden, i.e. consistency – controlled by authority. University „also imparts the 
beginnings of scientific judgement by teaching the practice of experimental proof and 
giving a first experience of routine research. But a full initiation into the premisses of 
science can be gained only by the few who possess the gifts for becoming independent 
scientists, and they usually achieve it only through close personal association with the 
intimate views and practice of a distinguished master.” (SFS 43) Learning in science 
is also based on and presupposes the presence of authority. 
For Polányi the pattern for understanding scientific discovery is the theory of 
the burgler, that is, the way we understand a situation in everyday life. The process of 
apprehension of reality is the same in science as in everyday life. In both cases the key 
idea is intuition which is per definitionem „always imperfect.” (SFS 36) It seems to be 
not too far from Oakeshott’s idea of the intimations of tradition as the reasonable way 
of finding proper actions in several practices. Actually Polányi used „intimation” 
alternatively to intuition. (SFS 81)  
Another similarity between scientific activity and other practices is that actors 
do not need to be conscious of clues integrated into coherence. Even more, most clues 
stay hidden, they belong to tacit knowledge. The idea of tacit knowledge opposes 
rationalism which for Oakeshott meant the idea of a ready made inventory of 
everything necessary – information, measures, tools, etc. – for an activity. As Polányi 
pointed out describing scientific activity, both in scientific activity and in everyday 
practices we know much more than we can formulate. The use of tools, measures, the 
identification of a situation, etc. requires tacit knowledge and these are the 
unconscious activity of our mind. Science as any other practice may be conducted 
only in a misty context. „The premisses underlying a major intellectual process are 
never formulated and transmitted in the form of definite precepts. When children learn 
to think naturalistically they do not acquire any explicit knowledge of the principles of 
causation.” (SFS 42) It happens as premisses of thought are in general transmitted 
from one generation to the next. They are learnt by intelligent imitation of the adult in 
context. „This training can be supplemented by precept, but imitative practice must 
always remain its main principle.” Painting, music, and scientific discovery and 
verification, etc. can be learned only by practice. (SFS 43) 
Science is not simply the same as any other meaningful activity, i.e. practice, 
but the other point is that problem solving, inventing, i.e. finding a new coherence is 
not a conscious or reflective activity. So, science has a practice which does not differ 
basically from any other practice, and therefore scientific knowledge or knowledges 
pretending to be „scientific” in politics or ethics cannot claim any superiority above 
knowledges of everyday practices. Deliberating just like understanding or inventing in 
science is tacit integration of clues, which presupposes indwelling, that is, 
unproblematic, tacit acceptance of clues, meanings, tools, etc. Understanding in 
science or understanding of a situation in everyday life presupposes indwelling, 
therefore problematization of or reflection on the whole context (tools, meanings, etc.) 
is not simply impossible, but it would demolish any reasonable, meaningful – 
coherent – action, perception, invention, because tools or meanings may help 
understanding only if they are taken for granted. As our attention focuses on a detail – 
a tool or a meaning – it loses its helping function in tacit understanding of a situation 
or tacit finding proper, meaningful action: for instance Heidegger’s example of the 
inappropriate hammer. If we listen to the hammer and nail, we are not able to fix 
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something properly. When people focus their attention to details, they lose their 
indwelling, the tacit acceptance. And with the loss of indwelling, people lose the 
chance of meaningful, proper action. Therefore the overstretched claim for reflective 
knowledge, methodical activity demolishes meanings and meaningful activities. 
 
The basic non-reflective, non-analytical nature of human understanding – in 
science as well as in everyday practice – means  
1, that so-called „objectivist” epistemology is a mistake even in science, and 
scientific activity does not differ from any other, 
2, the totalizing claim for reflective or analytical knowledge is against all 
meaningful activity in science itself too, 
3, tacit knowledge by defintion cannot be exported or implanted, indwelling is 
a slow and tortuous process which cannot be skipped over by new people, and  
4, this epistemology is responsible for our political and moral problems. The 
formalization of the totality of our knowledge referring to an activity and then the 
trying to act following this precepts demolish the activity itself. 
 
Oakeshott on practice in his post-war works 
In his post-war works Oakeshott used practice in a wider and therefore 
changed meaning. He wrote about the parctice of theorizing, science and history 
without even mentioning the danger or problem of ignoratio elenchi or criticizing 
pragmatism. He may have done this because he used practice in an altered sense 
which separated practice/tradition from rationalism and not from the different modes 
of experience. In this new meaning practice referred to skill or being at home in a 
meaningful activity: the knowing how. While earlier he aimed to defend practice from 
science by separating them strictly, in his post-war works he refers to science as 
having its own practice, that is, practical knowledge, so he defended practice, i.e. 
meaningful, coherent activities (including science), from the claims of a positivist 
notion of science (rationalism) by pointing out that even science works as our 
common everyday practice. Therefore science cannot have claims for a more certain 
or superior kind of knowledge than knowledge used in everyday practice (phronesis). 
Oakeshott’s criticism of scientism attacked mainly the claims in politics and morality 
supported by supposedly superior epistemology, that is, rationalism. In his post-war 
works it is not science or history as such, but rather the mistaken epistemological 
claims (and political and moral claims supported by it) that seem to endanger practice, 
now connected much more to tradition and authority than the earlier notion of practice 
used in Experience and its modes. 
The meanings of practice and tradition – notions used interchangeably128 – in 
Rationalism in Politics and in On Human Conduct is close to Dilthey’s geistige Welt 
and Husserl’s Lebenswelt. „Being at home” in the world (in his Tower of Babel) as a 
characteristic of practice was not mentioned in Experience and its modes. The notion 
of „being at home” refers to the unproblematic nature of practice, that is indwelling 
which is a precondition of propriety in practices, perception, etc. This non-Aristotelian 
notion of praxis was opposed to the rationalist epistemological ideal, and became 
dominant in Oakeshott’s post-war works. (To tell the truth, there are references to this 
notion of practice already in Experience and its modes and in On Human Conduct, 
when Oakeshott wrote about the philosopher’s relations to common, cave-dweller 
people. However, here tacitness and mental mist are not something specially 
characterising practice or practical knowledge, but these refer to non-philosophical 
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modes of knowledge.) Total self-transparency turns out to be impossible, because 
human beings are thrown into a world of deeply imbedded, historical practices that 
can never be made fully explicit. 
In Oakeshott’s criticism, rationalism is opposed to practice. Rationalism meant 
for him a way of thinking which supposed and claimed the possibility of context-free 
knowing as well as action. This radical epistemology makes radical actions possible. 
Practice, tradition and Lebenswelt are connected notions because of their emphasis on 
the necessity of taken for granted context in reasonable, proper human thinking, 
speaking and acting. As Oakeshott emphasized in his post-war writings, meaningful 
knowing and reasonable action can be imagined only if the actor dwells in a 
historically pre-formed and inherited context. Oakeshott was not clear whether the 
rationalist (context-free) knowing and action was simply impossible or dangerous. 
However, rationalism was seen as corrupting existing practice, that is meaningfulness 
and reasonableness. Practice-tradition-Lebenswelt seems to be not any knowledge or 
context at hand. It differs from heritage, because it is the sedimentation of the wisdom 
rooted in our ancestors’ experience and its free and responsible conclusions, so the 
wisdom embedded in practice-tradition may inform the long-term effects and side-
effects of actions. The idea of practice-tradition-Lebenswelt is inherently normative, 
critical: if meaningful knowing and action are results of intersubjective, common 
knowledge rooted in the past, context-free knowing and action are meaningless and 
harmful for practice. 
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Oakeshott on artes liberales and political agency129 
 
Learning achieves fine things through taking pains, but evils one 
acquires of themselves without any pains. Democritus 47. 
 
Although Oakeshott disdained mass society and the concomitant enterprise 
association, he accepted the status quo as many others in the political thinking of his 
age, without any effort to criticize or justify any particular political institution.130 He 
abandoned the issue of political regime, and instead he, as many others, focused on 
political knowledge. Oakeshott’s Rationalism in Politics, like many other works since 
Plato’s apocryphal First Alcibiades, focused on a classical issue, the problem of 
political knowledge, what its nature is, where one can get it and how? For Oakeshott, 
political education is not ex ducare, not leading someone into the truth, it has nothing 
to do with justice and the world outside of cave-dwellers. The cave-dwellers cannot 
get practical knowledge from political philosophers who escaped from the prison of 
conditionality. Here Oakeshott wrote against the idea of political action “under the 
guidance of an independently and premediated ideology” as opposed to tradition.131 
However, at the beginning of the On Human Conduct he didn’t argued against 
ideologies  in general, but only against the causal explanations of ”alleged sciences”132 
as psychology and sociology, using the vocabulary of “laws” and “process” instead of 
practice. Here he criticized the “categorical muddle”, “confusion” and “rubbish”133 of 
modernist social sciences where “ignorant armies clash by night”.134 It is a little bit 
embarrassing that Oakeshott traced back them to Bacon’s anti-rhetorical phrase, “res, 
not verba”, but he seems not to reflect to Hobbes anti-rhetorical program of civic 
science. 
The lack of Oakeshott’s critical reflection to Hobbes anti-rhetorical and 
scientific program is rather surprising. Hobbes claimed the restoration of hierarchical 
order with the construction of civic science in the De Cive, the Elements of Law and 
the Leviathan.135 What is more, Hobbes perceived the plurality and subjectivity of 
individuals as dangerous for public peace, therefore he aimed to eliminate them from 
public life. In the “Preface” of De Cive, Hobbes wrote about a hypothetical golden age 
when there was full authority, but it was ruined by the debates of private people.136 
According to him, the debate can never result consensus and peace, only authority can 
create and keep them. The roots of debates and rebel are the nature of language and 
the man rebellious nature, so these seem to be parts of human condition. Opposing the 
optimism of Milton’s Aeropagitica, Hobbes lamented: “what bloodshed hath not this 
erroneous doctrine caused, that kings are not superiors to, but administrators for the 
multitude! Lastly, how many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of, which 
teacheth that the knowledge whether the commands of kings be just or unjust, belongs 
to private men; and that before they yield obedience, they not only may, but ought to 
dispute them!.. They kept empire entire, not by arguments, but by punishing the 
wicked and protecting the good… [people] nor were they kept in peace by 
disputations, but by power and authority… private men being called to councils of 
state , desired to prostitute justice, the only sister and wife of the supreme, to their 
own judgments and apprehensions; but embracing a false and empty shadow instead 
of it; they have begotten those hermaphrodite opinions of moral philosophers, partly 
right and comely, partly brutal and wild; the causes of all contentions and 
bloodsheds”.137 
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Hobbes saw civic science as weapon against human proudness, rebelliousness 
and fights in the “The Epistle Dedicatory” of De Corpore. 138 “The tongue of man is a 
trumpet of war and sedition”. 139 Political chaos connected to the disorder of 
language.140 Rhetoric can be effective from the same causes which question its 
efficiency, i.e. the limited capacity and opaque character of human mind. Speaker and 
Fortuna can exist only in a contingent world, where deliberations are needed and may 
happen. Rhetoric and practice can exist only in the opaque human condition, therefore 
the civic science (scientia civilis) aimed by Hobbes not only opposed rhetoric, but it 
had a different view on human condition, too. 
It is a part of the nature of language that its meanings, mainly the metaphors141, 
are ambiguous, debatable, therefore language needs deliberation. Because language 
lacks natural standards, it may not exist in practice without authority deciding the 
ambiguities. Language needs authority, therefore it cannot found it. 
 “But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which 
he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his 
contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are 
ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and 
absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of 
the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no 
Commonwealth; or, in a Commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from 
an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his 
sentence the rule thereof”.142 
On the other hand, not only language need authority, but authority works by 
words.143 That was the reason why, mainly in his Behemoth, Hobbes refused the 
Protestant practice of Bible interpretation and Luther’s teaching of sola Scriptura. In 
the chapter X. of De Cive, Hobbes refused the basic element of rhetoric, the ethos and 
invention.  According to the chapter ch. XII  of De Cive, rhetoric and the studia 
humanitatis are the root of political evil in general. In the chapter V. of the Elements 
of Law one may find the refusal of  prudential, and in the next chapter the 
enthronement of maths as a perfect and universal  demonstrative method. 
Hobbes needed civic science as not linguistic, therefore preceding debates and 
fights. Thus, not the practice of civic science, but its conclusions can found order and 
support authority. It presupposes a different world than rhetoric: civic science’s world 
is transparent for human mind, containing clear causal relations which can be known 
and by them eliminating the uncertainties of human condition. De Cive hopes that the 
science created on the pattern on geometry can save people from ambiguity and 
fights.144 So, the epistemological uncertainty, plurality and debates are the sources of 
civil wars. 145 Hobbes taught that ethics and politics can be sciences, and the civic 
science can be useful to achieve the wished aims, i.e. public peace. Therefore, he 
proposed civic science where “everything is best understood by its constitutive 
causes”, like “in a watch, or some such small engine”.146 Civic science describes the 
human word as a contest of “blind forces” instead of the “twilight of obscure 
ideas”.147  
In the Experience and its Modes Oakeshott understood science as a 
quantitative discipline, but later he emphasized the impersonal, mechanical character 
of social sciences in which “a society is understood as a process, or structure, or an 
ecology; that is, it is an unintelligent „going-on”, like a genetic process, a chemical 
structure, or a mechanical system. The components of this system are not agents 
performing actions; they are birth-rates, age groups, income brackets, intelligence 
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quotients, life-styles, evolving 'states of societies', environmental pressures, average 
mental ages, distributions in space and time, 'numbers of graduates', patterns of child-
bearing or of expenditure, systems of education, statistics concerning disease, poverty, 
unemployment, etc. And the enterprise is to make these identities more intelligible in 
terms of theorems displaying their functional interdependencies or causal 
relationships… It is not an impossible undertaking. But it has little to do with human 
and nothing at all to do with the performances of assignable agents. Whatever an 
environmental pressure, a behavior-style, or the distribution of gas-cookers may be 
said to be correlated with or to cause (a rise in the suicide rate? a fall in the use of 
detergents?) these are not terms in which the choice of an agent to do or say this rather 
than that in response to a contingent situation and in an adventure to procure an 
imagined and wished for satisfaction may be understood. It is only in a categorical 
confusion that this enterprise could be made to appear to yield an understanding of the 
substantive actions and utterances of an agent”.148 
It was clear for Oakeshott that theorems concerning human agency alter from 
those of mechanics or watches because of the interpretative character of human life.149 
Even the expression, “social science”, aiming to reduce human actions to causal 
relations, is a “ruinous categorical confusion” because it supposed to investigate 
human conducts “as if they were nonintelligent components of a ‘process’, or the 
functional constituents of a ‘system’, which do not have to learn their parts in order to 
play them. The design here is to remove human action and utterance from the category 
of intelligent going-on”.150 
 
2,  
In the past, political education was for the prince or the political class, let’s say 
gentlemen as the ambitious Alcibiades. The artes liberales and rhetorical education 
declined with the genre of the mirror for prince (specula principum). The education 
and character of the prince and the political class were seen important because of the 
good governance. It was not a question that someone should rule, therefore it was 
important  that the ruler should be virtuous man and not a tyrant. Erasmus wrote in the 
Education of a Christian Prince:  “In navigation the wheel is not given to him who 
surpasses his fellows in birth, wealth, or appearance, but rather to him who excels in 
his skill as a navigator, in his alertness, and in his dependability. Just so with the rule 
of a state: most naturally the power should be entrusted to him who excels all in the 
requisite kingly qualities of wisdom, justice, moderation, foresight, and zeal for the 
public welfare”.151 So politics is personal. 
In the pre-modern world, people lived in hierarchical institutions, therefore the 
practical question was for them: “How we should educate the good decision 
makers?”; “What kind of character may help them in practical decision making?” The 
only alternative for hierarchy was thought anarchy, the horrible chaos. But during and 
after the Reformation the idea of horizontal, that is, non-hierarchical and egalitarian 
relations spread, which could be based on faith or love, later on rational consensus or 
mutuality. In the 16-18th century the contractualist approach to good order replaced 
the monarchism of the Middle Age and the Renaissance. Contractualism asserted that 
government can exist only by the rational consent of the governed, men can live 
together as brothers, with minimal enforcement, “according to Reason” and “united in 
one Body”. This contractual hope to eliminate enforcement was followed by scientism 
after the failure of the contractual remaking of political and social relationships during 
French Revolution.  
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After the failure of contractual reconstruction of human world, the new hope 
was scientism. Firstly, it supposed a basically egalitarian, still non-chaotic human 
world. Its main question was, if not the authority of hierarchical institutions, like state 
or church, what can arrange people in peaceful cooperation. As Tocqueville noted: “In 
the ages of equality all men are independent of each other, isolated and weak. The 
movements of the multitude are not permanently guided by the will of any 
individuals; at such times humanity seems always to adherence of itself. In order, 
therefore, to explain what is passing in the world, man is driven to seek for some 
greater causes, which, acting in the same manner on all our fellow creatures, thus 
induce them all voluntarily to pursue  the same track. This again naturally leads the 
human mind to conceive general ideas and superinduces a taste for them”.152 The 
character of citizens as well as political class was undervalued by the egalitarian and 
scientist interpretation of politics. 
 Secondly, this social scientific approach to the understanding of human 
condition was, rather ironically, based on the idea of Providence. This understanding 
of human cooperation presupposes that morality or motivation of actions are out of 
question, because an invisible hands or some hidden causes, forces, or mechanisms,153 
systems154 explain the on-goings. The modernist social sciences have claimed to find 
these hidden and non-moral causes and forces, and they offered “regularities which do 
not have to be learned”,155 but can be used by politicians to manage rationally the 
political society for better future.  
In the pre-scientific view, the human condition, just like the motivation of each 
person in it, is opaque. Man is an unity of opposing and endless diversity of 
inclinations, and the invincible difficulty of agency is that we understand backward, 
but we must act and deliberate forward on the sandy basis of guesses and past 
experiences.  Modern scientists have abandoned the problem of moral motivation of 
actions coming from plurality and uncertainty of human condition, and started to 
create an amoral language of social and political sciences. As Yaron Ezrahi wrote: 
“sociology, political science, economics, psychology, and other modern social 
sciences was amoral discourse on human behaviour”.156  Because of “the difficulties 
of knowing other persons, of inferring their "reality," their true motives and intentions, 
from their outward behaviour”, modern social scientists implemented the machine 
metaphor and the notion of impersonal causes. 
Oakeshott reacted against this scientist view of human affairs mainly in the On 
Human Conduct, but he seems not to note Hobbes anti-rhetorical project. The 
“fraudulent claims of the so-called social sciences”157 call the self-interested or 
calculating action as the only reality, and according to them every moral consideration 
are only hypocritical appearances and useless for understanding and controlling on-
goings. Referring to Thucydides’ and Mandeville’s heritage, the basic and debunking 
experience of social scientists is that people only hypocritically refer to moral values. 
Science as such, in this view, is a version of realism or Epicureanism: humans are 
motivated by calculable self-interests, material-sensual joys. Therefore, social sciences 
presuppose a human being different from that of artes liberales. In social sciences 
neither individual action is moral, nor it should be, because social and political 
arrangements are unintended consequences of actions, created by hidden forces.  
The motivation and the consequences of action are separated since St. 
Augustine in our culture, and politics has been centered increasingly around 
consequences. From this point, the importance of the moral considerations or moral 
judgments of actors have been undervalued. The amoralizing social sciences offered a 
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vocabulary of “machine metaphor and concomitant notions such as equilibrium, 
balance, and self-regulation” and alleged techniques to manipulate human relations for 
peace, harmony and progress, without claiming moral actions of individuals or their 
moral re-education. In the 20th century, in the dominant view of market or democracy 
the ideal situation is a balanced one – see the phrase of “checks and balances” – apart 
from the equal actors’ moral considerations or characters. 
This view on political leadership as social-engineering needs technical 
knowledge of social relations to manipulate them with an emancipatory ethos: there is 
no need for moral education or moral control of citizens, because of the irrelevance 
the morality of individuals. Therefore, social-engineers could take the robe of 
emancipator from moral constrains as in the case of Karl Popper’s open society. The 
point is not whether someone is virtuous, but whether he has to bother himself with it 
or not. Modern political thinking have de-emphasized the importance of the character 
of political actors because of the alleged rationally enineered political arrangement 
which excludes enforcement. 
Not only the sort of knowledge contained in artes liberales, the education of 
phronimoi long ago, differs from that of the modern social science, but their basic 
presuppositions concerning human being and human condition are antithetical. Both 
contractualist and scientist view of human agency turned the attention to non-personal 
elements in politics, like institutional settings and rational knowledge used for 
continuous re-reform.  
If political actors’ moral considerations don’t matter, political agency – 
reinterpreted as engineering or reforming expertise - may be liberated from the moral 
dilemmas, uncertainty, risky decisions, responsibilities and conflicts coming from 
moral pluralism and uncertainties of human condition. Tradition, authority, faith and 
uncertainty have been thought as non-scientific and non-progressive, whilst scientific 
knowledge has been increasingly seen as solution for political debates, dilemmas and 
perplexes.  
According to the self-image of mainstream social sciences, these are interested 
in a disinterested comprehension of the play of interests. Whether politics is seen as a 
battlefield or a self-regulating machine containing checks and balances, political 
science itself amoralizes the very activity, it supposed to understand. According to the 
mainstream, political results are not connected to the actors morality, basically they 
motivated only or mainly by their interest. Successful understanding of political 
situations and actions can be based only on this so-called realist anthropology. The 
normative element of this view emphasis proper and exportable institutional setting, 
instead of the moral character of the political class. 
 
3,  
Oakeshott opposed practical knowledge to the rationalism of bookish action. 
At this point, he followed Hobbes in refuting those actors who “trusting only to the 
authority of books, follow the blind blindly”.158 In this dichotomy of practice and 
rationalism, is there any place for artes liberales? Artes liberales connected strongly 
to books, even if criticizing wise follies as the Praise of Folly. 
 If morality is a language which can be “learned only in being used”,159 where 
is a place for artes liberals? In the On Human Conduct, Oakeshott connected human 
agency to the Geistesgeschichte,160 because reading juts like acting needs some 
hermeneutical practice: “The starting-place of a doing is a state of reflective 
consciousness, namely, the agent’s own understanding of his situation, what it means 
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to him”.161 In the world everything is known to man “in terms of what it means to 
him. A human being is condemned  to be a learner because meanings have to be 
learned”.162 Writing about the liberal education he wrote: “Learning to read or to 
listen is a slow and exacting engagement… It is learning to follow, to understand and 
to rethink deliberate expressions of rational consciousness; it is learning to recognize 
fine shades of meaning without overbalancing into the lunacy of “decoding”; it is 
allowing another’s thoughts to reenact themselves on one’s own mind…and one may 
learn to read only by reading with care, and only from writing which stand well off 
from our immediate concerns: it is almost impossible to learn to read from 
contemporary writing”.163 
It’s no wonder that Oakeshott trusted the educational capacity of reading, 
because in our tradition reading is connected to moral education: lectio transit in 
mores.
164
  This tradition didn’t want to eliminate arbitration from human agency, he 
wanted only to educate and discipline it.  
The aim of liberal arts as an educational activity is character formation, and 
not the import and fabrication of institutional settings and manipulating techniques. It 
would educate people, because it presupposes the importance and the cultivation of 
the character of political class, ideally the phronimoi, and it understands political 
agency as prudent particularism. So it seems that not only in practice, but by means of 
reading as well one may get some practical skills. By means of liberal education, 
person may become “being able to see connections that allow one to make sense of 
the world and act within it in creative ways”.165 Meanings, partly explicit and partly 
implicit, interpret situations and keep relations, practices and selfs. Joseph says in 
Thomas Mann’s Joseph and his brothers that leadership is not in hand, but in mind, it 
means the ability for overview, i.e. to see meanings, coherence and incoherence in 
situations and in actions. Agency often means answering to empirical desire or 
difficulties, but political agency is typically needs Joseph’s ability. According to the 
fans of liberal education, one may get this sensitivity for meaning, coherence and 
incoherence in this education, but – and that’s important – nobody knows exactly 
how. This education is about morality in sense of self-discipline, about reflection but 
not about technical skill or representation of interest; it’s overtly a slow and time 
consuming process, admittedly opaque and the result is also confessedly uncertain. So, 
it is an aristocratic practice, proper for those who apply for political agency for its own 
sake, and won’t be in despair in case of unsuccessful public career. 
There are three different arguments about the connection between liberal 
education and political agency. 
a, Presupposing that life is a “continuous intellectual adventure”166 one willy-
nilly deals with human intelligence. According to his approach meaning is the 
common element in reading and acting: both contain the “intelligent procedure”167 of 
understanding. The two characteristic elements of rhetoric, separating it from civic 
sciences, are metaphor and invention. “The metaphor is, therefore, the original form 
of the interpretive act itself, which raises itself from the particular to the general 
through representation in an image”.168 Invention is a “capacity to perceive the 
analogies existing between matters lying far apart and, apparently, most dissimilar”.169 
The vocabulary of understanding and rhetoric is rather close to that of practice and 
morality: contingency, alternatives, deliberation, uncertainties, perplexes, propriety170 
and in practice like in understanding the judicial faculty of mind should be used. In 
aesthetic education or in games one may learn to see differences and to practice 
judgment171 without real responsibility.  
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Politics is an art without rules and aiming to find decorum in the midst of 
opposite and irreconcilable expectations, and artistic education is basically the same in 
every arts because of the cultivation of intuitive judgment. 
The knowledge contained in agency is not scientific but artistic, so it is never 
completed. From Classics, just like from practice, one may learn that no-one can 
control his life. And that’s fine. Culture, opposed to science, is an unfinished 
emotional and intellectual journey connected to liberal education.172  
b, Beside the similarities between in the intellectual activity of practice and 
reading, reading may make reader reflect to himself, and may help forming humility 
and self-criticism. For example, von Kleist’s The Prince of Homburg and Michael 
Kohlhaas are about moral luck, dilemmas, justice and responsibility “Being human is 
a historic adventure… Know Thyself meant learn to know thyself. It was not an 
exhortation to buy a book on psychology and study it, it meant, contemplate and learn 
from what men, from time to time, have made of this engagement of learning to be a 
man”.173  
This moral stance  of reflection is experienced as a restrain from within, 
traditionally called as the “inner man”. Not sainthood, but the normative self-
reflection is human, that is, knowing that one has acted or are acting against his notion 
of proper or good behavior. Liberal education turns our attention to dilemmas or 
perplexes, to the tragic sense of agency, and by reflecting to them one may realize his 
limits. Prudence may start by this elimination of hybris.  
c, The voice of poetry was important for Oakeshott, because it may liberate 
one  from the constrain of his time, situation and “currant engagements, from the 
muddle, the crudity, the sentimentality, the intellectual poverty and the emotional 
morass of ordinary life”.174 “Becoming educated is itself an emancipation”.175 Liberal 
education takes individual into another world, it can liberate mind from hegemonic 
intellectual fashions and from the professionally narrow expertise. On the other hand, 
the poetical character of liberal arts refers to the search for intuition.  Logic, arithmetic 
or syllogism cannot lead to new insight, but somehow, in the play of free association 
of ideas new insights may emerge.176 
 
4, 
The relation between liberal education and modern social sciences seems to be 
not too friendly. Oakeshott wrote that “social sciences… damaged liberal learning” 
because of using the mask of science.177 The decline of liberal education has been 
connected to an attack from social science arguing by their alleged relevance and 
usefulness and to the massification of society. He wrote about the “cruder subversion 
of liberal learning” associated with an apocalyptic view of “collapse which now 
threaten us” and the “abolition of man”. 178  
The liberal education was associated with the gentleman. In the contemporary 
academic life liberal arts are pushed back into the humanities. Oakeshott didn’t 
perceived only social sciences and the fashion of technics as dangers for liberal 
education and civility, but “culture philistines”, too.179  Liberal education could 
survive only in a closet far from any practical relevance. The contemporary liberal 
education can be found mainly in departments following the philosophical ideal, 
searching speculative truth and beauty.  The ideal of gentleman declined, and the 
philosophical ideal of open rational discussion aiming truth, called deliberative 
democracy is strong today. Political and moral thinking has been being dominated 
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partly by the liberal casuistry, i.e. analytic philosophy, and partly by several 
emancipating versions of post-moderns. 
Liberal education was connected originally to the Ciceronian republicanism, to 
the philosopher in action, who takes part actively in political-moral community and 
tries to find the propriety. Cicero’s phrase artes qua libero sunt dignae has been and it 
is still aristocratic, claiming freedom and leisure180, and aiming public leading roles. 
So otium may effect somehow negotium. Emphasis is on both “effect” and 
“somehow”. One of the scandal concerning liberal education is the lack of its 
methodology and the highly probable results arrived by it. 
Political agency described above does not only differ from social engineering, 
but overtly opposes the dominant political ideal of morally free and consensual, only 
technically and impersonally dominated people. Liberal education as education for 
political agency is about decision making. But the notion of decision contains 
enforcement, because making decision among competing claims means to 
overshadow some, therefore a decision always means enforcing some people and their 
claims. No decision can be perfectly founded, there may be always some criticism 
concerning it, thus the ideas of decision and liberal education oppose a wall-to-wall 
consensus and implying enforcement. 
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Conservatives’ Paradox  
 
The Master said “Men all say, ‘We are wise’; but being driven forward and 
taken in a net, a trap, or a pitfall, they know not how to escape.” 
The Doctrine of the Mean, Confucius 
 
‘Conservative’ is a rather ambivalent label in Hungary, as maybe in other post-
Communist countries today.  It was used, around 1990, to refer to hardliner or 
dogmatic Communists, who insisted uncritically on some radical dogma.  More 
recently it has been used for those who opposed post-Communists and the post-
Communist world.  Because of our recent past, some people say that there is only a 
Socialist (or Communist) tradition, therefore conservatives must be Socialist, and the 
non-socialist political tradition was demolished during the last 40 years.  Mutatis 
mutandis, the same can be said about Western mass democracies, as well. 
The ambivalent meaning of the term ‘Conservative’ refers to the problematic 
relation of Conservatives to the existing world around them.  And from this point of 
view, no difference can be seen between the Conservatives of the West and those of 
the post-Communist world.  In both cases, the problem is their relation to the present 
and to the recent past that has resulted in the present. 
Conservatives are not always or necessarily for the status quo.  For them the 
main difficulty is in finding institutions worthy of preservation, institutions that have 
not been distorted to the point of being no longer worth preserving.  Whilst in post-
Communist countries totalitarianism made this problem clear, in Western liberal 
democracies the welfare state, mass society, and mass culture have raised the same 
question:  What do Conservatives want to conserve?  Many Conservatives look 
around the world and do not like what they find.  Their complaints about the loss of 
tradition and authority — to mention only some favorites of Conservatives — 
expresses this distaste.  But it is not really new; the very founders of Conservative 
thinking, like Edmund Burke, were not satisfied by their world.  One may find the 
same phenomenon among the German Conservative revolutionaries at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, or among the Anglo-Saxon Conservatives during the 
seventies and eighties.  These examples show that the critical attitude toward the 
world is not only common among Conservatives but, with it, they often fall into the 
sin of rationalism, of seeing the dissatisfying present as a problem to be solved. 
The double problem of sorting out a tradition’s relation to the present while 
taking either an accepting or a critical stance toward the contemporary world is not a 
Hungarian post-Communist peculiarity.  Nor is conservatism easily confined to 
merely historical horizons.  An idealized past easily throws up abstract ideals.  Karl 
Mannheim, for example, at one time interpreted Conservative thinking as 
traditionalism, but later mentioned it as a form of utopian mentality.181  It is simply 
not true despite Oakeshott’s noting the conservative’s capacity for delight that 
Conservatives are generally delighted at what they find. 
The concern of this essay is whether Conservatives can be critical of the world 
around them and not rationalistic or ideological at the same time.  Can the criticism of 
the present and recent past be combined coherently with reverence towards tradition 
and authority; that is to say, can that criticism resist being transformed into an appeal 
to abstract principles standing over and against the actual, inherited world in which we 
live? 
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Conservatives’ criticism of the present is not carried out in a modern 
Enlightenment style, negating the existing world in the name of a better future.  Their 
criticism is based on tradition, which is not an antiquarian notion in the Conservative 
mind, but one that refers to ideas of proper and reasonable action, and good order. 
I would suggest that we should resuscitate the original normative meaning of 
tradition:  it is not anything at hand, but only what was tried and proved to be good.182  
Tradition answers indirectly to the Aristotelian questions:  What should we do?  And, 
what can we do? 
No doubt, tradition is selective.  As Nietzsche wrote183, man cannot live 
without both memory, and oblivion, but both of them are selective.  The notion of 
tradition implies that this selection is not whimsical, but it refers to experience and 
judgments of the past.  It is worth differentiating tradition from heritage.  Heritage is 
what is at hand; it refers to inertia and usage.  Heritage might even include some ruins.  
However, the notion of tradition is normative because it refers to practices that have 
been probed and tested, explored, and found to be adequate.  The authority of tradition 
arises from this experiential finding of satisfactoriness, and confers a presumption of 
goodness in what is.  The original notion of tradition is normative, because God 
reveals himself in history; therefore what could survive a long period of time and 
many tests and trials is probably from God. 
The oft-mentioned trial and error learning process of tradition or practical 
experience presupposes the freedom to make conclusions, decisions, and to form 
interpersonal relations.  Lucky countries may learn from their successes, but in the 
case of a not really lucky country, like Hungary, people may learn from failures as 
well.  But even in this case, tradition needs freedom.  The modern form of tyranny, 
totalitarianism, cannot create political tradition, only meaninglessness.  In the past 
under tyrannical politics some tradition might emerge because pre-modern tyranny did 
not interfere in everyday life practices.  Pre-modern tyranny only creamed off the 
harvest and took the nicest girls.  Only the Enlightened absolutism of the eighteenth 
century started directly to refashion people’s characters and practices in order to 
construct a new world.184  Therefore, not simply tyranny as such may demolish 
tradition, but mainly the modern social tyrannies, because these tend to interfere with 
the free trial and error learning process in almost every practice. 
The more tyrannical politics interfere with everyday practice, the less space is 
open for meaningful activities in economics, family life, housing, and other areas.  Of 
course, tradition may be initiated by force, chance, speculation, or imagination, but 
only the free deliberation of several generations can give authority to institutions or to 
knowledge.  The failure of Socialism shows the meaninglessness of forced actions.  It 
collapsed by itself.  Today, there is no Socialist tradition, only a dusty heritage. 
Beside the threat from totalitarianism, we can learn from Tocqueville’s 
description of democracy that egalitarianism opposes tradition, too.  Epistemological 
egalitarianism (a refusal of intellectual authority and of any kind of epistemological 
asymmetry) brings about epistemological chaos with political consequences.  
Tocqueville tells us that democracy coheres with a mental homelessness where 
everything is opened up to a borderless discussion.  Tradition, like authority, is 
“aristocratic,” in at least this negative sense — it allows and even welcomes 
distinction, and to learn its intricacies takes a lot of time and effort.  And contrary to 
egalitarianism, this learning process is based on the recognition of definite 
significances.  Tradition is based on differences:  first of all, the difference of master 
and disciple; secondly, the difference of importance.  Tradition teaches us to dare to 
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enhance or highlight something, it teaches us to make a difference between good and 
bad, important or less important, noble and ignoble, etc.  Making a difference is not 
democratic.  Making a difference means pointing to an author, to a text.  In 
Tocquevillian terms, it means an historiographic principle of explanation in terms of 
individual deeds, not impersonal social movements or ‘forces’. 
 
A World Without Tradition? 
It must be asked whether the conservative ideal of non reflectiveness — 
whether depicted by Burke,185 or by Oakeshott in his On Being Conservative,186 
reminding us of Bagehot’s famous remark on the joy and delight of the present state 
of things — is or is not incoherent with the critical attitude toward contemporary 
culture and politics.  In Burke’s case criticism was directed against French and 
English radicals, while in Oakeshott’s case, it was directed against the welfare state 
and mass society. 
‘Rationlaism’ is what Oakeshott called the morality of reflection, and the 
politics of the book.  Perhaps Burke’s Reflection was itself a step towards rationalism 
and this or any paper reflecting on tradition simply carries on this original sin — the 
fall into ‘traditionalism’.  Talk about tradition is not the same as living in and being 
embedded in tradition.   Talking about tradition is a job dear to a Catholic or an 
Oakeshottian, but C. S. Lewis’ warning should be always kept in mind that “analytical 
understanding must always be a basilisk which kills what it sees and only sees by 
killing.”187  Although Conservatives are eager to refuse ideologies and, because of 
that, most of them prefer the term ‘Conservative’ to the label ‘Conservatism’,188 the 
pursuit of political identity, self-definition, and mobilization after World War II tends 
to create canons, dogmas.  Are the contemporary Conservatives modern ideologues 
who accept some Conservative principles, but would like to refashion them in terms 
of rationalistic idelas to pursue “perfection as the crow flies”?  Or is the 
rationalization of Conservative thinking more or less necessary in a world without 
tradition and authority? 
Rationalism, that is, ideology and dogma-making is not rare among today’s 
Conservatives, maybe, partly, because of the intellectual origin and education of many 
of them.  But, on the other hand, it seems to me that they have to face up to 
rationalization as a more or less necessary result of the intellectualization of and 
reflection on tradition.  The modernists and the heirs of French Enlightenment forced 
them consciously to argue for tradition.  As Burke wrote:  “It has been the misfortune . 
. . of this age that everything is to be discussed.”189  In order to defend tradition people 
had to reflect on it, which resulted in some dogmatization of tradition.  Moderns 
forced tradition-bound people to give reasons for their prejudices and institutions, to 
argue for them.  This was a victory not over Conservatives, but over conservative 
habits.190  And it seems to me that there is no return to Adam’s prelapsarian, innocent 
world.  Any effort toward a reflective return to the unconscious and non-reflective 
way of thinking and acting seems to be ‘writing on water’. 
Because tradition is a key idea for Conservatives, the assumption of the 
evaporation of tradition undermines Conservative thinking itself.   But besides the 
inevitable creep of rationalism, can one see other answers among Conservatives 
concerning tradition and existing world? 
One common answer is that tradition is any knowledge and institutions at 
hand.  While this notion of tradition is far from radicalism, it may not bring about 
conflict or debates, because it is not critical of the contemporary world.  If one accepts 
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that tradition is simply ‘what is,’ he will accommodate himself to the status quo,191 
whatever it is, as Voltaire’s Pangloss did in his Candide.192  This domesticated, 
uncritical interpretation of the tradition is not rare and is welcomed by moderns.  The 
engines of progress will eventually transform the better future into the worser past; 
Pangloss will be reincarnated as Hegel. 
At this point, the question can be raised:  are tradition and authority substantial 
categories or do these refer to a certain mode of knowledge and action?  Do the 
notions of tradition and authority refer to some substance, commonly called good life 
or good order?  Or may anyone have authority; may tradition emerge anywhere and 
with any content? 
What I am suggesting is that the content of tradition is not a chance 
occurrence, even if it has emerged by chances.  What was handed over has some 
worth because it has survived.  On the other hand, if any knowledge and institution 
may be tradition, what differentiates tradition from fashion?  This interpretation would 
wash away the cultural and political differentiations between the Conservatives and 
moderns or post-moderns. 
A second, rather common answer to the question of Conservatives’ 
relationship to the contemporary world in light of their appreciation of the past is a 
nostalgia or melancholy because of the disappearance of the old good world of 
tradition.  As Burke wrote characteristically:  
The age of chivalry is gone.  That of sophisters, economists; and calculators 
has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever.  Never, never more 
shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission, that 
dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart which kept alive, even in servitude 
itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom.  The unbought grace of life, the cheap defense 
of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, is gone.193 
While this habit is not alien to us, we have to see clearly, that it assumes that 
the tradition is already gone and is irrelevant in contemporary life.  It is defeatist:  So, 
finally, we lost.  With this assumption, Conservatives’ task is only to slow down 
inevitable changes, but the future does not belong to them. 
A third answer is the so-called Conservative revolution (Nietzsche, Spengler, 
Hans Freyer, Ernst Jüng, Arthur Moeller van der Bruck).  They were optimistic about 
the capacities of human will and action, but presupposed the total loss of tradition.  
They opposed modernity and hoped to create a new man, new institutions, and a new 
order worth conserving.  But is there any other option than to bury thinking and action 
based on tradition?  Must today’s Conservatives wily-nily follow the German 
“Conservative revolutionaries”?  Or is the politics of slowing down the only 
alternative?  If Pangloss and Burke seem too acquiescent and too nostaligic, 
respectively, it hardly seems more sober to take up the standard of remaking the world 
in the pseudo-classicists image. 
 
So What? 
Once upon a time, the Hungarian born John Kekes asked Michael Oakeshott 
what could be done in a country where the existence of tradition, mainly a political 
one, was problematic.  Oakeshott’s semi-joking answer was, “That’s your problem.”  
Actually, that is our problem.  But as I can see, and as I have mentioned, it is a rather 
common problem of the West, as well.  As Oakeshott himself wrote, entertaining the 
thought of a crisis-point in a tradition at which everything seems lost: 
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If, in order to meet this crisis, there were some steady, unchanging, 
independent guide to which a society might resort, it would be no doubt be well 
advised to do so.  But no such guide exists; we have no resources outside the 
fragments, the vestiges, the relics of its own tradition of behaviour which the crisis has 
left untouched. (RIP, 50) 
To turn to one of, if not the major crisis to which Oakehsott directed his 
attention, we should look at his well-known criticisms of the modern productivist 
state, and of mass society.  Faced with what Ortega had labelled the ‘revolt of the 
masses’, emphasizing the revolutionary intent of the unconscious crowd and the 
civilizational stakes, and what others called, a little less uncalmly, the ‘crisis of 
modernity’, Oakeshott undertook to ‘shore the fragments against our ruin’, to gather 
the relics and dry bones of tradition, and to restate for contemporary ears the best of 
ancient and modern political wisdom.  He faced ‘our problem’. 
May a nonreflective quiet common sense or the plain man’s practices help 
guide human agents toward proper action?  From Burke up to Oakeshott we may read 
many complaints about the evaporation of Sittlichkeit and the homeless mind, as Peter 
Berger194 called it many years ago.  Some explain the spread of rationalism in terms of 
the loss of certainty and the rise of an intellectual proletariat who may have only his 
chains to lose.  But as Burke was forced by the French revolution, so the welfare state 
and New Left of the sixties forced the Conservatives to reflect on the world around 
them and on their presuppositions and prejudices.  But one may stop here.  It is not 
necessary to go further and to make a catalogue of tradition or Conservatism, which 
seems to be a widespread tendency.  The philosophical question is whether one is able 
to found and demonstrate universally a way of life and prejudices.  But these efforts 
are against the old habits of Conservatives who valued prejudices because they do not 
know their raison d’etre.195 
Is there any viable traditional knowledge at hand in the contemporary West or 
in the post-Communist countries that could steer a ship of state?  Or is it necessary to 
become rationalist and ideological? In the latter case, it would not be a different 
epistemology, or a different mode of thinking and acting, but only different dogmas 
that would differentiate Conservatives from their opponents.  Obviously, there must 
be some tradition at hand, and not only in museums and traditionalist communities.  
Of course, there are routines in everyday practices.  But the real issue is the existence 
of moral and political traditions that may help us in making judgments in borderline 
cases. 
In spite of centuries of critical destruction and reformulation of traditions, 
there are traditions in some islands of the lifeworld such as churches, libraries, 
vineyards, and families.  These islands help us in everyday life where we do not stand 
alone, homelessly, in a barbaric, meaningless plurality not moderated by tradition.  
But it is not the answer I am looking for.  The real issue is the existence of moral and 
political traditions, not simply vestigal traces of a past mode of life quaintly preserved, 
propped up by sentiment, tariffs, and sunk costs.  How could the warmth of family 
life, the cool of the cellar, or the quiet of a library help actors in political situations?  
Before the spread of the rationalist ideal of political action as technical expertise using 
systematized knowledge, political education followed Polybius’ ancient ideal, which 
used past events as a stock of experiences and examples out of which political actors 
might develop a tacit knowledge of situations and actors. 
While contemporary situations and problems do not correspond in detail with 
the past, the practical skills for proper and reasonable action, and the keys for 
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understanding current, non-routine situations, can be derived from learning about past 
situations.  Of course, such derivation does not happen via explicit, conscious 
inference.  Skillful apprehension of the past, like other skills, involves learning how to 
judge and not merely the assimilation of information.  Because these skills exist only 
in practice, they can be learned only by personal participation.  This ‘participation’ is 
an engagement to learn from the past, a question-and-response procedure as opposed 
to a merly personal reflection on first principles; but it is always someone reflecting 
and engaging something — in that sense, personal and direct. 
The European, Greco-Christian tradition of authors is still at hand.  We rely 
upon the same authors that past generations relied upon.  Of course, just as we do not 
redesign the fire station during a fire, no one would be so crazy as to rush into a 
library and initiate his diligent study of the classics when he is facing a non-routine 
situation, a ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’.  In borderline cases our tacit knowledge springs to 
the fore; of course, this presupposes an already-acquired moral and political educiton.  
We must face the new already armed with the appropriations of the old. 
This interpretive situation, broadly conceived, is becoming widely recognized 
as the starting point for grappling with the problem of prudence or practical wisdom 
today.  While the meaning of traditon remains in dispute, tradition’s importance does 
not.  One might assert, (melo-)dramatically, “we are all traditionalists.”  During the 
recent decades historians of ideas have contributed – not only in Hungary – to public 
debates by their archaeological excavations of authors and texts.  In the fields of 
political and social thought, scientism seems to me to be defeated, and the dominant 
mode of thinking is rather reflection on, or interpretation of, one author or tightly 
grouped subtraditions of several authors. 
History is the history of situations, and the description of situations is always 
“thick description,” to use Ryle and Geertz’s phrase.196  The description of situations 
or of experiences are thick, because they contain much more in a “many-layered 
sandwich” than can be expressed openly, or discussed analytically:  In another idiom, 
“There are also many other things that Jesus did, but if these were to be described 
individually, I do not think the whole world would contain the books that would be 
written” (John 21:25). 
 The great authors are great, partly, because of their rich and ineffable contents, 
of which some may be put into predicative statements, whilst many other elements 
will be reflected only in the studies, commentaries, and appropriations of later 
generations.  But even the not yet reflected meanings are involved in the great authors’ 
texts.  Because of this “thick” character of great authors’ texts no one can argue for or 
against all the meanings imbedded in them.  The subject of political or social learning 
is its own history. 
To say that knowledge and experience come from tradition means that 
knowing and acting properly are never wholly a matter of present ideas; they are 
situated in a context of meanings originated from the past.  Because of that, what is 
radically new cannot be reasonable, and what is reasonable cannot be wholly new.  
The boundlessly free man and his action cannot be understood by others; thus, what is 
presented as freed from all linguistic, social, or historic moorings must be heard as 
senseless babble. 
Because the notion of tradition is usually connected to Conservatives, it may 
be important to point out, that the rediscovery of some past authors is not tradition yet.  
Leo Strauss and his method of “close reading” supposes that the original meaning of 
texts can be found and reconstructed apart from both the time gap between us and the 
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texts, and the commentaries concerning the authors.  Strauss’ methodology promises 
to jump over the tradition of commentaries.  But this stretching back does not differ 
too much from the hope of radical enthusiasts and enlightened philosophes, who 
hoped to jump back to the original meaning of the Gospels, or to understand directly 
what a Founding Father really intended.  Thus, while Strauss himself was aware of 
traditions of thought, of commentary and interpretation, his approach tries to work 
back beyond these, to what seems alone sufficiently authoritative to meet present 
crises:  the original.  However, this risks lapsing into a rigidly technical way of 
handling texts. 
 Traditional understanding is a cultivated mental habit, not the application of a 
technique.  Traditional knowledge is fused with a mode of life, with a kind of 
practice; therefore, traditional knowledge is personal.  Thus initiation into a tradition 
is always character formation, too, implying the acceptance of authority as such.  That 
is, the traditional learner apprentices with the great authors, submitting to them while 
being unsure where they will lead him.  As MacIntyre wrote: 
The reader was assigned the task of interpreting the text, but also had to 
discover, in and through his or her reading of those texts, that they in turn interpret the 
reader.  What the reader, as thus interpreted by the texts, has to learn about him or 
herself is that it is only the self as transformed through and by the reading of the texts 
which will be capable of reading the texts aright. . . .  The person in this predicament 
requires two things: a teacher and an obedient trust that what the teacher, interpreting 
the text, declares to be good reasons for transforming oneself into a different kind of 
person — and a different kind of reader — will turn out to be genuinely good reasons 
in the light afforded by that understanding of the texts which becomes available only 
to the transformed self.  The intending reader has to have inculcated into him or 
herself certain attitudes and dispositions, certain virtues, before he or she can know 
why these are to be accounted virtues.  So a prerational reordering of the self has to 
occur before the reader can have an adequate standard by which to judge what is good 
reason and what is not.  And this reordering requires obedient trust, not only in the 
authority of this particular teacher, but in that of the whole tradition of interpretative 
commentary into which that teacher had had earlier to him or herself to be initiated 
through his or her reordering and conversion.”197 
Conservatives are apt to think that the proper and reasonable moral and 
political action is the result of individual character and virtues rather than a pretended 
philosophical truth or scientific facts and laws.  It is never certain that someone will 
act according to the models found in classic texts, but his understanding of situations 
presented in them, and of judgments and decisions made in them, will probably 
influence his practical knowledge, as well as his character.  Therefore, as Oakeshott 
and our tradition say, education in the sense of character formation may be the answer 
for the dilemmas of tradition presented in this essay. 
What distinguishes a human being, indeed what constitutes a human being, is 
not merely his having to think, but his thoughts, his beliefs, doubts, understandings, 
his awareness of his own ignorance, his wants, preferences, choices, sentiments, 
emotions, purposes and his expression of them in utterances or actions which have 
meanings; and the necessary condition of all or any of this is that he must have learned 
it.  The price of the intelligent activity which constitutes being human is learning.  
When the human condition is said to be burdensome, what is being pointed to is not 
the mere necessity or having to think, to speak and to act (instead of merely being like 
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a stone, or growing like a tree) but the impossibility of thinking or feeling without 
having slowly and often painfully learned to think something.”198 
Today, to extol tradition is to swim against the tide.  Although having to learn 
“slowly and painfully” may eventually be a human predicament as widely recognized 
as our interpretive one, authors like McIntyre and Oakeshott are, at least for now, 
quite rare in being willing to tell us the price of becoming human in a world 
dominated by the flashy promises of fundamentalist rationalism on the one side, and 
on the other, a casual cynicism that calls itself ‘post-modernism’.  Traditional 
knowledge deals with forgotten, lost political and moral dilemmas, problems, and 
experiences.  It is thanks to the continual resuscitation of authors out of textual 
entombment in dark and dusty archives, and their return to life’s playing fields that we 
have notions — time-tested, if not eternally vouchsafed ideas — of good order, proper 
action, justice, freedom, and law.  Although totalitarians, modern Enlightenment 
philosophes, and post-moderns have all promised our emancipation from the 
tormenting compulsions of the past, it is always the authors mediated to us in a 
tradition of thinking and acting who can liberate us from the simplifying limitations of 
contemporary intellectual and political fashions. 
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The limits of knowledge: violence and good order 
or the arrogant pretense of knowledge 
 
The 20th political science focused on the idea and practice of procedural 
democracy as the evolutionary winner of the competition of regimes. Supposedly, this 
liberal democracy is the viable and coherent regime of our main values like justice, 
liberty, etc. Many years before Churchill said his bon mot on democracy, democratic 
constitution had achieved a position similar to those of monarchy during the Middel 
Ages. As monarchy was seen as the best regime by people during the Middle Age, 
democracy could reach this status in the political thinking at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Since then the issue of good regime became a taboo and political thinkers left 
it. Political thinking shifted into the area of political epistemology and action theory. 
The issues of the nature of political knowledge and political action allow people to 
think about good life and human condition apart from the actual constitutional or 
power structure of state. 
This institutional framework was complemented by the revival of political 
philosophy of the Platonic paradigm in the second part of the 20th century, mainly 
focused on political knowledge.  
This revival happened without real debates or fights, although after the World 
War II. Karl Popper set Plato in an intellectual Nuremberg trial because of his alleged 
totalitarian, that is, closed society hints: the accused Platonist tradition would base 
political authority on superior knowledge of justice. Still, the present dominant 
thinking in political philosophy goes against poor Sir Karl, at least in the emphasis of 
the Platonic issues. The revival of political philosophy was a criticism of the dominant 
(social) scientist and rationalist thinking about politics, disorders and derailment of 
modern ideologies but, still, it continued willy-nilly some presupposition of 
Enlightenment. Namely, that the politics is a question of knowledge, and only the 
origin and characteristics of this knowledge are arguable. So, political epistemology 
became a focus of political debates. The issue in this paradigm is the nature and the 
origin of proper political knowledge: Whether it is endlessly perfectable, that is, it can 
be wholly coherent and certain in its consequences, or it is opaque, fragmented and 
uncertain.  Although this revival took the problem of justice into the centre of political 
thinking, again. But Rawls’ project is not interesting if one would like to understand 
politics. His question was: What would institutions look like if they were designed by 
people who were already agreed on a set of principles of justice? 
Against Popper’s interpretation, it seems to me that today the mainstream sees 
Totalitarianism as the culmination of modernity of which distinctiveness of modernity 
consists of the rejection of pre-modern political philosophy: for example the discourse 
on democracy refuses implicitly the Platonic-Aristotelian thinking.199 The emergence 
of political philosophy correlated with the moderns’ loss of confidence. Leo Strauss 
interpreted crisis of modernity as a result of moderns’ nihilism: modern man no longer 
believes that he can know what is good and bad, right and wrong. Strauss kicked in 
door with the ancient question: How can we separate acceptable and unacceptable 
regimes? He connected the problem of missing idea of justice to the theologico-
political problem. According to Strauss this theologico-political problem is whether 
“men can acquire that knowledge of the good without which they cannot guide their 
lives individually or collectively by the unaided efforts of their natural powers, or 
whether they are dependent for that knowledge on Divine Revelation”.  The Moderns, 
and typically the modern social sciences decided this dilemma on behalf of 
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immanency, so they imprisoned people in their empirical world where the question of 
liberty or good order cannot even asked. The Moderns sought and allegedly found the 
final resolution of the theologico-political problem, which resolution would be based 
on Reason or immanency (named as empirical science) against transcendence (named 
as metaphysic). This modernist hope was connected to a wholesale re-conception of 
the human condition. Moderns rejected any tension toward the divine ground, they 
denied transcendence or took it for irrelevant for public affairs.  
1, The Platonic position is that “the just… is advantageous.” (Alcibiades 116d) 
and ignorance is a cause of evils (Alcibiades 118a). According to the Euthyphro, the 
source of problems in politics is the struggle among opinions concerning justice, so 
the lack of proper knowledge.  
They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and 
unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among 
them, if there had been no such differences-would there now? (Euthyphro 110) 
Therefore, the basic problems in politics seem to be conflict and knowledge, 
and by learning justice, one may overcome conflicts. Actually, the successful 
politician would be that person who could abolish politics. 
 
2, 
Let me turn now to the issue of being otherworldly in the world. In the other 
often quoted texts of Plato – the Republic and the Apology - on the relationship of 
justice and philosophers and political community, we may find a much more 
ambiguous interpretation. As it is well known, Socrates was accused by disturbing the 
youth’s mind, because he justified his actions by referring to his daimonion, a source 
of knowledge and action outside of the terrain of his political community. From 
Socrates’ story it seems to us that truth claim may be perceived as dangerous for 
political community, as well as it may be harmful for the agent representing it. So, 
referring to justice may be a source of conflict, and it may cause political damage 
instead of advantage.  
The whole dialogue of Republic on justice is situated outside of the city, like 
Plato’s school the Academia. Later on, in the cave metaphor, it can be read that the 
philosopher turning back into the cave may be laughed, beaten or even killed. The 
knowledge of justice or, at least, the talking about justice in public seems to be 
disadvantageous in the existing political community.  
From the Republic, we may conclude that the knowledge from without, that is, 
not intersubjective shared knowledge of cave dwellers may be a source of conflict, 
therefore it is dangerous. Therefore the wise will stay away from it. Politics is a 
dangerous place for the friend of justice. According to Plato the problem is the cave 
dwellers’ character. And because the city cannot be overcame, the best if philosophers 
stay away from public life, they earn eudaimonia in private life. (Apology 32a) It may 
point to a strange direction: Plato was a realist who think that politics cannot be just, 
referring to good order in public stirs up peace. 
Theoria, transcendental knowledge in its original sense, as such seems to be 
problematic to cave dwellers, theory seems to be irrelevant in politics. As we may 
read in the Doctor Faustus, a criticism of modern intellectuals, ThaĜes had fallen into a 
ditch while walking round scanning the skies. The cave metaphor turns our attention 
to the epistemological hybris and conflicts may emerge from it. 
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While the knowledge of justice is connected to nous in the Republic, what is 
dominantly interpreted by moderns as rationality, in the Phaedros philosopher is 
connected to mania, the gift of gods.200 In the Symposium Plato also connected the 
philosopher to mania (Symposium 218b). In the Phaedros Plato enumerated the 
different types of mania, what is often called insanity because of its effects in human 
life.201 (249e) 
It might be so if madness were simply an evil; but there is also a madness 
which is a divine gift, and the source of the chiefest blessings granted to men. 
(Phaedros 244a) 
Madness means irresponsibility and breaking social norms and customs, 
breaking with aidos (shame) in which Plato trusted in his Protagoras. (332c) Divine 
madness (theia mania) channeled through poets, prophets and philosophers is a kind 
of possession (Ion 534b-e). It is outside of discursive reason, outside of 
intersubjectivity and social and empirical life, it transcends reason. Divine inspiration 
is coming from without, later called by Christians as Grace or conscience. Divine 
inspiration may joined to an act of chaos or ecstatic frenzy, therefore in the Republic 
Plato turned against poetry because it would demolish order and peace, stirring 
irrational emotions of the appetitive part of the soul. 
So, mania results transgressive behavior: transgression of socially established 
rules and transgression of border of our world. Maniac is not only vehement, but he is 
violent, too. The activity of people referring to justice not only creates turmoil, but it 
is violent in itself. 
Before the class based analysis of political fights and conflicts done by Guizot 
and later continued by the Marxist thinking, enthusiasm and inspiration were the 
commonly thought as the sources of political calamities. Enthusiasm, the main issue 
of the 18th century moral and political thinking after the Civil War launched by the 
Puritans, and inspiration were seen as coming from the otherworld and take people 
beyond the norms and established social patterns. The non-rational, non-discursive 
and intuitive disposition demands the abandonment of reason, and it may be defective 
or even evil. Since then, enthusiasm caused continuous problems in our thinking. 
People are seen mad because they do not take into consideration the consequences of 
their actions.  
Maniac is an ambiguous figure because it is asocial, on the one hand, but only 
this type of man – a philosopher, prophet or poet – can step out only from the 
common world of cave dwellers and import some knowledge from without. 
Therefore, maniac is a sign of the transcendental world independent from us but 
influencing us. Intrusion of transcendental may deform human mind and may cause 
numberless personal or social calamities, and at the beginning no one can certainly tell 
the authentic truth claim from madness. 
 
3,  
Talking about liberty and justice is talking about good order, proper 
arrangements of people. Thus, this talk is political, because by talking about them we 
reflect on human relations, and their change by human will. But on the other hand, 
people perceive order, justice and liberty, or miss them by implicitly referring to 
transcendental knowledge. The sensorium of transcendence, as Voegelin interpreted 
it, means that the psyche realizes itself as „in this world” but not only „of this 
world”.202 
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Learning and experiences may teach man a lot of knowledge, but not 
everything. The knowledge cannot be derived from immanent world is called 
transcendence. Man is transcendental being simply because he is able to perceive 
something else than himself and impressions from his five senses. He perceives 
something which may limit him and, at the same time, may liberate him in immanent, 
empirical world. Man is transcendental because he is able to step out from his 
empirical experiences and to get a context in which the experience is meaningful. 
Transcendence, apart from its content, seems to be liberating, but liberation 
(transgressing and violentia) goes hand in hand with conflict. Knowledge of justice 
and liberty, weather it is connected to nous or to mania, has an oblique relationship to 
practice – this obscurity refuses the possibility of ideological or dogmatic practice.  
The idea of good order is interpreted by many as utopian or perfectionist203. 
Later on, in the Modernity the idea of good order took after the mechanism and it was 
connected to scientism. Generally, the idea of good order is connected to Christian 
Platonism’ peace and harmony, to the lack of enforcement and conflicts, to a kind of 
anomic freedom, to geometrical clarity, often to rationality, and more and more to 
hedonism.  Although, the Modern Republican, liberal, communitarians converge in 
their assumption that success lies in the elimination from a regime of dissonance, 
resistance, conflict and struggle. They would confine politics to the juridical, 
administrative or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building 
consensus, maintaining agreement… free modern subjects from political conflicts and 
instability.”204 
 
While the ideal of just and free human world is usually peaceful, without 
conflicts, violence and enforcement, the truth claims, referring to justice or liberty and 
other transcendental ideas potentially undermines any political order. These claim are 
violentia, that is, transgressing which provoke enforcement in order to create some 
order and peace. While Plato theoretically recognized the conflictual potentiality of 
truth claim, this dilemma came into practice by Christianity. The dilemmas and 
ongoing conflict between force and morality, immanence and transcendence, peace 
and justice are the backbone of Christian thinking. Politics is interpreted paradoxically 
both as an activity using force and as an activity eliminating force by just laws. From 
Plato onward, our tradition is full of complain about the allegedly divine inspiration 
which stirs up emotions, morality, human order. Talking about transcendental or the 
so-called prophetic knowledge is partly the problem of order and non-technical, non-
rationally calculable innovation. Crossing boundary can be interpreted both as the 
liberation from the yoke of conventional order and as the danger of chaos.  
Ambiguity of crossing the boundaries is a characteristic dilemma of our 
tradition. Keeping some order is a basic aim of politics, therefore the transcendence is 
often perceived as a potential danger which should be domesticated somehow, at least 
linguistically by the secular „public use of reason”.205. Because of the obvious 
potential danger of the transcendence, political thinkers and actors tended to keep it 
somehow at bay.  
The practice of political control of transcendence as old as the tension between 
politics and religion, but its probably first theoretical formulation emerged only as a 
side effect of Investiture Wars by Marsilius of Padua who argued against Rome, 
ordering truth claim behind the claim for this-worldly peace. He formulated 
theoretically what had been the practice, that is, the divorce of peace from justice, 
order from transcendental truth claims.  
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The attitudes of political thinkers towards transcendence can be well 
characterized by the famous front page of Hobbes’ Leviathan, where the two types of 
weapon that the state uses are symbolized. On the one side, there are the instruments 
of force (swords, guns, battle flags etc); on the other the symbols of ideas and religion. 
In sake of peace or security of guaranteed life style, state must use and control both. 
As one may see in case of Marsilius and Hobbes, their main arguments were peace 
against truth claim of religion.  
The invasion of transcendence – whether it is called sacred / charisma / 
sublime / religion / conscience, etc. – into human life can carry different 
consequences. The power of resistance and transformation coming from religion is a 
continuous dilemma of the Christian tradition. How can false prophets or the second 
becoming be detected? Is a sectarian group mad because its activities lead to violence, 
or else it is sane because its purpose is liberation from an evil power? Do the existing 
laws and order, and the power of government represent the prevention of chaos and 
the preservation of peace and security, or else they are oppressive and evil? 
Or, because of this epistemological problem, is it worth keeping transcendence 
at bay? Or, can the attempt to achieve the total fusion of truth claim and political 
society be dangerous? This dilemma points to a pious acceptance of Augustinian 
theology in which the world is morally absurd and opaque, contingent, and the refusal 
of the Pelagian or Gnostic hope of redeeming modernity. According to St. Augustine 
our knowledge is limited, action has always side-effects and contains some failures, 
therefore the democratic ideal of self-control, self-domination is impossible. The 
acceptance of this human condition requires humility, a basic attitude of religion. 
Otherwise, man will always feel oppressed and servile. And tranquility is fleeting at 
best, human beings are not rocks. Conflict and instability are perennial possibility. 
The yearning for a world beyond politics is self-destructive. 
 
4, 
Political order needs some overcome of radical plurality coming from 
numberless sources. There is no substitute for politics, if by politics we mean the 
various ways in which arrive at authoritative decisions in a world in which people 
legitimately hold different views about the purposes of government and the manner by 
which it should be carried on. Political situation is not normal situation, but a rather 
unique one, because the restoration of order, decent life requires to use means that are 
forbidden in other fields.  
Conflict, antagonism seems to be perennial, ineradicable, but not only because 
of the biases, interests, limited resources and pathologies. A serious source of these 
antagonisms and need of enforcement is the very idea of justice and liberty and other 
transcendental knowledge which aims to abolish rather often politics, struggles and 
enforcement and violence altogether. 
The modern hope of intellectuals has been being the moral psychology of 
Kant, Rawls and Habermas, which is based on the idea that everyone is required 
morally to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the 
understandings of self and world of all others. (Habermas’ three presuppositions - this 
situation would be inclusive, coercion free, open and symmetrical - would eliminate 
decision and violence altogether.) And doing so, rational agreement will emerge 
somehow. But agreement and rational consensus  is illusory. Politics is not an 
exchange of opinions but a contest for power. Political decision does not announce 
that the other party was morally wrong, simply, they have lost.  
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There is no rational, no non-authoritative solution for plurality and 
contingency. Instead of rational agreement there can be coercion, authority, 
bargaining, manipulation, procedural or institutional arrangements. 
The rebirth of Platonic issues has problematized the taken for granted 
relationship between the political order of cave dwellers and the intellectuals truth 
claim, and turned the attention to the agonistic and authoritative nature of politics 
emerging from the ambiguity of truth claims. 
Divine madness must be overcome but it never be completely lacking. The 
European political – intellectual as well as institutional – tradition cannot cope with 
this problem, there seems to be a continuous flux of violence, enforcement to secure 
peace. Historical achievements are fragmentary and broken. Both the institutional and 
the intellectualist approaches set aside the violence and enforcement used by political 
authority. However, neither of them can fulfill this hope. Both the truth claims coming 
from mania, and the several imperfections and contingency necessarily result conflicts 
and dilemmas. Therefore de-liberation and the concomitant enforcement seems to be 
smuggled unreflectively into the practice during the process of creating political unity 
from plurality. 
Divine madness and violence (truth claims) opposes the ideal of civility as an 
absence of force. 206 Violence is barbarism, it is against civilization. Civilization is a 
creation of mind, an intellectual process. Although, today the dominant discourse 
connects truth to peace, the violent potential of any truth claim should be clear. Peace 
and harmony, if at all, may be after the victory of truth, before that, truth claims will 
create just the opposite. Like the mythical law givers (Moses or Romulus for example) 
who created felicious order, but they started it with violence. 
The potential delegitimation of political order by referring transcendental truth 
claim was started in philosophy by the Plato who was aware of the potential conflict 
between immanent order (the cave dwellers) and transcendence (the philosopher), and 
he reflected to the dilemma of philosopher: what should he do with his transcendental 
knowledge after he has retirned into the cave? While it was a theoretical recognition of 
the dilemma of the short term conflictual potentiality of truth clai , this dilemma came 
into practice by Christianity.  
 
Before it, religious community coincided with a political one, religions were 
connected to an ethnic group or a polis. But, by Christianity the specific religious 
community appeared, in which anyone could be member apart from his origin, 
political loyalties or legal status. The only criterium for the membership in this 
specific religious community was to accept that Jesus was the Cristos. At the same 
time, however, Christians refused the cult of Roman gods and the Emperors, that is, 
they were disloyal to the political order. The appearance of specific religious 
community meant that the border, marker, symbols and loyalty of political and 
religious communities ceased to overlap each other. And even more, these two 
different communities might have got into conflict. Since the early Christianity the 
loyalty claims of religious or political authorities are continuous source of conflicts 
and debates in our culture. Since that time in the Crhistian world the transcendental 
truth claim could have caused conflicts in the immanent political order. Christianity 
broke apart the two aspects of communities – sacerdotium and regnum –, and 
separated them.  In spite of the Erastinians, the Byzantine practice and the alliance of 
throne and altar, one should see the uniqueness of this duality in Christian tradition 
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and the well-known devaluation of poltical order: “No man can serve two masters” 
(Matthew 6, 24); and “We ought to obey God rather than men.” (Acts 5, 29)  
The history of typically Christian dilemma and conflict between political and 
religious communities can be followed since St. Augustine. The worldly and amoral 
order – the civitas terrena – can exist only by means of the naked force and power of 
worldly magistrate, because the sinful men are not able to create order and peace by 
themselves.207 On the other hand, he claims the presence of justice in human affairs: 
“remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gang of criminals on a large scale?”208  
The dilemmas and ongoing conflict between force and morality, immanence 
and transcendence, peace and justice are the backbone of Christian thinking. Politics 
is interpreted paradoxically both as an activity using force and as an activity 
eliminating force by just laws (and the same paradox may be told concerning state or 
political society).209  
Talking about transcendental (or the so-called prophetic aspect of religion) is 
partly the problem of order and non-technical, non-rational innovation. (However, in 
the Greek thinking one may also find the mad Gorgon, transgressing the accepted 
norms, an unspeakable, unthinkable and the chaos itself.) Crossing boundary can be 
interpreted both as the liberation from the yoke of conventional order and as the 
danger of chaos.  
Ambiguity of crossing the boundaries is a characteristic dilemma of our 
tradition. It may have liberating as well as chaotic effects at the same time. Keeping 
some order is a basic aim of politics, therefore the transcendence is often perceived as 
a potential danger which should be domesticated somehow, at least linguistically by 
the secular „public use of reason”.210. Because of the obvious potential danger of the 
transcendence, political thinkers and actors tended to keep it somehow at bay. It seems 
to me that Moderns have preferred keeping away transcendence from public affairs, 
which project has been called commonly as the secularized politics. 
The practice of political control of transcendence as old as the tension between 
politics and religion, but its probably first theoretical formulation emerged only as a 
side effect of Investiture Wars by Marsilius of Padua who argued against Rome, 
ordering truth claim behind the claim for this-worldly peace. He formulated 
theoretically what had been the practice, that is, the divorce of peace from justice, 
order from transcendental truth claims.  
The attitudes of political thinkers towards religion and transcendence can be 
well characterized by the famous front page of Hobbes’ Leviathan, where the two 
types of weapon that the state uses are symbolised. On the one side, there are the 
instruments of force (swords, guns, battle flags etc); on the other the symbols of ideas 
and religion. In sake of peace or security of guaranteed life style, state must use and 
control both. As one may see in case of Marsillius and Hobbes, their main arguments 
was peace against truth claim of religion. But in their case peace meant only the lack 
of conflict, but not internal, psychic and mental satisfaction, too. The peace – today 
security – argument of later political theorists, up to our recent defenders of neutral 
state, interprets peace without any transcendental relevance, only as the lack of 
conflicts and fights. 
 
The dilemma is that very political, this-worldly dangers may come from both 
the loss of transcendental measures of humans and human relations, and also from the 
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penetration of transcendental truth claims into this-worldly affairs. Without 
transcendental measures – like the idea of truth, justice, liberty, etc. -, how would 
people be able to realize whether their order is good, just and free or not? While 
transcendental truth claims mean obvious danger for existing immanent order, it may 
sink  into tyranny whithout these measures. 
 
The strength of the contemporary neutral or secular state is not in its forced 
liberal ideal, but rather in its renunciation of all ideals, apart from empirical individual 
well being. Democracy created a consumer culture as Tocqueville foreseen some 
generations ago. From Roman historians to de la Boetie211 and Montesquieu212 
tyranny was connected to the well-being.213 Therefore, well-being is not necessarily a 
sign of good order. This republican tradition warns us that not only coercion, physical 
force and censorship may be used by tyranny. There are angel faced evils, too. (See 
Huxley’s Brave New World)  
 
- 1, man is a transcendental as well as immanent being, his transcendental 
knowledge may undervalues the immanency (naming it unjust, servile and the like) 
which is connected to imperfection, enforcement, lying and politics;  
- 2, commonly there is conflict between these two214 (see the returning 
philosopher’s problem with cave dwellers); 
- 3, there no certain measure or method can be seen to solve this ambiguity, to 
separate pure chaos from perfect order or eternal peace.  
 
The dream of transparency and shared knowledge 
The Modernist and today democratic hope – men’s self-government may 
replace God or institutional enforcement – has an utopian stance, and it continued the 
Lockean tradition which hoped that coercion can be domesticated or finally eliminated 
from politics. Tory sceptics just like 19th century Germans romantics rebelled against 
this whiggish optimism and started to emphasize the arbitration as inherent parts of 
political activity: Dilemmas are dilemmas because they cannot be rationally resolved. 
(Plalto, Eutyphron 110 b-d). 
Coercion seems to be necessary because practically impossible to find good 
reasons to persuade all member of the political community. Political Modernism was 
a radical interpretation of contract theory: they hoped and aimed to form social 
relations. Politically Modern means the hope that people is able to take into their 
hands their own life, they will be our own masters, human condition can be 
completely understood and controlled. Consequently, anything resists human 
understanding and control – because it is opaque and unintelligible – is arbitrary and 
oppressive. What is worst, enemy of human progress and happiness. Moderns are 
rationalist because they are not able to accept piety: the sense that humans must trust 
something what is out of their control.  
Because of the unforeseen and often unpleasant consequences, understanding 
the human condition contains a piety toward the human world: an acceptance of its 
fuzziness and that our knowledge of human world is rather limited.  
The emphasis of the narrowness and necessary imperfection of our knowledge 
is a pessimistic or tragic view, because man must make decisions on morally and 
cognitively uncertain epistemological basis. He must act in a fuzzy human world 
where he is still responsible as Oedipus was. Politicians are responsible for unforeseen 
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consequences. And what is more, often morally wrong action may result some public 
good, what is the real absurdity for rationalist.  
Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’s Augustinian view of human condition re-emerged 
with the anti-rationalist backlash. The non-rational and non-knowable nature of 
human world involves the necessary imperfection of politics. Even a thorough 
rationalist like Aquinas who represented an optimistic view on human world and 
epistemological potentiality to know it, taught that emergency situations didn’t have 
laws. As he wrote: necessitas non subditur legi (Summa Theologica, Ia IIae, q. 96, 
a.6), and necessitas non habet legem. (Summa Theologica, IIIa, q. 80, a.8) If not 
always, but in certain situations, called necessitas, human condition is morally 
obscure and absurd. Why it is the nature of politics? Why does our epistemological 
imperfection involve moral absurdity and need tragic heroism from political actors, as 
Weber taught in his Politics as Vocation? 
The Aristotelian–neo-Thomist prudential thinking about political action is 
optimistic, supposing that virtues and propriety can be achieved at least potentially, 
even if not actually. But pointing to the imperfect nature of political epistemology 
involves the tragic view of political action and the morally absurd nature of human 
condition. 
If the human world is not rationally ordered and it seems to resist to its 
systematization as well as rational understanding, humans must part the certainty and 
clearness of maths in political and moral life. This anti-rationalist view of political 
knowledge and action undercuts implicitly democracy based on the notion of self-
government and responsibility, and welfare state and bureaucratic ethos based on 
certainty and responsibility. How could anyone be responsible for his action without 
certain knowledge about its consequences?  How could anyone be responsible for his 
action in an ethically absurd world full of dilemmas, contingency, dominated by 
Fortuna and unforeseen situations interpreted as “consequences”. The refusal of 
optimistic epistemology of rationalism may involve a pessimistic view of human 
agency and political settings. 
But inherent in anti-rationalism that at least the human world is to complex to 
describe and systematize into a logically consistent theory.  
Both the institutional and the intellectualist approaches set aside the violence, 
enforcement used by political authority. However, neither of them can fulfill this 
hope. Both the truth claims in rationalism coming from mania, and the imperfection 
of practical knowledge in the skeptic approach necessarily presuppose freedom, and 
result conflicts and dilemmas. Therefore de-liberation and the concomitant 
enforcement seems to be smuggled unreflectively into the practice – irrespectively of 
whether it is based on the idea of institutional procedures or any version of 
intellectualism – during the process of creating political unity from plurality. 
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Mania: The Dilemma of Truth Claims: being otherwoldly in the world.  
 
The 20th political science focused on the idea and practice of procedural 
democracy as the evolutionary winner of the competition of regimes. Supposedly, this 
liberal democracy is the viable and coherent regime of our main values like justice, 
freedom, etc. This institutional framework was complemented by the revival of 
political philosophy of the Platonic paradigm in the second part of the 20th century, 
mainly focused on political knowledge.  
Intellectuals as a social group emerged in political fights in the 19th century. 
Although, this label was used for a social group, it should be clear that intellectuals 
emerged in politics, and they identified themselves with a special political stance 
supported by an allegedly special knowledge – something like the clerics’ role in the 
religion. Since then the identity of intellectuals was closely connected to justice 
(whether it is liberation or emancipation from economical, racial or gender 
inequalities) and critical self-reflection of political society. Intellectuals from the 
beginnings presupposed that some standard of politics existed outside of politics; and 
also, they identified themselves gladly with these standards, and their political activity 
with the implementation of them. 
The revival of political philosophy in the second part of the 20th century was 
the revival of the Platonic paradigm, focusing on political knowledge. This revival 
happened without real debates or fights, although after the World War II. Karl Popper 
set Plato in an intellectual Nuremberg trial because of its alleged totalitarian, that is, 
closed society hints: Platonist tradition would base political authority on superior 
knowledge referring to justice. Still, the present dominant thinking in political 
philosophy goes against poor Sir Karl, at least in the emphasis of the Platonic issues. 
The revival of political philosophy in the second part of the 20th century by focusing 
on political knowledge was a criticism of the dominant (social) scientist and 
rationalist thinking about politics, disorders and derailment of modern ideologies 
 but, still, it continued willy-nilly some presupposition of Enlightenment. 
Namely, that the politics is a question of knowledge, and only the origin and 
characteristics of this knowledge are arguable. So, political epistemology became a 
focus of political debates. The issue in this paradigm is the nature and the origin of 
proper political knowledge: Whether it is endlessly perfectable, that is, it can be 
wholly coherent and certain in its consequences, or it is opaque, fragmented and 
uncertain. This revival took the problem of justice into the centre of political thinking, 
again. But Rawls’ project is not interesting if one would like to understand politics. 
His question is: What would institutions look like if they were designed by people 
who were already agreed on a set of principles of justice? 
Against Popper’s interpretation, it seems to me that the mainstream sees 
Totalitarianism as the culmination of modernity. The distinctiveness of modernity 
consists of the rejection of pre-modern political philosophy., or example the discourse 
on democracy refuses implicitly the Platonic-Aristotelian thinking.215 The emergence 
of political philosophy correlated with the moderns’ loss of confidence. Leo Strauss 
interpreted crisis of modernity as a result of moderns’ nihilism: modern man no longer 
believes that he can know what is good and bad, right and wrong. He kicked in door 
with the ancient question: How can we separate acceptable and unacceptable regimes? 
He connected the problem of missing idea of justice to the theologico-political 
problem. According to Strauss this theologico-political problem is whether “men can 
acquire that knowledge of the good without which they cannot guide their lives 
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individually or collectively by the unaided efforts of their natural powers, or whether 
they are dependent for that knowledge on Divine Revelation”.  The Moderns, and 
typically the modern social sciences decided this dilemma on behalf of immanency, so 
they imprisoned people in their empirical world from where the question of liberty or 
good order cannot even asked. The Moderns sought and allegedly found the final 
resolution of the theologico-political problem, which resolution would be based on 
Reason or immanency (named as empirical science) against transcendence (named as 
metaphysic). This modernist hope was connected to a wholesale re-conception of the 
human condition. Moderns rejected any tension toward the divine ground, they denied 
transcendence or took it for irrelevant for public affairs.  
Intellectuals have been using the taken for granted Christian idea of conscience 
as a model for the creation of their own social-political role, namely they claimed 
specific attention because the precondition of any betterment and reform is a critical 
self-reflection and self-scrutiny , the realization of sins is the first step in the ordo 
salutis; this rebirth of Platonic issues has problematized the taken for granted 
relationship between the political order of cave dwellers and the intellectuals truth 
claim, and turned the attention to the agonistic and authoritative nature of politics 
emerging from the ambiguity of truth claims. 
 
1,  
In the apocryphal Alcibiades dialogue one may read that Socrates teaches his 
pupil, Alcibiades in order to reach political success, and by doing so he implies the 
importance of knowledge in successful political action. But not any kind of 
knowledge is important for the political success: it needs the knowledge of justice. At 
the beginning Alcibiades seems to be rather “realist”, that is, he argues for the 
separation of justice and successful political action. 
I think, Socrates, rarely are Athenians advised and the other Greeks, which is 
more just or more unjust; for such things they believe are obvious; so passing over 
these they consider which will be advantageous in practice. 
For these, I think, are not the same, the just and the advantageous, but many 
really profited by committing great wrongs, and others, I think, doing just actions 
gained no advantage. (Alcibiades 113d) 
And Socrates’ answer to this position:  
SO. And what if you should be sailing on a ship, then would you think whether 
it is useful to hold the tiller inward or outward, and in not knowing you would go 
astray, or turning it over to the pilot would you keep silent? 
Alcibiades  Turn it over to the pilot. 
SO. Then you do not go astray about what you don't know, as long as you 
know that you don't know? 
Alcibiades . It is not likely. 
SO. So are you aware that mistakes in practice are because of this ignorance, 
thinking one knows when one does not know? 
(Alcibiades 117d)  
 
Finally, Alcibiades accepts Socrates’ position, that “the just… is 
advantageous.” (Alcibiades 116d) Intellectuals seem to continue one of the basic idea 
of this text: ignorance is a cause of evils and the shameful kind of stupidity 
(Alcibiades 118a). According to the Euthyphro, the source of problems in politics is 
the struggle among opinions concerning justice, so the lack of proper knowledge.  
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They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and 
unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among 
them, if there had been no such differences-would there now? (Euthyphro 110) 
Therefore, the basic problems in politics in the Plato’s works are conflict and 
knowledge, and by learning justice, one may overcome conflicts. Actually, the 
successful politician would be that person who could abolish politics. 
 
2, 
Let me turn now to the issue of being otherworldly in the world. In other often 
quoted political texts of Plato – the Republic and the Apology - on the relationship of 
justice and philosophers and political community, we may find a much more 
ambiguous interpretation. As it is well known, Socrates was accused by disturbing the 
youth’s mind, because he justified his actions by referring to his daimonion, a source 
of knowledge and action outside of the terrain of his political community. From 
Socrates’ story it seems to us that truth claim may be perceived as dangerous for 
political community, as well as it may be harmful for the agent representing it. So, 
referring to justice may be a source of conflict, and it may cause political damage 
instead of advantage.  
The Republic is rather disturbing from this point of view. The whole dialogue 
on justice is situated outside of the city, like Plato’s school the Academia. Later on, in 
the cave metaphor, it can be read that the philosopher turning back into the cave may 
be laughed, beaten or even killed. The knowledge of justice or, at least, the talking 
about justice in public seems to be disadvantageous in the existing political 
community. So, a “small remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person” 
contemns and neglects politics. (Republic 496b) 
Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a 
possession philosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; 
and they know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at 
whose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be compared to a man who 
has fallen among wild beasts --he will not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but 
neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore seeing that he 
would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and reflecting that he would have to 
throw away his life without doing any good either to himself or others, he holds his 
peace, and goes his own way. He is like one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which 
the driving wind hurries along, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest 
of mankind full of wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be 
pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright 
hopes. (Republic 496c-e) 
From the Republic, we may conclude that the knowledge of justice is a source 
of conflict, therefore it is dangerous, therefore the wise will stay away from it. Politics 
is a dangerous place for the friend of justice. According to Plato the problem is the 
cave dwellers’ character. And because the city cannot be overcame, the best if 
philosophers stay away from public life, they earn eudaimonia in private life. 
(Apology 32a) It may point to a strange direction: Plato was a realist who think that 
politics cannot be just, referring to justice in public stirs up peace. 
Not only the understanding of the relation between politics and the knowledge 
of justice is different in the Alcibiades and in the Republic, but the understanding of 
the knowledge, too. In the first one, knowledge of justice is resembled to the 
knowledge of helmsmen’s practical knowledge referring to the ability of making 
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proper judgment, proper understanding of situations and conditions, knowledge of 
limits and characterized by flexibility. However, in the Republic the dilemma of the 
knowledge of justice does not refer to practical knowledge, but to theoretical one. 
Here, because of the confrontative character of theory (the knowledge of justice) and  
action, public life may be dangerous for philosophers who therefore should be forced 
to take any political role. Theory as such seems to be problematic to cave dwellers, 
theory seems to be irrelevant in politics. As we may read in the Doctor Faustus, a 
criticism of modern intellectuals, ThaĜes had fallen into a ditch while walking round 
scanning the skies. The cave metaphor turns our attention to the epistemological 
hybris and conflicts may emerge from it. 
While the knowledge of justice is connected to nous in the Republic, what is 
dominantly interpreted by moderns as rationality, in the Phaedros philosopher is 
connected to mania, the gift of gods.216 In the Symposium Plato also connected the 
philosopher to mania (Symposium 218b). In the Phaedros Plato enumerated the 
different types of mania, what is often called insanity because of its effects in human 
life.217 
Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is 
imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the 
recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a 
bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is 
therefore thought to be mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the 
noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest to him who has or shares in it, 
and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it.  (249e) 
Mania is not simply the source of the knowledge, but it is the largest blessing 
and is coming from gods. 
I told a lie when I said" that the beloved ought to accept the non-lover when he 
might have the lover, because the one is sane, and the other mad. It might be so if 
madness were simply an evil; but there is also a madness which is a divine gift, and 
the source of the chiefest blessings granted to men. (Phaedros 244a) 
Madness means irresponsibility and breaking social norms and customs, 
breaking with aidos (shame) in which Plato trusted in his Protagoras (332c) Divine 
madness (theia mania) channeled through poets, prophets and philosophers is a kind 
of possession (Ion 534b-e). Mania is outside of discursive reason, outside of 
intersubjectivity and social and empirical life, it transcends reason. Divine inspiration 
is coming from without, later called by Christians as Grace or conscience. Divine 
inspiration may come from an act of chaos or ecstatic frenzy, therefore in the Republic 
Plato turned against poetry because it would demolish order and peace, stirring 
irrational emotions of the appetitive part of the soul. 
So, mania results transgressive behavior: transgression of socially established 
rules and transgression of border of our world. Maniac is not only vehement, but he is 
violent, too. The activity of people referring to justice not only creates turmoil, but it 
is violent in itself. 
Before the class based analysis of political fights and conflicts done by Guizot 
and later continued by the Marxist thinking, enthusiasm and inspiration were the 
commonly thought as the sources of political calamities. Enthusiasm, the main issue 
of the 18th century moral and political thinking after the Civil War launched by the 
Puritans, and inspiration were seen as coming from the otherworld and take people 
beyond the norms and established social patterns. The non-rational, non-discursive 
and intuitive disposition demands the abandonment of reason, and it may be defective 
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or even evil. Since then, enthusiasm caused continuous problems in our thinking. 
People are seen mad because they do not take into consideration the consequences of 
their actions, and they hurt the existing common norms.  A maniac is stand out the 
taken for granted world and refusing the shame just like any modesty, therefore he is 
outside of conventional social control.  
Maniac is an ambiguous figure because it is asocial, on the one hand, but only 
this type of man – a philosopher, seer or poet – can step out only from the common 
world of cave dwellers and import some knowledge from without. Therefore, maniac 
is a sign of the transcendental world independent from us but influencing us. Intrusion 
of transcendental may deform human mind and may cause numberless personal or 
social calamities, and at the beginning no one can certainly tell the authentic truth 
claim from madness. 
 
3,  
Talking about liberty is talking about good order, proper arrangements of 
people. Thus, this talk is political, because we reflect on human relations, and their 
change by human will. But on the other hand, people perceive order, justice and 
liberty, or miss them by implicitly referring to transcendental knowledge. The 
sensorium of transcendence, as Voegelin interpreted it, is the psyche realizes itself as 
„in this world” but not only „of this world”.218 Learning and experiences may teach 
man a lot of knowledge, but not everything. The knowledge cannot be derived from 
immanent world is called transcendence. Man is transcendental being simply because 
he is able to perceive something else than himself and impressions from his five 
senses. He perceives something which may limit him and, at the same time, may 
liberate him in immanent, empirical world. Man is transcendental because he is able 
to step out from his empirical experiences and to get a context in which the experience 
is meaningful.  
Transcendence, apart from its content, seems to be liberating, but liberation 
(transgressing and violence) goes hand in hand with conflict. Knowledge of justice, 
weather it is connected to nous or to mania, has an oblique relationship to practice – 
this obscurity refuses the possibility of ideological or dogmatic practice. (see 
Oakehott, Strauss, Voegelin). 
The idea of good order is interpreted by many as utopian or perfectionist219. 
Later on, in the Modernity the idea of good order took after the mechanism and it was 
connected to scientism. Generally, the idea of good order is connected to peace and 
harmony, the lack of enforcement and conflicts, a kind of anomic freedom, 
geometrical clarity, often to rationality, and more and more to hedonism.  Although, 
the Modern Republican, liberal, communitarians converge in their assumption that 
success lies in the elimination from a regime of dissonance, resistance, conflict and 
struggle. They would confine politics to the juridical, administrative or regulative 
tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building consensus, maintaining 
agreement… free modern subjects from political conflicts and instability.”220 
 
But truth claims, referring to justice potentially undermine any political order.  
While Plato theoretically recognized the conflictual potentiality of truth claim, this 
dilemma came into practice by Christianity. The dilemmas and ongoing conflict 
between force and morality, immanence and transcendence, peace and justice are the 
backbone of Christian thinking. Politics is interpreted paradoxically both as an activity 
using force and as an activity eliminating force by just laws. From Plato onward, our 
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tradition is full of complain about the allegedly divine inspiration which stirs up 
emotions, morality, human order. Talking about transcendental or the so-called 
prophetic knowledge is partly the problem of order and non-technical, non-rationally 
calculable innovation. Crossing boundary can be interpreted both as the liberation 
from the yoke of conventional order and as the danger of chaos.  
Ambiguity of crossing the boundaries is a characteristic dilemma of our 
tradition. It may have liberating as well as chaotic effects at the same time. Keeping 
some order is a basic aim of politics, therefore the transcendence is often perceived as 
a potential danger which should be domesticated somehow, at least linguistically by 
the secular „public use of reason”.221. Because of the obvious potential danger of the 
transcendence, political thinkers and actors tended to keep it somehow at bay. It seems 
to me that Moderns have preferred keeping away transcendence from public affairs, 
which project has been called commonly as the secularized politics. 
The practice of political control of transcendence as old as the tension between 
politics and religion, but its probably first theoretical formulation emerged only as a 
side effect of Investiture Wars by Marsilius of Padua who argued against Rome, 
ordering truth claim behind the claim for this-worldly peace. He formulated 
theoretically what had been the practice, that is, the divorce of peace from justice, 
order from transcendental truth claims.  
The attitudes of political thinkers towards religion and transcendence can be 
well characterized by the famous front page of Hobbes’ Leviathan, where the two 
types of weapon that the state uses are symbolized. On the one side, there are the 
instruments of force (swords, guns, battle flags etc); on the other the symbols of ideas 
and religion. In sake of peace or security of guaranteed life style, state must use and 
control both. As one may see in case of Marsilius and Hobbes, their main arguments 
were peace against truth claim of religion.  
The invasion of transcendence – whether it is called sacred / charisma / 
sublime / religion / conscience, etc. – into human life can carry different 
consequences. The power of resistance and transformation coming from religion is a 
continuous dilemma of the Christian tradition. How can false prophets or the second 
becoming be detected? Is a suicide-bomber a mad terrorist; or is he a martyr? Is a 
sectarian group mad because its activities lead to violence, or else it is sane because its 
purpose is liberation from an evil power? Do the existing laws and order, and the 
power of government represent the prevention of chaos and the preservation of peace 
and security, or else they are oppressive and evil? 
Or, because of this epistemological problem, is it worth keeping transcendence 
at bay? Or, can the attempt to achieve the total fusion of truth claim and political 
society be dangerous? It points to a pious acceptance of Augustinian theology in 
which the world is morally absurd and opaque, contingent, and the refusal of the 
Pelagian or Gnostic hope of redeeming modernity. 
 
4, 
Mania, and its results, intuition and enthusiasm were revalued by 
contemporaries as a check on rationalism. (see Oakeshott on poetry). All human 
experience (interpretation of situations, that is, meaning and decision) owns some 
poetic elements: they are contingent, fragmented and uncertain. Action is always a 
failure, because the is cannot fulfill the ought to. Knowledge is limited, action has 
always side-effects and contains some failures, therefore the democratic ideal of self-
control, self-domination is impossible. The acceptance of the human condition 
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requires is humility, a basic attitude of religion. Otherwise, man will always feel 
oppressed and servile. Tranquility is fleeting at best, human beings are not rocks. 
Conflict and instability are perennial possibility. The yearning for a world beyond 
politics is self-destructive. 
Political order needs some overcome of radical plurality coming from 
numberless sources. There is no substitute for politics, if by politics we mean the 
various ways in which arrive at authoritative decisions in a world in which people 
legitimately hold different views about the purposes of government and the manner by 
which it should be carried on. Political situation is not normal situation, but a rather 
unique one, because the restoration of order, decent life requires to use means that are 
forbidden in other fields.  
Conflict, antagonism seems to be perennial, ineradicable, but not only because 
of the biases, interests, limited resources and pathologies. A serious source of these 
antagonism and the need of enforcement the very idea of justice and liberty and other 
transcendental knowledge which aims to abolish rather often politics, enforcement 
and violence altogether. 
The modern hope of intellectuals has been being the moral psychology of 
Kant, Rawls and Habermas, which is based on the idea that everyone is required 
morally to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the 
understandings of self and world of all others. And doing so, rational agreement will 
emerge somehow. But agreement and rational consensus  is illusory. Politics is not an 
exchange of opinions but a contest for power. Political decision does not announce 
that the other party was morally wrong, simply, they have lost. Instead of rational 
agreement there can be coercion, authority, bargaining, manipulation, procedural or 
institutional arrangements. 
 
Transcendence and political hedonism 
Contemporary mass democracy means a rather unique epistemic situation. I 
supposes that the institutional framework, that is, the arrangements of immanent order 
can affect the intrusion of transcendental knowledge.   
 
The present mass individualism acknowledges only empirical desires and 
power to efficiently satisfy them.  The source of present statism is the claim of mass 
individuals for guaranteed life style. The secularized state, without any transcendental 
truth claim, can get loyalty only by the promise of universal association supporting 
anyone’s rights to satisfy whimsical desires. Besides this task, the only serious task of 
present political order to keep those views and beliefs far from people, which may 
challenge the existing order. The leading art of politics in our age is opinion and 
attitude fabrication on mass scale and to keep the potentially dangerous view at bay by 
criminalizing them as hate speech, radical, trouble-maker or something like these. 
Only those views are seen as serious and considerable, which stay in the context of 
presuppositions of this secular order and refer only to technical details how to improve 
it. Order based on political hedonism seems to be tolerant, because it accepts any 
human empirical desires. But it is intolerant concerning beliefs referring some 
transcendental meaning.   
Today’s democracy seems to be far from force or any kind of “hard” politics. 
Present democracy, people believe, can satisfy diverse needs, and, really, it renders 
easily all contending beliefs inoffensive or ridiculous. The dominant political 
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hedonism claims productivist or welfare state, and makes all ideas unattractive and 
unpopular, unless they appeal to economic interests. 
The strength of the contemporary secular state is not in its forced liberal ideal, 
but rather in its renunciation of all ideals, apart from empirical individual well being. 
Democracy created a consumer culture as Tocqueville foreseen some generations ago. 
From Roman historians to de la Boetie and Montesquieu  tyranny was connected to 
the well-being.  Therefore, well-being is not necessarily a sign of good order. This 
republican tradition warns us that not only coercion, physical force and censorship 
may be used by tyranny. There are angel faced evils, too. The quest for perfect society, 
providing well being and missing conflicts, has resulted apathetic citizens who are 
seems to be intolerant of any belief which could disturb or limit their empirical 
satisfactions.  
Any order perceived as perfect and waterproof is inimical to transcendence. In 
Huxley’s Brave New World people are blind to Shakespeare’s tragedy, but they are 
free in terms of sexual promiscuity. In the immanence of paradise – in pigs’ republic 
as Plato called it – now there is a recent anxiety about the loss of meaning, i.e. the loss 
of truth claim in a world where sensations and animal pleasures alone are worth living 
for; and anything transcendental – as justice, beauty, meaning, etc. – is put aside 
because of its potential conflictual and empirically or rationally non verifiable 
character.  Any infusion of transcendence into politics is interpreted as dangerous 
because it may hurt neutrality, that is, it may potentially provoke fights, and it would 
limit humble hedonism, the very legitimation of present political order.  
The conflict between political hedonism and transcendence is that the first 
measures everything only by human empirical senses and argues that anything is 
worthless or non-existing, which cannot be traced back to them.  This conflict may 
appear as the problem of relativism, because both the hedonism of democracy and 
relativism presupposes Protagoras’ humanism: “Man is the measure of all things”. 
Therefore, the intrusion of transcendental into order is experienced by many as an 
absolutist danger for democracy and welfare security.  
Political hedonism and contemporary idea of secular or neutral state involves 
the danger of a world without transcendence, i.e. a world which is closed into the 
limits of secular reason and which is without divine insight, a world where the 
perennial questions of meaning, liberty and truth may not even emerge.  The case of 
László Tıkés, the Reformed priest who started the protest against Ceausescu’s tyranny 
in Romania in 1989, shows that even the most secular people of the world may learn 
from the religious people’s epistemological dissonance, that is, truth claims. His 
strength and self-confidence came from without, he referred to his conscience. Von 
Trier’s famous movie, the Dogville, shows that a democratic community may became 
amoral and tyrannical, using moral discursive reasons, and in this case justice may 
arrive only from outside. 
Divine madness must be overcome but it never be completely lacking. The 
European political – intellectual as well as institutional – tradition cannot cope with 
this problem, there seems to be a continuous flux of violence, enforcement to secure 
peace, and truth claims. Historical achievements are fragmentary and broken. Both the 
institutional and the intellectualist approaches set aside the violence and enforcement 
used by political authority. However, neither of them can fulfill this hope. Both the 
truth claims coming from mania, and the several imperfection and contingency 
necessarily result conflicts and dilemmas. Therefore de-liberation and the concomitant 
enforcement seems to be smuggled unreflectively into the practice – irrespectively of 
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whether it is based on the idea of institutional procedures or any version of 
intellectualism – during the process of creating political unity from plurality.
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On good order: peace and conflict, immanency and transcendence 
 
The separation of religion and politics, church and state is typically discussed 
in terms of freedom. People argue for separation to secure the liberty of conscience, or 
recently the religious liberty, in general. Talking about liberty is talking about good 
order, proper arrangements of people. Thus, this talk is political, because by talking 
about liberty we reflect on human relations, patterns and their change by human will. 
But on the other hand, people perceive order and liberty or miss them by implicitly 
referring to transcendental knowledge. Therefore, good order or liberty is not simply a 
political matter, but in a sense religious, too. Important political issues are religious 
and vica versa. Of course, there are historically many answers to the problem of 
liberty and many of them are anti-political in the sense that they hope the end of 
conflicts and enforcement. These anti-political answers decided the thelogico-political 
problem of human wickedness by hoping or presupposing the sinless man and a 
coming antinomian world without enforcement (as Kant’s Kingdom of Goals or 
Rousseau’s Democracy).   
The ongoing conflict between politics and (transcendental) morality based on 
the idea that evil in man is ineffaceable, therefore “as long as there will be men, there 
will be malice, envy and hatred, and hence there cannot be a society which does not 
have to employ coercive restraint”.222  
 
History 
Starting with history of a problem is already a theoretical decision. This 
historical approach of problems presupposes not only a reaction of the Ancients 
against the Moderns, but a certain view of the human condition in which both the 
notions of the boundlessly autonomous and the plastic man are unacceptable. 
According to the first one, man may be whatever he wants; while the plastic man 
would be a kind of billiard ball impacted on by impersonal (“social” or “historical”) 
“forces” – whatever these means. Whilst the first explain everything by empirical and 
whimsical needs, the second has an elective affinity with materialism – typical in 
Darwinism and sociology –, because it explains man’s actions by his environment; 
and both notion of man refuse the liberum arbitrium and the transcendence. Focusing 
on the history of ideas and debates supposes liberum arbitrium and man who thinks 
about what he does or what he wishes. This interpretative mode of thinking is 
sensitive for the immense variety of elements and keys taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of situations and decision making, so it has an elective affinity with the 
emphasis of the complex web of culture and tradition. Therefore, this approach is a 
continuous introduction into our culture and it has a discursive coalition with 
Hermeneutics.223 Intelligent understanding, following the idea of Gestalt psychology, 
means ordering a lot of keys. What we may hope for is to be acquainted with as many 
keys, point of views, as possible and some capacity of ordering them. The view of 
human condition I’ve referred is based on the very idea of contingency (the 
consciousness of differences of contexts). It turns our attention to the epistemological 
finitude of human mind, the opaqueness of human life, the futility of the search for 
certainty and the burdens of reasoned judgement.  The anti-modernism of historical 
approach originates from the excavation of ideas, not resolved but forgotten problems 
and dilemmas of our culture (Argumentationgeschichte), without a teleological 
approach to history.  
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The Moderns sought and allegedly found a final resolution of the theologico-
political problem, which resolution would be based on Reason against Revelation, or 
immanency against transcendence. According to Leo Strauss this theologico-political 
problem is whether “men can acquire that knowledge of the good without which they 
cannot guide their lives individually or collectively by the unaided efforts of their 
natural powers, or whether they are dependent for that knowledge on Divine 
Revelation”.224 This hope was connected to a wholesale re-conception of the human 
condition. The Moderns, and typically the Modern social sciences decided this 
dilemma on behalf of immanency, so they imprisoned people in their empirical world 
from where the question of liberty or good order cannot even asked. 
 The reflection to the politically problematic potential of transcendence was 
started about Plato who was aware of the potential conflict between immanent order 
(the cave dwellers) and transcendence (the philosophy). He reflected to the 
philosophers’ dilemma: what should they do with their transcendental knowledge? 
But it was only a theoretical recognition of this dilemma, while in practice this 
dilemma came into being by Christianity. Before the Christianity, religious 
community coincided with a political one, religions were connected to an ethnic group 
or a polis. But, by Christianity the specific religious community appeared, of which 
anyone could be member apart from his origin, political loyalties or legal status. The 
only criterium for the membership in this community was to accept that Jesus was the 
Cristos. At the same time, however, Christians refused the cult of Roman gods and the 
Emperors, that is, they were disloyal to the political order. The appearance of specific 
religious community meant that the border, marker, symbols and loyalty of political 
and religious communities ceased to overlap each other. And even more, these two 
different communities might have got into conflict, since the early Christianity the 
diverging loyalty claims of religious and political authorities are continuous source of 
conflict in our culture. 
In spite of the Erastinians, the Byzantine practice and the alliance of throne and 
altar, one should see the uniqueness of this duality in Christian tradition.225 
Christianity broke apart the two aspects of community – sacerdotium and regnum –, 
and separated them.  As Panikkar wrote “In Western story the relationship between 
politics and religion has been beset by the following dilemma: either religion and 
politics are considered to be identical (Caesaro-papism, theocracy, sacrum imperium, 
and all types of totalitarianism), or else one is pitted against the other as if religion and 
politics were mutually incompatible and antagonistic forces (Church and State, sacred 
and secular, God and Caesar, and all types of liberalism)”.226  
The dilemmas and ongoing conflict between force and morality, immanence 
and transcendence, peace and justice are the backbone of Christian thinking. This 
paper is interested mainly in the epistemic relation between religion and politics rather 
than the institutional separation of church and state, and the regained relevance of 
religion227, mainly from the point of view of liberty and good oreder. 
 
Types of religiosity 
In recent works one may find at least three different modes of religiosity, apart 
from denominational or geographical differentiations. As even casual review of the 
books and articles written about the relationship between religion and politics, or 
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state, will make clear that religion described in these three different modes from the 
point of view of politics. 
 
Civil religion. One of the common subjects in sociology of religion is the 
question of the religious or quasi-religious integration of society. Since Bellah's 
studies228 on civil religion, the integrating religion has been called „civil” religion. 
Civil religion is the religion of the members of a political community when the 
political and the religious community are the same. Civil religion is a mixture of both 
religious and political meanings and symbols. In the case of civil religion, religion can 
preserve its community characteristics and relevancies in public life, but its price is 
the adaptation to politics or sometimes its instrumentalization by politics. This 
religion expresses and saves community and public identities, community border, 
motivates common actions and integrates communities. Civil religion is political 
religion because it mobilizes - overtly or covertly - for common political aims and it 
directly legitimizes the order of political community and authority. Therefore civil 
religion is connected more strongly to political institutions, attitudes, laws, 
responsibilities, duties and rights than to personal love. While civil religion means a 
kind of homogeneity, it provides a rather wide range of freedom in private matters 
because it emphasizes public expectations rather than strict personal religiousness. 
Thus, this kind of religion adapts itself to modern differentiated society. The cross is 
taken together with the flag, a nation can be the chosen people of God, the political 
community, authority, and institutions can be sacralized.  
The very expression of civil religion was created by Rousseau consciously to 
resolve the duality of religious and political communities and loyalties, and the 
disturbances coming from the infusion of transcendence into immanent order.229 The 
notion of civil religion, although it can be traced back to the classical philosophy and 
the Church Fathers, was hammered by humanist searching for minimal, common 
religion apart from denominational differences (see the utopias of the 16-17th century), 
and by politiques of the same age, who were also interested in peace and stability of 
state.  The spread and formation of this idea of „religion” can be seen as an 
intellectual effect of conflicts of Reformation.   
The Renaissance of Cicero and the stoic thinking took the word „religion” into 
the pre-modern political thinking. In „De Natura Deorum” Cicero used this word in a 
worldly context, without any reference, of course, to true faith or salvation: „with 
piety, reverence and religion must likewise disappear. And when these are gone, life 
soon becomes a welter of disorder and confusion; and in all probability the 
disappearance of piety towards the gods will entail the disappearance of loyalty and 
social union among men as well, and of justice itself, the question of all virtues”.230 It 
seems to be significant that the word „religion” entered into and was introduced by 
republican political thinking, alongside the emergence of the idea of „politics”; and 
this import originated from a highly sceptical author, Cicero, whose arguments against 
dogmas and certainty spread in the 16th century. Thus, the idea of „religion” was 
joined to a scepticist view on the possibility of certainty about truth. In the Ciceronian 
context, it was not salvation that gave divinity and piety an importance, but their 
peaceful consequences to the Roman res publica. In a fragment of De Natura Deorum 
we can find a decisive meaning of religion: „Cicero was aware that the objects of 
men’s worship were false. For after saying a number of things tending to subvert 
religion, he adds nevertheless that these matters ought not to be discussed in public, 
lest such discussion destroy the established religion of the nation”.231 
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Machiavelli in his Discourses on Livy introduced republicanism with the 
notion of „religion” to European thinking. Here, Machiavelli wrote three chapters „on 
Roman’s religion” (Chapter XI-XIII in Book I.). In this text, he used the word 
„religion” in a Ciceronian meaning, wholly from the point of view of political society: 
„religion as a thing altogether necessary if he wished to maintain a civilization 
[civilitá]”.232 ; „the religion... was among the first causes of the happiness of that city 
(Rome). For it caused good order, and good order makes good fortune, and from good 
fortune arose the happy success of enterprises. And the observance of the divine cult 
is the cause  of the greatness of republics, so the disdain for it is the cause of their 
ruin. For where the fear of God fails, it must be either that the kingdom comes to ruin 
or that it is sustained by the fear of a prince, which supplies the defects of 
religion”.233 (emphasis added)  
From its early use, the notion of „religion” had a sceptical meaning, this 
notion, significantly, was indifferent to doctrinal differences, arguments about truth. 
„Thus”, wrote Machiavelli, "the prince of a republic or a kingdom should maintain the 
foundation of the religion they hold... All things that arise in favour of that religion 
they should favour and magnify, even though they judge them false”.234 (emphasis 
added)  
The dogmatic conflicts and religious civil wars of the 16-17th centuries cast 
doubt on dogmas because of their social-political consequences. A need for peaceful 
co-existence between people of different faiths emerged. Thus, the image of 
universitas fidelium based on conscientia and dogmatic tenets slowly became worn 
out, and „religion” took its role.  The meaning of „religion” from its early day in the 
16th century meant control, and it did not refer to dogmas, but first of all to a set of 
shared, common moral rules.  
The meaning of „religion” was indifferent to the truth, because it did not refer 
to salvation. It lacked a defined content: it was simply a form of opinion, of thinking. 
„Religion” meant immanent moral rules with this-worldly consequences, and it 
bracketed the afterlife future of man. „Religion” was seen as useful from the point of 
view of the peace of political society. Besides Montaigne’s essays, this republican and 
highly sceptic meaning can be found in Bodin’s writings, who was the godfather of 
the modern notion of „state”. Indeed, Bodin’s Colloqium was not published until the 
19th century, but his other work, the Six Books of the Commonwealth was widely 
read. And it had a decisive role in the creation of our ideas about sovereignty, state, 
politics - and we can find the same use of „religion" in the Six Books as in the 
Colloqium. „Even atheists agree that nothing so tends to the preservation of 
commonwealth as religion, since it is the force that at once secures the authority of 
kings and governors, the execution of the laws, the obedience of subjects, reverence 
for the magistrates, fear of ill-doing, and knits each and all in the bonds of friendship. 
Great care must be taken that so sacred a thing should not be brought into doubt or 
contempt by dispute, for such entails ruin of the commonwealth”.235  The point of 
view of worldly, „political” peace - and its experts, the politicians - triumphed over 
the questions of truth and otherworldly salvation – and its experts, the clerics.236 
„However great superstition may be, it is more tolerable than atheism. For the one 
who is bound by some superstition is kept by this awe of the divine in a certain way 
within the bounds of duty and of the law of nature”.237  
It is important for us that the notion of „religion” was created by worldly 
people, politicians by profession, whose main interests were the peace of political 
society, control from within and without, obedience, rather than eternal truth and 
 92 
salvation. „Religion” referred to the inner-worldly consequences of fides as such - 
whatever its content might be. Machiavelli and Bodin were characteristically non-
believers.                                                                                                                   
The notion of civil religion focuses on the integrative and legitimating 
functions of religion in the political order. However, this notion of religion is always 
goes together with the interpretation of state or political community as a kind of 
church, that is, universiatas fidelium, where all members have the same more or less 
communal beliefs. „Let us walk by the same rule, let us mind the same things.” (I. 
Tim. 2.8.)  
The notion of civil religion was transported into our present thinking by 
Gallican Catholicism.238 As it is well known, the notion of civil religion originated 
from Rousseau’s On Social Contract where he stated that the in idealized pagan times 
„each State, having its own cult as well as its own government, made no distinction 
between its gods and its laws”.239  
Rousseau followed Marsillius of Padua’s240 argument, who wrote that the 
highest value was the peace, and the church and it truth claim was worthless in 
worldly affairs, if it would have break the peace of political society.241 In all cases of 
civil religion thinking, the conflict of truth-claim and peace-claim was decided on 
behalf of the last.242 
 
Private religion243 
Private religion solves the conflict between religion and politic by adapting to 
politics, as well, but its adaptation is different from that of civil religion. In this case 
religion evacuates any practices, institutions, fields of thinking claimed politics or 
economics. Both fields have been dominated increasingly by the idea that morally 
wrong and self-interested actions can result good in long run, and expertise in these 
fields means how to manipulate non-ethical desires, passions and actions. Privatized 
religion accepts the de-ethicization of politics and economics. “Religion has been 
privatized in modern societies, it is claimed, as a result of the progressive weakening 
or disappearance of the public framework of religious belief and apprehension… 
Belief has become a matter of private choice”.244 But the public – private separation 
are hardly meaningful practically and theoretically as J.S. Mill’s separation of self-
regarding actions from the other regarding ones.245 
This mode of religion emerged at least from two strings in Christian thinking: 
partly from the Christian notion of conscience as a direct and personal relation to God, 
and partly from the practical need for religious toleration of each conscience, apart 
from its content. 
 
1, The intellectualist tradition (Plato, Aristotle, Stoics) supposed that man 
always strives for good. If he does wrong, it is because of the lack of the knowledge of 
good. But already in Euripides’ plays246 the problem was formed that humans often 
know what is good, still they do not act according to their knowledge. This age 
formed the idea of conscience – syneidesis – which referred to our common 
experience: sometimes people know what is good, but their actions don’t follow it, 
therefore they shame themselves. So, against the Platonist view, the Hellenistic 
syneidesis (conscientia) supposed the duality of human soul and moral life.247 
Syneidesis was a human feeling of shame and fear produced by the knowledge that 
one`s personal action in past had been wrong. It meant the capacity to experience this 
reaction as well as to posses the knowledge that might cause it.  St. Paul imported248 
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the idea of syneidesis into Christianity and connected syneidesis to Christian faith. In 
the Patristic thinking conscience became the highest position of authority in moral 
questions. It is always sin to act against conscience (contra conscientiam agere 
peccatum).249  
Already in the Patristic thinking the problem of the universal existence of 
conscience was problematized: if each of us has conscience, how can some people be 
sinful, criminal, atheist, etc.? If each of us has conscience, how the wrong, sinful 
action is possible? The Patristic answer was that man was created with conscience, 
but in many cases it “sleeps”. Good emotion was seen as the sign of healthy, good 
conscience, whilst bad emotion as the penalty of wrong conscience. Conscience can 
direct man’s action with a deontic force via feelings: it punishes the sinful action or 
thought by bad feelings, sorrow and fear, while it rewards good action and thought by 
pleasant feelings, joy and hope. Still, the erroneous or sleeping conscience may go 
with good emotion as well. So, good emotion was seen as a sign, but not as an 
evidence of good conscience. 
The intellectualization of the meaning of consciene started by Philip de 
Chancellor who differentiated conscientia from synderesis as two distinct powers of 
human soul regarding moral problems.250 His problem was again: if each of us has 
conscience, how sin is possible? He answered to this problem by differentiating 
conscientia from synderesis and by the idea that synderesis was from God, therefore 
naturally universal and always infallible251, but conscientia was individual, and it 
might make mistakes or it might sleep. According to Aquinas’ Summa everyone has 
synderesis by nature. It was not even lost by the damned. Synderesis contains the 
eternal moral laws, so humans are born with moral knowledge which, however, was 
distorted by original sin. But original sin didn’t destroy this inborn, innate moral 
knowledge of each man.  
In this model, conscientia can be bad or make mistakes, but the synderesis 
never, because it is from God, it is humans’ inborn moral knowledge. Errors of 
conscientia may originate from the not proper order of human powers, that is, the not 
proper syllogism; and errors may originate from the defective, fallible practical reason 
(the propositio minor), which is not inborn but learnt in human life, and damaged by 
the Fall. Thus, conscientia was not interpreted as always trustworthy: because of the 
original sin human individuals cannot trust unreservedly their own conscientia. Self-
righteousness was balanced by suspicion regarding individual conscientia, by the 
reflection to the possibility of erroneous conscience.252    
Conscience`s direct relation with God was the origin of sense of individual 
dignity and confidence. As Luther said in Worms: “I cannot so otherwise, here I stand, 
may God help me. Amen.” Failing to follow the dictates of one’s own conscience was 
considered to be sinful. And this conscience was seen as the basis of Christian 
antinomian freedom: a true Christian doesn’t need laws, government, or any other 
human inventions, (that is, forum externum) because he is directed by his infallible 
forum internum connected directly to God.  
The age of casuistry, the 16-17th century popularized the idea of conscience. 
This conscience was an inner discourse reflection: “Examine yourselves whether ye be 
in the faith.” (Cor. 13.5.) The casuistry turned the attention to the intrinsic nature of 
action: motivation and situation were the important element in judging an action. The 
good conscience meant that the man had to know not only God and the Law, but his 
own motivations and situations, as well. Individual was not only responsible for not 
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violating his conscience, but he was also responsible for the formation and 
functioning his conscience.  
The casuistry, willy-nilly, had important part in individualisation of mind. 
Namely, the casuistry reflected to the problem that every situation differed from any 
others, so every situation needed a new decision and new interpretation. This idea 
from the legalistic thinking was taken into the religious thinking.253 The real question 
was then: Who might make the judgement (individual, or church, or parish 
community)? The Puritan argument for the non-churchly interpretation and judgement 
was that situations were so varying that it was everyone’s own responsibility to make 
the proper judgement.    
The plurality of conscience became value only in the English Civil War 
Puritanism.254 Earlier it was explained even by Puritans as the result of human 
fallibility and episcopacy (that is, the bad institutional context).  Milton in his On 
Divorce implied that good conscience – a sign of good Christian – can be detected by 
psychological well being, by good emotions. He argued for divorce by emphasizing 
that any one who disturbed man’s emotions and made him angry, sad or confused, 
hurt his conscience. Any molestation – from a wife or an authority, forum externum – 
was interpreted as troubling the good conscience. Because Christian ought to follow 
the order of his conscience, he also committed to defend his own good conscience. 
But only individual can decide what or who molestates his emotional well being and 
endangers his good conscience, so only he can judge others’ (i.e. a wife or a 
magistrate) claim concerning him.255  
If this „black box” kind of conscience may be the sovereign in moral 
questions, that is, its moral judgment cannot be asked from without, practically 
everyone may judge in moral questions according to his momentary desires, interests 
or passing whims. This conscience will always say what the actor wants to hear, so 
this interpretation of conscience lost its original controlling function. This modern 
conscience fused with will, it become arbitrary, that is, the very opposite of its original 
meaning. The idea of conscience was turned from a shield into a sword during the 
modernization. 
 
2,  
The story of the religious toleration, an important element in the identity of 
present Western political order, is rather well known and immense academic indiustry 
is built around it.256 The contemporary political and social theory prefers explaining 
private religion as a result of compartmentalization of society, that is, allegedly 
autonomous spheres, mainly politics and economy, have emerged during the 
evolutionary history of modernization, which spheres would be the clear reign of 
power and technical rationality. These two spheres and practices in them have been 
seen as par excellence secular and free from any intrusion of transcendence. But this 
argument for privatization of religion put aside the totalizing character of religion. 
The old conflict of sacerdotium and regnum was redefined as the private and 
free sphere of faith and the public sphere of pure force (politics).257 The idea of 
toleration emerged side by side the notion of politics as a sphere might exist without 
consensus and ancient virtues, most in evidently in Machiavelli’s The Prince and 
Hobbes’ Leviathan. In case of Bodin or Hobbes one may see clearly that the main 
argument for tolerance is the reason of state: intolerance may induce revolts: 
„disjunction of temporal and spiritual domains was already being advocated as a 
technique for strengthening the sway of secular rulers over nonreligious matters. 
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Privatization of religious disputes or the withdrawal of public officials from 
theological controversies was acclaimed a sovereignty-enhancing.… the cause of 
religious toleration succeeded chiefly because it proved advantageous to power-
wielders, humane respect for rights of conscience providing little more than a figleaf 
of morality for an otherwise self-interested policy”.258 Until the liberalism, tolerance 
was not seen as moral value, but as functional for the reason of state. The emergence 
of politics as a secular sphere and the de-politicization of religion, that is, the 
limitation of transcendence was the result of several fights. Tolerance and the 
sovereignty emerged as the alternative of endless civil wars originating from endless 
and undecided truth claims.  
 In the Colloqium heptaploromes, that is, Colloqium of the Seven about the 
Secrets of the Sublime, Bodin’s main interest was how the harmony of the state could 
exist together with a variety of different opinions about human and divine affairs. 
„Nothing is more destructive in a state than for citizens to be split into two factions, 
whether the conflict is about laws, honours, or religion”.259 In Bodin’s France almost 
everyone was at odds and angry with one another, and one of his basic axioms was 
that a pest more dangerous than civil discord could not arise. „A change in religion 
has more dangerous consequences, namely upheaval in public affairs, destructive 
wars, even more calamities from plagues and torments of demons”.260 We can read 
practically the same sentences in the Six Books, where they refer to the political 
wisdom of pagan antique „states” and also to the practice of the Turks.261  Because we 
cannot decide which religion is true, „it is safer to admit all religions than to choose 
one from many”.262 It is clear that, in a sceptical way, „religion” meant a form without 
any reference to its substance: „I am not concerned here with what form of religion is 
the best”.263  
Bodin’s conclusion was that ambiguity in matters of faith cannot be removed, 
and as these debates cannot be decided by reasoning or argument, it is laudable to 
abstain from discussions of divine matters. From these two premises he concluded 
that the state should be tolerant, indifferent in the affairs of divinity.  „Since”, Bodin 
writes, „the leaders of religions and the priests… have had so many conflicts among 
themselves that no one could decide which is true among all the religion, is it not 
better to admit publicly all religions of all peoples in the state, as in the kingdom of 
the Turks and Persians, rather than to exclude one? For if we seek the reason why the 
Greeks, Latins, and barbarians formerly had no controversy about religion, we will 
find no other cause, I think, than a concord and harmony of all in all religions”.264  
Hobbes regarded politics of conscience, that is, the reference to transcendence 
as deadly seditious to political order.265 Politicians, the experts of this worldly order, 
transcendence was ambiguous, something that may be useful as well as dangerous. 
Sovereignty didn’t interfere into conscience only if it abstains from interfering into 
matters of order. It also means that politics, that is, order doesn’t represent the 
citizens’ thinking, who live in it, and this order can and should hold free from 
transcendence. The limitation of conscience to “private” matters was the price what it 
should pay for its unmolested freedom from authorities.266 
 
Prophetic religion.  
If privatized religion is characterized as irrelevant in public life, civil religion 
can be described as corrupt, because the search for relevance resulted adaptation to the 
worldly affairs. Prophetic religion is a third mode, it is relevant but not adapted to this 
world. Instead, it aims to change it, it has some deontic force coming from the 
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transcendental. This mode of religion can easily be detected because of the conflicts 
follows from it. “I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I if it be already 
kindled?” (Luke 12, 49) Any normative criticism of amoral politics – recent neutral 
states – refuses those ordering of values, which would exclude values from public 
life.267  
The invasion of transcendence – whether it is called sacred / charisma / 
sublime / religion / conscience – into human life can carry different consequences. In 
the civil religion thinking people tended to reflect to the legitimating and integrating 
effects of religion, but it should be clear that it may have revolutionary effects, too. 
The power of resistance and transformation coming from religion or transcendence 
connected to meaning and truth claims is a continuous dilemma of the European-
Christian tradition. How can false prophets or the second becaming be detected? Or, 
because of this epistemeological problem, is it worth keeping transcendence at bay? 
Or, can the attempt to achieve the total fusion of faith (truth claim) and a certain 
society be dangerous? 
Probably, politics tended to limit the public relevance of religion because of its 
unforeseen consequences. In the case of its limited relevance, its subversive effects 
can also be restricted. And as the politics tends to control more and more its 
environment to reduce any disturbing or unforeseen influences, and this situation is 
called as social security, transcendence is pushed back from public life. Still, I have to 
emphasize that prophetic religion is not simply public268, it refers to individual 
morality, too, because political order is also a way of life, and anything questioning 
the dominant way of life has public relevancies.   
Defender of political or immanent order may refuse this kind of religiousity, 
let it be neutral state or tolerant democracy. One may easily find many people today 
refusing prophetic religion in the name of freedom of conscience, or peace and 
harmony, and tolerance or economic progress.269  
Prophetic religion, a critical infusion of transcendence into empirical order is 
not rare in religious literature, the Bible is only an example for it. Still, modern social 
and political thinking is rarely reflected to it. Probably Max Weber’s works one of the 
best examples for the interpretation of prophetic religion. In his The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism270 he described the ethic of vocation and this-worldly 
ascetism which deeply and radically changed the believers’ everyday life. His – 
probably – most important question was: how can it be? In general, Weber was 
interested in the changing effects of religion – writing about charisma and sacred he 
focused on it, not to its integrative or order maintaining effects –, but is was clear for 
him that the first condition, what religion has to meet in order to change the world 
around it, is to differ from the existing way of life and order. My point here is that in 
Weber’s thinking it is clear that not adapted religion can change its environment. 
Search for relevance doesn’t need necessarily accommodation, but criticizing or 
prophetic religion can be relevant as well. And this mode of religion, transcendental 
knowledge may change the empirical world. The Protestant ethic prescribed a life 
style and attitude wholly different from the late-Renaissance or Mediaeval traditional 
ones. The same interpretation of the critical, therefore potentially changing, nature of 
religion is the backbone of his historical sketch of the rationalization process in the 
West. As one may read in his Economy and Society271, the rationalization process 
originated from religious needs, like resentment, theodicy and search for religious 
experience. 
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As the history of the notion of the other two modes of religion shows, the 
fundamental purpose of political – at least, discursive – control of religion has been 
being to prevent sedition or conflicts. If each man can claim – as it happened to the 
case of rhetoric of conscience – direct relation to transcendent justice and can criticize 
the order around him, the empirical order and its peace may collapse. Referring to 
conscience’s claims and freedom may justify heroic actions, but everyday life cannot 
go without boundaries; the transgression by each must result the collapse of any 
borders and selections. The wisdom concerning this potentiality – Nemo iudex in 
causa sua – can be learnt from Aristotle272 or from Old Testament.273 Therefore, from 
very practical reasons of empirical order, people have reflected to the problems might 
emerge from each man’s claim to have direct relations to God or eternal truth. The far 
from perfect solution was the religious community, the intersubjective character of 
religion.  
The idea of conscience originated from the Hellenistic syneidesis, and its Latin 
version, the conscientia received the meaning of an inner secret of an individual in St. 
Jerome. But, originally conscientia meant knowledge shared with others. “Con” or 
“Syn” means “with”. The original meaning of conscientia was the shared aspect of 
knowledge. Of course, intersubjectivity, shared practice domesticates prophetic 
religion, it takes away its edge and tension toward the empirical world. A religious 
community, church, is intersubjective relations of contemporaries, relation of living to 
the dead generations, therefore it is not the secular „public use of reason”.274 
Practically, there is no epistemical, only this social dike keeping the potential dangers 
of transcendental truth claims at bay.  
 
Transcendence and political hedonism 
The conflict of religious and political community (sacerdotium – regnum) after 
the crisis of Reformation was decided on behalf of the last. “The essential principle 
claimed by each state was sovereignty, a quality previously attributed to God… The 
modern sovereign right of kings did justify king’s unlimited power. Each state denied 
that any other institutions were above it. The Reason of State… was not to be 
challenged by the mystery of the church”.275 The irrelevance of transcendence was 
forced by political decisions, and the political history of the Christian countries deeply 
influenced the religiosity in these countries.276 It supposes that the institutional 
framework, that is, the arrangements of order can affect religious life and knowledge. 
In the following section I describe the rather unique epistemic situation of 
transcendence in mass democrarcy, with special reference to post-socialism. 
The modern mass democracy created a strange form of individualism on mass 
scale: mass individualism combined the radical human rights thinking with market 
liberalism. Whilst the first emphasizes rights without duties, the last spread the view 
that anything can be solved by human choices. Basically both thinking flatter to mass 
individuals: there is no bad choice, one has the rights to do whatever he wants.  
Egalitarian democracy is often criticized because of its relativism, and mass 
individuals are frustrated because they value foremost his difference from the others, 
but nothing is worth differing, nothing is better than anything else. They may choose, 
but they may not choose well. Even making a value judgement is seen as moral 
failure, and neutrality or tolerance are the most preferred virtues. There is no wrong 
choice or life-style, and anything make them upset what makes them remember for 
their conscience or the morally good. Today, anti-clericalism cannot be explained by 
the authoritative activity of churches, from this point of view it is most important that 
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even the existence of churches makes mass individuals remembering for right and 
wrong.  
The frustrated and angry mass individuals self-confident, still they claim 
security by the state, in practice, they claim a guaranteed life-style. It means that the 
main task of the state today is the elimination of the unpleasant results of the wrong 
choices of mass individuals. The political hedonism would build political order on the 
satisfaction of human desires, and it can call itself tolerant, because formally it accepts 
any claim and labels any moral as oppressive, which would limit these desires and 
wishes. Neutrality is able to get relativism and hedonism dominance by expelling all 
morals from public life, which would limit desires. 
The present situation is usually called tyranny by its critics. Even the notion of 
tyranny – the traditional name for wrong political regime combined with wrong life-
style – presupposes some transcendental idea of good and bad, right and wrong. 
Without it one hardly state that the present political regime in not the best available.   
The mass individualism does not make judgements, does not value actions, it 
is proud of this alleged neutrality and tolerance. Actually, it thinks amorality the 
highest level of morality, where there is no good or bad, thus there is no bad decision 
or way of life. Those bold persons or institutions which warn, even unintentionally, 
mass individualist people for good, evoke anger and fury from them. Tthis anger one 
source of the keen reaction against any intrusion of transcendence into the empirical 
world. (The other source, as I’ve mentioned above, transcendence may upset this-
worldly order, so today this intrusion means the loss of security of well-being.)  
The present mass individualism, and mainly its post-communist version, 
acknowledges only empirical desires and power to efficiently satisfy them. As Pope 
Benedict XVI wrote277:  
“The essential problem of our times, for European and for the world, is that 
although the fallacy of the Communist economy has been recognized, its moral abd 
religious fallacy has not been addressed.” 
The source of present statism is the claim of mass individuals for guaranteed 
life style. The secularized state, without any transcendental truth claim, can get loyalty 
only by the promise of an universal association supporting anyone’s rights to satisfy 
whimsical desires. Besides this task, the only serious task of present political order to 
keep those views and beliefs far from people, which may challenge these rights or the 
relations of existing order. The leading art of politics in our age is opinion and attitude 
fabrication on mass scale and to keep the potentially dangerous view at bay by 
criminalizing them as hate speech, radical, trouble-maker or something like this. Only 
those views are serous and considerable, which stay in the context of presuppositions 
of this order and refer only to technical details how to improve it. Order based on 
political hedonism seems to be tolerant, because it accepts any human empirical 
desires. But it is intolerant concerning moral beliefs referring some transcendental 
meaning.  Not plurality is new in modernity, but the dominant secular thinking. 
Today, mainstream thinking identifies democracy with liberty and good order. 
The history of the notion of democracy shows us that before Rousseau it had a 
definitely bad meaning, only Rousseau idealized it in his On Social Contract. When 
someone talks today about the relation of religion and politics he refers implicitly to 
present democracy. And today’s democracy seems to be far from force or any kind of 
“hard” politics. Present democracy, people believe, can satisfy diverse needs, and, 
really, it renders easily all contending beliefs inoffensive or ridiculous. In modern 
democracy, on general, and in post-communism, in particular, the only legitimate 
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public belief is egoism and the private pursuit of economic well-being. The dominant 
political hedonism claims productivist or welfare state, and makes all ideas 
unattractive and unpopular, unless they appeal to economic interests. Its strength is 
not in its forced liberal ideal, but rather in its renunciation of all ideals, apart from 
empirical individual well being. By means of an apolitical economical and social 
policy, democracy created a consumer culture as Tocqueville foreseen some 
generations ago. Maybe, the “dictatorship of well-being” seems to be overstatement, 
but from Roman historians to de la Boetie278 and Montesquieu279 tyranny was 
connected to the well-being.280 Therefore, the present well-being is not necessarily a 
sign of good order. The republican tradition warns us that not only coercion, physical 
force and censorship may be used by wrong order. There are angel faced evils, too. 
The quest for perfect society, providing well being and missing conflicts, has resulted 
apathetic citizens who are seems to be intolerant of any belief which could disturb or 
limit their empirical satisfactions.  
Democracy overtly worships the limitless in science, arts and economy, and it 
hopes opening undreamt opportunities by technically rational knowledge which 
allegedly would liberate men by helping them in controlling their environment and the 
consequences of their actions. And, although, democracy allows chaos in everyday 
life, as we can read in Plato, it is rather often seen as closed immanent and 
meaningless world. Democracy is proudly open to all kinds of technological, 
economic and sexual „revolutions”, but opposes anything that would question its 
apolitical status quo. 
The intrusion of transcendence is rather often named as madness (mania) 
because of its influences. Plato in his Phaedrus gives us a taxonomy281 of god-given 
mania (Phaedrus 244a – 249e), and mania is often opposed to reason. Since Plato the 
phenomenon of enthusiasts – those who possessed by God – is a continuous subject of 
reflection. In Plato’s description the man possessed by God is thought mad because he 
do not concern this-worldly affairs and behaves and thinks unconventionally. The 
maniac, the enthusiasts steps somehow out from the context of the taken for granted 
order. Still, in case of Plato, this man is able to escape into the world of ideas. His 
dialogue on poetic and philosophic inspiration points to claim that people are able and 
have to go beyond discursive reason, they can transcend it.  
But also from Plato onward, our tradition is full of complain about the 
allegedly divine inspiration which stirs up emotions, morality, human order. Talking 
about transcendental (prophetic aspect of religion) is partly the problem of order and 
non-technical, non-rational innovation. However, in the Greek thinking one may also 
find the mad Gorgon, transgressing the accepted norms, an unspeakable, unthinkable 
and the chaos itself. Crossing boundary can be interpreted both as the liberation from 
the yoke of conventional order and as the danger of chaos.  
Ambiguity of crossing the boundaries is a characteristic dilemma of our 
tradition. It may have liberating as well as chaotic effects. Keeping some order is basic 
aim of politics, therefore the transcendence is often perceived as a potential danger 
which should be domesticated somehow. Because of the obvious danger of the 
transcendence, political thinkers and actors tended to keep it somehow at bay. The 
notions of civil and private religion are two characteristic attempts for it. It seems to 
me that moderns have preferred the last solution, the keeping away transcendence 
from public affairs, which project has been called commonly as the secularized 
politics. 
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The practice of political control of transcendence as old as the tension between 
politics and religion, but its probably first theoretical formulation emerged only as a 
side effect of Investiture Wars by Marsilius of Padua. The attitudes of political 
thinkers towards religion can be well characterized by the famous front page of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan, where the two types of weapon that the state uses are symbolised. 
On the one side, there are the instruments of force (swords, guns, battle flags etc); on 
the other the symbols of ideas and religion. In sake of peace, state must use and 
control both. As one may see in both case of Marsillius and Hobbes, their main 
arguments was peace, and as it is often quoted from Hobbes, non veritas facit legem.  
Transcendence intrudes human life by references some eternal meaning called 
justice since Plato. Of course, in Platonic and Augustinian imagination peace and 
justice/truth were combined. In their case peace meant not only the lack of conflict, 
but internal, psychic and mental satisfaction, too. The peace arguments of later 
political theorists, up to our recent defenders of neutral state,282 interpret peace 
without this transcendental relevance, only as the lack of conflicts and fights. 
One may find references in the Platonic thinking to the very political, this-
worldly dangers coming from the loss of transcendental measures of humans and their 
relations. As I’ve quoted above, St. Augustine asks from those who insist on the 
immanency of political order: “remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gang of 
criminals on a large scale?”283 Without transcendental measures – like truth, justice, 
liberty, etc. -, how would people be able to realize whether their order is good or not?  
Inglehart and Norris in their recent Sacred and secular284 have explained 
secularization by welfare state’s security. The idea, that the order perceived as perfect 
and waterproof is inimical285 to transcendence, can be read in Huxley’s Brave New 
World where people are blind to Shakespeare’s tragedy, but people are free in terms of 
sexual promiscuity. In the immanence of paradise now there is a recent anxiety about 
the loss of meaning, i.e. the loss of truth claim in a world where sensations and animal 
pleasures alone are worth living for; and anything transcendental – as justice, beauty, 
meaning, etc. – is put aside because of its potential conflictual and empirically non 
verifiable character.286 Any infusion of transcendence into politics is interpreted as 
dangerous because it may hurt neutrality, that is, it may potentially provoke fights, and 
it would limit hedonism, the very legitimation of present order.  
The conflict between political hedonism and transcendence is that the first, 
often called secular humanism, measures everything only by human empirical senses 
and argues that anything is worthless or non-existing, which cannot be traced back to 
them.287 This conflict may appear as the problem of relativism, because both the 
hedonism of democracy and relativism presupposes Protagoras’ humanism: “Man is 
the measure of all things”. Therefore, intrusion of transcendental into the present order 
experienced by many as an absolutist danger for democracy and welfare security.  
Charels Taylor, referring to experience society (Erlebnisgesellchaft) where 
indivuduals are for immanent emotive experiences, argues that here a new kind of 
religiousity has emerged, characteristically spirituality without transcendence.288 That 
is, this spirituality – without any conflicts with the existing order – focusing on 
individuals’ immediate emotive experiences without deontic force and the 
transforming potential of transcendence.  
The present dissidents are called traditionalists, fundamentalists, people who 
refuse hedonism and secularism, and who refuse founding order only to empirical 
desires. These dangerous people refer to justice. Because the legitimation of present 
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order is based on the satisfaction of empirical desires, those who refer to a higher 
authority than individuals, are seen as antidemocratic or worse. 
I guess, mainly in post-socialist countries like mine, one can more sensitive to 
the lack of transcendental criticism. Although, the recent dominant theme probably the 
dangers of „religious fundamentalism” for peace and democracy, I’ve tried to depict 
the conditions of political hedonism – pigs’ republic, as Plato called it –, the danger of 
a world without transcendence, i.e. a world which is closed into the limits of secular 
reason and which is without divine insight, a world where the perennial questions of 
meaning, liberty and truth may not even emerge.289 The case of László Tıkés, the 
Reformed priest who started the protest against Ceausescu’s tyranny in Romania in 
1989, shows that even the most secular people of the world may learn from the 
religious people’s epistemological dissonance.  
As it is well known the first mention of the wall of separation of church and 
state can be found in Thomas Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 
1802. In spite of its long history, the separation debates have been typical in the US 
public life mainly during the second half the 20th century. These debates shows clearly 
the political nature of this issue. Separation, even if it is desirable for the sake of 
liberty, cannot be a demonstrative rational act: the terms like church, state, politics 
and religion need always interpretation involving judgments, and separation in 
practice needs arbitration. For example, religious education290 can be or not in public 
schools? Even if someone accepts the idea of separation, why would the prohibition of 
religious education in public schools hurt the principle of separation? The expansion 
of state during the 20th century pushed back religion into the so-called private life, and 
separation meant more and more separation from social life in general. The wall of 
separation seems to be impermeable only from one direction: religion shouldn’t be 
public, but state or public issues may invade into the so-called private spheres, like 
education or thinking.  
Present liberal democracy contains two different traditions from the point of 
view of separation. Firstly, for the äufklarist thinking - which is for a secular and 
neutral state, and would not allow any role for religion in public life - religious 
arguments are definitely forbidden in politics as a potential source of conflicts and as 
the archaic relics of pre-modern world. It also means that religion is private matter and 
no state agency may ask it. Therefore this view can be sold as tolerant, but is for a 
narrow secular notion of pluralism.  The other tradition relevant for our topic 
interprets politics as a field of several competing interests apart from their origins. 
Following this thinking religious groups and interests are naturally are parts of 
politics, just like trade-unions or any other pressure groups, and religious arguments 
are as legitimate in politics as anything else. 
 
On good order  
What we may hope is a quest for an understanding of our fundamental 
problems, dilemmas without the quest for determinate solutions which may fall into 
dogmatism. Interprerative human sciences can never hope or promise certainty, only a 
limited plausiblity; it may never hope exhaustive and comprehensive knowledge of 
situations and human motives. One reason of our unceratinty is that people know 
always more than they are able to tell.  
Against the Marxist or Machiavellian heritage which emphasizes that only 
force exists, our thinking on good order based on the presupposition that man is moral 
being: he has moral claims concerning himself and his relations. Therefore, his actions 
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do not simply come from the feel and satisfaction of his empirical desires. Acting 
presupposes some sense of good and bad, some notion of good order and good life. 
However, one may find that the reference to justice makes conflict, because everyone 
sees justice on his own side.291 Because of these conflicts coming from the debates 
about justice, some people expect us to give up the idea of good order. But in the 
world of relativism only the force and manipulation, the Leninist or Machiavellian 
politics may stand. The perception of order is a unique power of human mind, and it 
cannot be explained empirically. 
The tragic sense – I’ve referred above – is that evil or sin cannot be eliminated 
from this world. But how can we know the good? Not values, but valuing is important 
– making some order by means of hierarchy and differences.  
Learning and experiences may teach man a lot of knowledge, but not 
everything. The knowledge cannot be derived from immanent world is called 
transcendence. Man is transcendental simply because he is able to perceive something 
else than himself and impressions from his senses. He perceives something which may 
limit him and, at the same time, may liberate him his immanent, empirical world. Man 
is transcendental because hi is able to step out from his experiences and to get a 
context in which the experience is meaningful. Therefore, he is able to perceive God 
and to look for meaning. As Heidegger puts, interpretation of situations (or a text) 
involves fore-conceptions, fore-structure. One may understand the first letters of a 
sentence by fore-having the meaning of the whole sentence.292  
Let’s imagine a drawing: each line is wholly meaningless, they seem to be 
whimsically long or short. But if someone is able to look at the drawing from proper 
distance, he’ll realize the meaning of the drawing, probably a face. At this point, he’ll 
be able to perceive the meaning and significance of each line of the drawing, he’ll be 
able to judge each line. What seemed to be earlier whimsical, now gets meaning. 
Perceiving the meaning one perceives the order.  
The moral claim of man can be caught in terms of order and chaos: “for what 
is most important to meet with among men is not any given ordering, but order.”293 
Perceiving order is the sign of human mind, and making order is a continuous effort of 
human actions: he is “the only animal that has a feeling for order, for propriety, for 
moderation in word and deed.”294 
Traditionally, meaning and order are connected, just like meaninglessness and 
disorder. Without order “no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no 
arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of 
violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”.295 The 
tragic view of the fin de siécle contained both the sense of meaninglessness and chaos. 
(See Nietzsche, Max Weber) Chaos is something bad, and the notions of sin and evil 
connected to it. The human arts – like practices, languages, laws and political societies 
– emerged to reduce chaos.  
The idea of good order is interpreted by many as a kind of utopianism or 
perfectionism296 because of the immense influence of Plat’s Republic and Theaetetus. 
Later on, in the modernity the good order took after the mechanism and it was 
connected to scientism. But generally, the idea of good order is connected to peace, 
harmony, the lack of force and sin, a kind of anomic freedom297, geometrical clarity, 
often to rationality, and more and more to hedonism.   
The notion of good order, I describe here, start with man as we can know him, 
and not from a possible man of future. Instead of Rousseau’s method298 – who wrote: 
“Let us begin therefore, by laying aside facts, for they do not affect the question.” – I 
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would travel with Aristotle who teaches us in the Nicomachean Ethics that let’s take 
man as we find him. Because our dilemmas and problems coming from man’s 
epistemical and moral fallibility, and from plurality, contingency and opaque character 
of situations cannot be resolved – at least up to now –, our expectation concerning 
good order should be take into consideration this conditio humana. For man, the good 
life or good order is not a waterproof solution for anything.299 The notion of good 
order is not necessarily related to perfection. 
The perception of order is being at home in a situation. Being at home is 
simply to know the probable conditions and consequences. But in most situations, one 
may know only some elements of his situation and the reaction of the other may 
always be astonishing. As Georg Simmel wrote about knowing and not knowing the 
consequences of our actions: “We are all alike the chess player in this regard. If he did 
not know, to a certain extant, what the consequences of a certain move would be, the 
game would be impossible; but it would also be impossible if this foresight extended 
indefinitely”.300 Human efforts seeks to limit this contingencies by creating practices, 
institutions, i.e. some order, but in this respect there is no progress – order may always 
fall back into chaos, civilization into barbarism. 
Uncertainty involves irresponsibility: one cannot responsible for the 
unforeseen consequences of his action. Responsibility, that is, our moral character 
supposes a more or less ordered world, where there are probable consequences. But in 
politics, in the world of force and conflicts consequences are far from logical, 
demonstrated conclusions or certainty. The case of blind Teiresias301, the seer or 
Montesquieu’s story302 on the blind who knows much better his world as the others, 
show us that the meaningful and known world is not equal with a rational-mechanical 
one which is based on clear and demonstrated principles. The sense of lost order and 
the search for order, security and certainty, so characteristic during the last centuries, 
have resulted several efforts to build systems, in theory or in practice, where any 
consequences can be foreseen. In a system, certain and safe people would be liberated 
from the pressure of choice and the tragic anxiety, that we are responsible for our 
actions in a world where results are rather doubtful. Of course, this tragic sense is less 
characteristic in everyday life, but typical in case of politics. 
Good order seems to emerge by chances, “progress is achieved in zigzags, by 
constant readiness to readjust to reality. A straight line is the longest distance between 
two points. And the bloodiest”.303 As one may read in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, 
people of the age of scepticism during the 16-17th century were still aware of that 
reason does not walk in a straight line to truth.304 Usually, people realize it only after 
its disappearance: “the owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night 
are gathering”.305  
The notion of good order, I’m for, presupposes the imperfect human condition 
I’ve described, the world of conflicts, not resolved dilemmas and demand for decision, 
that is, liberty. Imperfection comes from immanency as human fallibility, contingency, 
plurality – resulting the conflicting nature and complexity of evidences, differences 
about weighting of considerations – the vagueness of concepts, borderline cases, etc.; 
but also from the tension between transcendental and immanency.  
Any hope for a perfect solution for our problems and dilemmas, a hope for the 
eternal kingdom or the end of history would eliminate liberum arbitrium, that is, 
decision. Liberum arbitrium involves change – liberty in a perfect world may lead us 
only into imperfection, and who on earth would be so crazy changing for the worse. 
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Liberty presupposes that world still can be improved. 306 The price what man has to 
pay for liberty is conflicts and authority.  
The usual perfectionist solution for dilemmas is finding „one very simple 
principle” – let’s say, for the separation of state and church, politics and religion –, as 
J.S. Mill called in his On Liberty.307 This so-called „geometrical method” supposes 
that actions are logical deductions from principle without the burden of judgement of 
practical reason, and that dilemmas can be easily solved by means of separating 
principles. Lovejoy called these people „espirit simplistes”308, following 
Burckhardt.309 famous phrase of "terribles simplificateurs”. The claim of finding one 
simple principle for separation is a claim for solving dilemmas once for all, supposing 
that one is able to achieve perfection and no serious exceptions cannot be in the 
future. This basically rationalist habit of mind is not only arrogant but seems to me 
self-revealing. Our culture and the freedom achieved in it contains numberless not 
resolved dilemmas, like religious community vs. political one, truth and morality vs. 
force, criticism vs. humility, etc. But, I tend to think that the solutions for these 
dilemmas are not only out of the capacity of human mind, but these resolutions are 
undesirable, maybe, because the eternal contradiction is the father of things.310 
Although, the present public thinking is dominated by fundamentalist rationalists, who 
hope to find the eternal solution for the dilemma between religion and politics, 
transcendence and immanency, or post-moderns (Leninists or Machiavellians) who 
tend to think of world only in terms of power and force, I would propose a different 
approach. The good order was not a result of principles but of ongoing debates, and it 
contains debates about truth claims that transcend the play of majorities or power 
relations. Reaching the limits of normative political theory, instead of the hubristic 
hope to find waterproof solution for arrangements of religion and politics, I suggest 
disposing the weight of our arguments so as to find propriety311 and, mainly in my 
post-communist context, emphasizing the semantic and motivating potential of 
religion. My argument does not not simply follows the sceptics’ a priori arguments 
about radical uncertainty, because in any dispute both sides are equally likely and no 
statement is more true than its denial. Although, I’m tend to enjoy this argument 
concerning the rationally defined limits of rationality, in this paper I’d refer to a 
posteriori arguments. Namely, historically one may find severals cases where people 
decided on one side of this dilemma, and later they realized the probability and 
significance of the other side of this dilemma. In practice, people may not suspend 
judgement even in hard cases, but as we may see, later on – earlier or later –, they 
turned on the opposite direction for a while.   
What Western civilization has achieved and may hope to achieve is an 
unsteady balance of transcendental truth claims and normative expectations and 
immanent order.  
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Conclusion 
Michael Oakeshott’s work is a subtle and unformulaic negotiation of freedom 
and tradition; “skepticism” and confidence in the resources of the Western tradition; 
conservatism and the celebration of the present. Nor he, neither his actors are always 
engaged in an “irritable search for order”?312 He could accept confusion and he 
thought that one task of political and moral thinking is to make the people able and 
enjoy the chaotic world as it is. 
     One aspect of this issue is Oakeshott’s relation to modernism on the one 
hand, and postmodernism on the other. “Modernism” here refers to the family of 
views which accord epistemic and often metaphysical supremacy or sovereignty, to 
the natural sciences, and either absorb or eliminate other voices as well.  Post-
moderns reject the sovereignty of the sciences on the grounds that every voice, 
including science, is constructed and therefore arbitrary. This (self-refuting) 
unmasking is often followed by a call to restructure institutions, including even 
language, along egalitarian lines. Postmodernism often claims to celebrate pluralism 
or diversity, while giving voice only to the practical. Whilst one may see common 
points in the pre-modern and post-modern thinking, there are obvious differences, as 
well. One of them, at least in case of Oakeshott is rule of law and the role of authority. 
Modernism in politics means the continuous effort to transform politics from the 
maintenance of traditional arrangements into a managerial science that conducts an 
ongoing struggle—often accelerated in wartime, often called war--against whatever 
presents itself as social imperfection,313 and aiming an utopical, harmonious end state 
by means of re-education or managerial manipulation of people, based on hedonistic 
calculus.314 Rationalism is identified by many as the political and moral epistemology 
of moderns, and typically, the political conflicts of modernity are connected to 
epistemological debates, too. They cannot “touch anything, without transforming it 
into an abstraction; [they] can never get a square meal of experience. 315 
Oakeshott was ambiguous concerning modernity, because he was both in 
modernity and against it, he realized the ambivalences within modernity, but he also 
was keen to avoid the modernist seduction of utopical hope (“end of history or 
Kingdom Come”). Modernity is inwardly divided against itself yet paradoxically 
united, balanced by means of this polarity.  The modernist failing is to surrender to the 
temptation of the extremes; its challenge is to keep the polarity and not to attempt to 
resolve it. The core of human condition is a fusion of opposites, as Carl Schmitt 
described the Roman Catholic Church. A venerable history of political thought has 
tried to reduce this incongruous complex in modern order to the rationalism of a 
single principle, a single explanation, a unifying structure or pattern of authority, but 
there is little evidence or conviction that it has been successful. To the contrary, we 
are left with the suspicion that not only the modern order rests on a contradiction that 
the theoreticians will never untangle, but that that is the very secret of its success, as 
well as the sign of its mortality.   
To realize this paradox of order defines the conservative thinker.  The 
dilemmas of politics are ultimately dilemmas in the human condition, eternal in both. 
Political rationalism may work only in regimes that are without internal 
polarity and plurality have  become privatized or superficial. Oakeshott refused a 
theoretical optimism of, for example, progress as a solution for everything. A balance 
of polarity, or antagonism, is dynamical and is can be seen only in history but rarely in 
action. As his peer, Hannah Arendt put it: Western political tradition since Plato has 
attempted not to comprehend the political, but to escape from politics altogether.316 
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“Ambiguity is a mark of the richness of our culture, its dynamism, and the 
danger is those who would kill it by the muscular enforcement of a single “voice” or a 
single idiom in a voice.  It corresponds, on the practical level, to ambivalence, of the 
conflict of practices and pursuits, as in the two contrary “styles” of politics (faith and 
skepticism, or later, enterprise state and civil association).” 
Oakeshott did not seek to resolve these contrarities. The completeness of being 
cannot be achieved in one mode (voice), but it contains practice, religion, poetry and 
philosophy. The notions of tradition, language, practice, self-enactment, self-
disclosure, conversation, voices, idioms, understanding (as opposed to explanation), 
sensibility, and so forth—characteristic terms of Oakeshott’s thought—all belong to 
what one might call the aesthetic quality of culture.  He followed the linguistic and 
hermeneutic turn of his age as well as the transcendental turn. 
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